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ABSTRACT 
 
 
ORCUN TEMIZKAN. Essays on exploitation and exploration in software 
development (Under direction of DR. RAM KUMAR) 
 
 
Software development includes two types of activities: software improvement 
activities by correcting faults and software enhancement activities by adding new 
features. Based on organizational theory, we propose that these activities can be classified 
as implementation-oriented (exploitation) and innovation-oriented (exploration). In the 
context of open source software (OSS) development, developing a patch would be an 
example of an exploitation activity. Requesting a new software feature would be an 
example of an exploration activity. This dissertation consists of three essays which 
examine exploitation and exploration in software development. 
The first essay analyzes software patch development (exploitation) in the context 
of software vulnerabilities which could be exploited by hackers. There is a need for 
software vendors to make software patches available in a timely manner for 
vulnerabilities in their products. We develop a survival analysis model of the patch 
release behavior of software vendors based on a cost-based framework of software 
vendors. We test this model using a data set compiled from the National Vulnerability 
Database (NVD), United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), and 
vendor web sites. Our results indicate that vulnerabilities with high confidentiality impact 
or high integrity impact are patched faster than vulnerabilities with high availability 
impact. Interesting differences in the patch release behavior of software vendors based on 
software type (new release vs. update) and type of vendor (open source vs. proprietary) 
are found. 
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The second essay studies exploitation and exploration in the content of OSS 
development. We empirically examine the differences between exploitation (patch 
development) and exploration (feature request) networks of developers in OSS projects in 
terms of their social network structure, using a data set collected from the SourceForge 
database. We identify a new category of developers (ambidextrous developers) in OSS 
projects who contribute to patch development as well as feature request activities. Our 
results indicate that a patch development network has greater internal cohesion and 
network centrality than a feature request network. In contrast, a feature request network 
has greater external connectivity than a patch development network. 
The third essay explores ambidexterity and ambidextrous developers in the 
context of OSS project performance. Recent research on OSS development has studied 
the social network structure of software developers as a determinant of project success. 
However, this stream of research has focused on the project level, and has not recognized 
the fact that software projects could consist of different types of activities, each of which 
could require different types of expertise and network structures. We develop a 
theoretical construct for ambidexterity based on the concept of ambidextrous developers. 
We empirically illustrate the effects of ambidexterity and network characteristics on OSS 
project performance. Our results indicate that a moderate level of ambidexterity, external 
cohesion, and technological diversity are desirable for project success. Project success is 
also positively related to internal cohesion and network centrality. We illustrate the roles 
of ambidextrous developers on project performance and their differences compared to 
other developers. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Background 
Software development is an organizational process that software vendors use to 
develop and maintain software (Hoffer et al. 2008). Software development primarily 
depends on the economic behavior and organizational structure of software vendors. In 
general, software vendors focus on effective management of software development. As 
shown in Figure 1, one dimension of software development is an external environment in 
which external entities such as government and interest groups (i.e., customers) impose 
costs on a firm (Baron 2001) since software vendors internalize the external effects of 
their decisions (Baron 2001). Other software vendors also affect the software 
development from the competition perspective (Arora et al. 2010b, Cavusoglu et al. 
2007). Therefore, the economic activity of software vendors is affected by government, 
customers, and other software vendors. Moreover, the changing needs of customers also 
affect software development since a software product is modified after delivery to correct 
faults, to improve performance or other attributes, and to enhance the product by adapting 
it to a modified environment (Banker and Slaughter 2000, Banker et al. 1998, IEEE 
1983). As shown in Figure 1, another dimension of software development is an internal 
environment in which organizational structure of software vendors affects software 
development.  
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Other internal factors specific to software vendors, software products, patches, and 
vulnerabilities also affect software development based on the cost structure of software 
vendors. In this dissertation, we analyze the effects of external and internal factors on 
software development. 
 
 
FIGURE 1: Research Overview 
 
Software development can be modeled with a systems development life cycle 
(SDLC) which provides sequential activities such as planning, analysis, design, 
implementation, and maintenance for software developers to follow. Software 
maintenance is the last phase of a systems development life cycle. Software maintenance 
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is defined as the modification of a software product after delivery to correct faults and to 
enhance the product by adding new features based on user requirements or by adapting it 
to a modified environment (Banker and Slaughter 2000, Banker et al. 1998, IEEE 1983). 
Although maintenance is the last phase, actually it covers all previous phases to be 
performed (Hoffer et al. 2008), and thereby it resembles a systems development life cycle 
itself (Hoffer et al. 2008). The total cost of system maintenance is estimated to comprise 
at least 50% of total software life cycle costs (Van Vliet 2000, Kemerer and Slaughter 
1999, Kemerer 1995). Thus, software maintenance is one of the major phases of a 
software development. In software maintenance, there are two important types of OSS 
project activities: software improvement activities by correcting faults (i.e., 
vulnerabilities) and software enhancement activities by adding new features.  
In an organizational context, exploitation and exploration have been identified as 
two types of activities for the development and use of knowledge in organizations (March 
1991). Prior research indicates that different types of tasks require different 
communication patterns and different amount of communication based on characteristics 
and nature of a task (Katz and Tushman 1979). A task can differ along several 
dimensions including time span, specific vs. general problem orientation, and the 
generation of new knowledge vs. using existing knowledge (Katz and Tushman 1979). 
March (1991) has suggested that exploitation and exploration represent fundamentally 
incompatible and inconsistent activities. For example, exploitation represents activities 
that improve existing organizational competencies and build on the existing technological 
trajectory. Therefore, exploitation broadens existing knowledge and skills, improves 
established designs, and expands existing products and services. In contrast, exploration 
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represents activities that changes the organizational competencies and build on a different 
technological trajectory. Therefore, exploration requires new knowledge, offers new 
designs, and creates new products and services. In addition, exploitation is related to 
efficiency, centralization, and tight cultures while exploration is associated with 
flexibility, decentralization, and loose cultures (Benner and Tushman 2003). Therefore, 
exploitation and exploration require different organizational structures (Benner and 
Tushman 2003, Levinthal and March 1993). We propose that OSS project activities can 
be classified as implementation-oriented (exploitation) and innovation-oriented 
(exploration) based on organizational theory (March 1991). In the context of OSS 
development, developing a patch would be an example of an exploitation activity. 
Requesting a new software feature would be an example of an exploration activity. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first research to study OSS development at the 
activity level. 
While exploitation and exploration represent fundamentally incompatible and 
inconsistent activities (March 1991), recent research on organizational literature has 
stressed the importance of a balance between exploitation and exploration for 
organizational survival (Benner and Tushman 2003, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). 
Structural differentiation is a proposed mechanism for organizations to build an 
ambidextrous organization (Benner and Tushman 2003, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). 
Structural differentiation refers to the subdivision of organizational tasks into distinct 
organizational units that develop appropriate contexts for exploitation and exploration 
activities. However, the coordination and integration of exploitative and exploratory 
activities is a necessary step in achieving ambidexterity (Jansen et al. 2009, Gilbert 2006, 
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Smith and Tushman 2005, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). We identified a new category of 
developers (ambidextrous developers) in OSS projects who contribute to exploitative 
activities (patch development) and exploratory activities (feature request). We propose 
that ambidextrous developers are an integration mechanism between patch development 
and feature request activities. We develop a theoretical construct for project 
ambidexterity based on the concept of ambidextrous developers. We develop a theoretical 
construct of ambidexterity as a measure of the ability of OSS projects to pursue both 
exploitative and exploratory activities concurrently.  
1.2. Research Objectives and Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation examines exploitation and exploration in software development. 
It consists of three essays and is organized as follows. 
In Chapter 2, we analyze software patch development (exploitation) in the context 
of software vulnerabilities which could be exploited by hackers. In particular, we analyze 
how the factors specific to vulnerabilities, patches, software, and software vendors affect 
the patch release behavior of software vendors. We develop a survival analysis model of 
the patch release behavior of software vendors based on the cost-based framework of 
software vendors. We test it using a data set compiled from the National Vulnerability 
Database (NVD), United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), and 
vendor web sites.  
In Chapter 3, we study exploitation and exploration in the content of OSS 
development. We introduce the use of organizational theory on exploration and 
exploitation together with social network analysis as a theoretical lens to study different 
types of sub-networks in OSS development. We empirically examine the differences 
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between exploitation (patch development) and exploration (feature request) networks of 
developers in OSS projects in terms of their social network structure. We identify a new 
category of developers (ambidextrous developers) in OSS projects who contribute to 
patch development as well as feature request activities. We use a data set collected from 
the SourceForge database. Our results indicate that a patch development network has 
greater internal cohesion and network centrality than a feature request network. In 
contrast, a feature request network has greater external connectivity than a patch 
development network. 
In Chapter 4, we explore ambidexterity and ambidextrous developers in the 
context of OSS project performance. We introduce the use of organizational theory on 
ambidexterity together with social network analysis as a theoretical lens to study OSS 
project performance. Recent research on OSS development has studied the social network 
structure of software developers as determinant of project success. However, this stream 
of research has focused on the project level, and has not recognized the fact that software 
projects could consist of different types of activities, each of which could require 
different types of expertise and network structures. We develop a theoretical construct for 
ambidexterity based on the concept of ambidextrous developers. We empirically illustrate 
the effects of ambidexterity and network characteristics on OSS project performance. We 
also study the effects of social network properties of OSS developers on OSS project 
performance. We use a data set collected from the SourceForge database. Our results 
indicate that a moderate level of ambidexterity, external cohesion, and technological 
diversity are desirable for project success. Project success is also positively related to 
internal cohesion and network centrality. We illustrate the roles of ambidextrous 
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developers and their differences compared to other developers. In summary, this 
dissertation explores software development using an under-researched theoretical lens. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: PATCH RELEASE BEHAVIORS OF SOFTWARE VENDORS IN 
RESPONSE TO VULNERABILITIES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Software vulnerabilities of information systems have become a significant 
concern for organizations, since these vulnerabilities result in security attacks such as 
virus, theft of information, and denial of service (DOS) leading to significant financial 
losses to users (Gordon et al. 2006). The existence of software vulnerabilities is an 
important reason for security attacks (Ransbotham and Mitra 2009, Arora et al. 2006b). 
The number of vulnerabilities reported by Computer Emergency Response Team / 
Coordination Center (CERT/CC) increased dramatically from 171 to 7326 between 1995 
and 2007. The public disclosure of such software vulnerabilities increases the risks posed 
by security attacks (Arora et al. 2006b). Disclosed software vulnerabilities could expose 
the systems of unprotected users to security attacks and could be exploited by attackers to 
compromise organizational information systems through these unprotected systems. At 
the same time, disclosure of vulnerabilities is used by social organizations such as 
CERT/CC to hasten the release of software patches by vendors.  
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One of the important characteristics of a disclosed vulnerability is its severity and 
prior research has found that the severity of the vulnerability affects the patch release 
behavior of software vendors (Arora et al. 2010a, Kannan et al. 2007, Png et al. 2008). 
However, these studies treat the severity as an aggregated measure. We expect that 
vulnerabilities with same severity measures can, however, pose different risks for data 
assets of an organization (Houmb et al. 2008, Mell and Scarfone 2007), depending on the 
type of impact. For example, vulnerabilities that result in unauthorized information 
disclosure may need to be responded to differently compared to vulnerabilities that lead 
to unavailability of data. Hence, the patch release behavior of vendors is likely to be 
different according to the expected impact of different aspects of the severity of the 
vulnerability. We use the data on vulnerabilities published by United States Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) and cross-reference the data with National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD) to capture detailed information about vulnerabilities and 
patches released by vendors. We then test a survival model of the vulnerability with this 
data, thereby extending prior research on patch release behavior and helping to 
understand vendor’s patch release response in a more comprehensive way. 
Our analysis shows that while confidentiality impact and integrity impact are the 
most important vulnerability characteristics that affect the patch release behavior of 
software vendors, these two impacts are highly correlated with each other. Therefore, 
vendors tend to show almost identical behavior for the same level of impact of 
confidentiality or integrity when releasing their patches. In general, higher confidentiality 
impact or integrity impact makes vendors release patches faster while higher availability 
impact results in slower release of patches. However, further analysis highlights some 
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interesting differences between open source software (OSS) and proprietary software 
vendors in terms of their response to availability impact of vulnerabilities. We also find 
that the patch release behavior of software vendors is different if the patch is an update 
rather than a new release. Introducing the type of patch in our paper is a response to a call 
in prior research (Arora et al. 2010a) for additional variables to describe patch release 
behavior and for using additional data sources. Prior research has recognized differences 
between OSS and proprietary vendors in debugging software (Raymod 1999). We find 
interesting differences between the behavior of open source software and proprietary 
software vendors in releasing patches for vulnerabilities, depending on the type of patch 
(upgrade vs. new release). Prior research also indicated that patch quality depends on 
patch development time (Arora et al. 2008) and cost of developing software (Arora et al. 
2008, Slaughter et al. 1998). We find that lower quality patches are released faster 
because of the trade-off between the quality of a patch and its cost to the vendors. 
2.2. Literature Review 
While there are multiple streams of research that help understand vendors’ patch 
release behavior, the common theoretical underpinning of most of these studies is that the 
release time and quality of security patches are largely determined by the economic 
behavior of vendors each of whom have a specific cost structure. Arora et al. (2008) 
introduce a model of vulnerability disclosure and software vendors’ patch release 
behavior involving a social coordinator (e.g., CERT/CC) as an external entity who sets 
the disclosure time and a vendor who decides on the patch release time. The model 
focuses on a vendor’s cost and social cost as the two types of costs. Social cost is total 
customer loss resulting from the exploitation of unpatched vulnerabilities by security 
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attackers. The vendor’s cost consists of two terms: the cost of patch development and the 
portion of social cost internalized by the vendor. The cost of developing a patch is 
determined by a vendor based on patch development time and patch quality because 
accelerating patch development and increasing patch quality draw upon more resources 
(Arora et al. 2008). Hence, vendors are likely to incur higher patch development costs 
with accelerating patch development or increasing patch quality because of allocation of 
more resources (Arora et al. 2008, Slaughter et al. 1998) or quality improvement 
processes (Slaughter et al. 1998). In contrast, vendors internalize the portion of social 
cost in the form of either a loss in reputation, a loss in future sales, or as customer support 
costs (Arora et al. 2008). In this model, social coordinators set the disclosure policy and 
influence vendor’s patch release behavior by determining optimal vulnerability disclosure 
time in order to minimize social cost. In response, a vendor decides on the patch release 
time in order to minimize its expected cost. Therefore, vendor’s patch release decision 
depends on the trade-off between these costs. Arora et al. (2008) indicated that a vendor 
is more responsive if a greater portion of the customer loss is internalized by the vendor. 
Arora et al. (2010a) also used the same model and indicated the positive impact of 
vulnerability disclosure on the patch release time, i.e., vulnerabilities that were publicly 
disclosed were patched faster. Cavusoglu et al. (2007) use an analytical model to study 
vulnerability disclosure mechanisms (i.e., instant disclosure, no disclosure, and optimal 
disclosure) on patch release decisions. They show that even though each disclosure 
mechanism ensures the release of patch by vendors, early disclosure does not always lead 
to faster patch release by vendors because vendors may incur higher development costs if 
they release patches faster. Hence, they may trade off development costs for higher 
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internalized customer loss. These studies provide analytical evidence that vulnerability 
disclosure affects the vendors’ patch release behavior and patch release time. However, 
the importance of these studies is to develop the model explaining software vendors’ 
patch release behavior in terms of their cost structure. 
Prior research on corporate social responsibility identified government and 
interest groups, such as customers, as external entities who impose costs on a firm (Baron 
2001). Market and legislation mechanisms lead firms to internalize the external effects of 
their decisions (Baron 2001). Therefore, economic activity of companies is affected by 
government and customers through two mechanisms. One is through market, in which 
customers influence economic activity of firms through either a loss in reputation, a loss 
in future sales, or as customer support costs. The other is through government 
legislations, in which government influences economic activity of firms through 
legislations and associated penalties. From corporate governance perspective, the primary 
objective of managers is to maximize shareholder value (Brigham and Ehrhardt 2008, 
Baron 2001). However, Wood (1991) argued that business and society are interwoven 
rather than being distinct entities and society has certain expectations for appropriate 
business behavior and outcomes. Therefore, the social responsibility of business 
encompasses the economic, legal, and ethical expectations (Carroll 1979). It is possible 
that vendor patch release behavior is affected by such legislative mechanisms, through 
their impacts on vendor’s cost components, such as internalization of social cost. 
The impact of the severity of vulnerability on the patch release behavior of 
software vendors has also been studied in prior research (Arora et al. 2010a). In Kannan 
et al. (2007), reactions of vendors differ for different types of security attacks because an 
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attack may target a specific vulnerability and with a different purpose. The impact of the 
severity of vulnerabilities on the number of attacks has been studied by Png et al. (2008), 
who conclude that software vendors tend to spend more effort developing patches for 
vulnerabilities having a higher severity impact than for vulnerabilities having a lower 
severity impact. The confidentiality-integrity-availability (CIA) framework assesses 
security attacks based on the risk posed by the attacks to confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of data assets. For example, theft of information is categorized as a 
confidentiality attack since it poses the risk of unauthorized disclosure of information. 
Virus attacks are categorized as integrity attacks since they pose the risk of unauthorized 
modification of data assets. Denial of service (DOS) attack is categorized as an 
availability attack since it makes systems unavailable. The severity of vulnerability 
studied by Arora et al. (2010a) is an aggregate variable and does not capture the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability dimensions of vulnerabilities on the patch 
release behavior of software vendors. It may be possible that components of vendor’s 
cost, such as internalization of social costs, may be different for different dimensions of 
vulnerability impact. 
Software complexity is a major factor influencing the software’s maintenance 
efforts (Banker and Slaughter 2000, Banker et al. 1998, Kemerer 1995, Roberts et al. 
2004) and maintenance costs (Banker and Slaughter 2000, Banker et al. 1998). Software 
maintenance is the modification of a software product after delivery in order to correct 
faults, to improve performance or other attributes, and to enhance the product by adapting 
it to a modified environment (IEEE 1983). Since releasing a patch for vulnerability is part 
of the software maintenance effort, software complexity is an important variable when 
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studying vendor patch release behavior. Software complexity generally refers to the 
characteristics of the data structures and procedures within software products that make it 
difficult to understand and change and software complexity has been strongly linked with 
software maintenance efforts (Banker et al. 1998). These results are supported by the 
study of Banker and Slaughter (2000) in which software development is regarded as 
software enhancement activity. Software complexity has also been studied as part of the 
complexity of information systems development projects (Xia and Lee 2005). In this 
study, the complexity has been analyzed based on the structural aspects of projects 
capturing the impact of variety and interdependency of project elements on complexity. 
As the number of project elements and their interdependencies increases, it becomes 
more difficult to control the project. 
Prior research has shown the impact of patch quality on patch development time 
(Arora et al. 2008) and cost of developing software (Arora et al. 2008, Slaughter et al. 
1998). This is based on the idea that software vendors choose the patch quality in order to 
minimize their expected costs, which consist of the patch development cost and the 
portion of total customer loss resulting from vulnerabilities exploited by attackers (Arora 
et al. 2008). Arora et al. (2006a) also showed that a software vendor has incentives to 
release a buggier product early and fix it later.  
Raymond (1999) indicated that the nature of software debugging, an important 
task in patch development, is different for proprietary and OSS vendors. OSS 
development depends on contributions and collaboration of volunteer software 
developers (Liu and Iyer 2007, Feller and Fitzgerald 2002). Prior studies show that 
collaboration among product design teams is associated with a reduction in product 
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development cycle time (Espinosa et al. 2007, Banker et al. 2006) and a reduction in 
software development cost (Jaisingh et al. 2008). Sen (2007) concludes that OSS vendors 
benefit from the collective network of software developers in OSS development process 
resulting in quicker releases of software than proprietary vendors.  
Software can be categorized as application software and system software based on 
what specific tasks the software is designed to accomplish (O’Brien and Marakas 2008) 
and the category can affect the patch development efforts. Meil and Scarfone (2007) 
indicated that the level of access to the operating system (i.e., root or user level of access) 
provides different level of control over the operating system (OS) and show that 
vulnerabilities at an operating system level are typically more severe than that on an 
application level. Arora et al. (2010b) examined empirically the impact of competition 
among multiple vendors on the patch release time. In particular, they looked at disclosure 
threat effect, which is the effect on patch release time of the possibility that another 
vendor releases a patch earlier and implicitly discloses the vulnerability. The disclosure 
threat significantly reduces the patch release time (Arora et al. 2010b), which is 
consistent with the results by Cavusoglu et al. (2007) who analyzed the multiple vendor 
case and concluded that the patch release of one vendor affects the patch release 
decisions of other vendors. Jaisingh et al. (2008) show that the software development 
process of one vendor is affected by competition from other software developers. 
The literature reviewed above suggests that vulnerability characteristics such as 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability could impact vendors’ patch release behavior. 
The patch release may also be affected by the software complexity, the software quality, 
the types of software development processes, and the differences between software 
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categories. Prior research also indicates that the presence of multiple vendors 
significantly affects the vendor’s patch release decision. Although prior research suggests 
the impact of these factors on the vendor’s patch release behavior, our study is the first 
empirical attempt to analyze the impact of the individual vulnerability characteristics 
(i.e., confidentiality, integrity and availability) as well as the impact of patch quality. The 
extant software vulnerability patch literature also does not consider the impact of 
software complexity and its interaction with other factors on vendor patch release 
behavior. On the premise that the time and cost to develop a patch are dependent on the 
software complexity, we collect data regarding patch types for vulnerabilities and 
examine how these patch types affect vendor patch release behavior. The following 
section discusses the vulnerability scoring system that measures the severity of individual 
vulnerability characteristics. 
2.3. Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) 
Information security is defined as the combination of the attributes of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Avizienis et al. 2004). The Control Objectives 
for Information and Related Technology (COBIT) standards is a widely accepted set of 
guidance for IT governance and also identities confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of data assets as important for IT governance. According to the Forum of Incident 
Response and Security Teams (FIRST), confidentiality refers to limiting information 
access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by or 
disclosure to unauthorized users (Mell et al. 2007). Integrity refers to the trustworthiness 
and guaranteed veracity of information while availability refers to the accessibility of 
data resources (Mell et al. 2007). 
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While confidentiality, integrity, and availability are referred to as the primary 
attributes of information security, secondary attributes such as accountability (Avizienis 
et al. 2004, Pfleeger and Pfleeger 2003, Biskup 2009), assurance (Avizienis et al. 2004) 
and authenticity (Avizienis et al. 2004) refine or specialize the primary attributes 
(Avizienis et al. 2004). For example, accountability is defined as availability and integrity 
of the identity of the person who performed an operation (Avizienis et al. 2004). The use 
of information should be transparent so that it is possible to determine whether a 
particular use is appropriate under a given set of rules and that the system enables 
individuals and institutions to be held accountable for misuse (Weitzner et al. 2008). 
Assurance is derived from integrity and is defined as the prevention of the unauthorized 
modification or deletion of information, while authenticity is defined as the integrity of a 
message content and origin (Avizienis et al. 2004). Although secondary attributes carry 
more specific information about the vulnerability than primary attributes, the impact of 
vulnerability is best represented by the impact scores of primary attributes. Moreover, the 
NVD database does not disclose any of the secondary attributes. Hence, the scope of this 
study is limited to primary attributes.  
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)1 provides standard measures 
for the impacts of vulnerability based on its severity. The characteristics of vulnerabilities 
are assumed constant over time and across user environments, and categorized into 
exploitability and impact subgroups (Mell et al. 2007). The CVSS gives an aggregated 
severity score (on a scale of 0 to 10) for each vulnerability. This aggregated severity 
score is calculated by combining exploitability and impact subscores. Although 
                                                 
1 The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is a standard for scoring the impact of 
vulnerabilities. The CVSS was originally introduced by the National Infrastructure Advisory Council 
(NIAC) and is currently managed by the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST). 
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exploitability subscores capture how a vulnerability is accessed, the focus of this study is 
on impact subscores since the three impact metrics (i.e. confidentiality, integrity and 
availability) measure the direct impact of an exploited vulnerability on data assets 
(Chandramouli et al. 2006). Possible values for each impact subscore are “None, Partial 
and Complete”2. While “None” indicates a total absence of the impact on data assets, 
“Complete” means the maximum impact on data assets. “Partial” refers to a partial 
impact on data assets. A higher value for each impact metric indicates higher severity for 
that metric.  
Although the definitions of the vulnerability characteristics do not overlap, they 
may be correlated across vulnerabilities. For example, if security attackers gain a right to 
modify data without authorization as a result of the exploitation of vulnerability, they 
may also acquire the content of data. Therefore, violations of integrity may also lead to 
the violation of confidentiality. The modification or destruction of data makes data 
unavailable or inaccessible and thus violations of integrity may also result in the violation 
of availability. We will analyze these possible correlations between any pairs of 
vulnerability characteristics in the Research Methodology section. 
2.4. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
The primary purpose of this study is to analyze how the factors specific to 
vulnerabilities, patches, software, and software vendors affect the patch release behavior 
of software vendors based on extending the cost-based framework of Arora et al. (2008). 
We develop a model of vendor patch release behavior and posit that software vendors’ 
patch release behaviors are affected by three impact dimensions of vulnerabilities, the 
                                                 
2 Corresponding coefficients of possible values for impact metrics are available at 
http://www.first.org/cvss/cvss-guide.pdf 
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types of patches, the types of software vendors, the software categories, and the patch 
quality. We also posit that software vendors’ patch release behaviors are affected by the 
presence of multiple vendors whose products have the same vulnerability. We consider 
government’s role in affecting components of vendor’s cost, such as internalization of 
social costs, and propose that government actions cause software vendors to internalize a 
higher amount of social cost via government enforcements and legislative penalties on 
customers. 
2.4.1. Vulnerability Characteristics: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability 
Arora et al. (2010a) show that vendors release patches faster for more severe 
vulnerabilities. However, the vulnerability severity used in their study is an aggregated 
score computed from individual vulnerability characteristics (Mell et al. 2007) and the 
impacts of individual vulnerability characteristics on vendors’ patch release behavior has 
not been captured. Theoretically, different combinations of vulnerability characteristics 
can produce the same aggregated severity score but pose different risks to users since the 
actual risk depends on the impact of each vulnerability characteristic on data assets 
(Houmb et al. 2008, Mell and Scarfone 2007). For example, a successfully exploited 
vulnerability can cause a complete loss of confidentiality, and a partial loss of integrity, 
but no loss of availability. In order to capture the impact of vulnerability characteristics in 
more depth, the CIA framework, which underlies the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability impacts of vulnerability, is used in our study. The CIA framework is used in 
prior research to classify security attack types (Kannan et al. 2007). Different types of 
security attacks (e.g., virus attacks, theft of information, and DOS attacks) target different 
aspects of data assets (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability). Security attacks 
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that result in unauthorized information disclosure, such as theft of credit card numbers or 
other customer information, are categorized as confidentiality attacks (e.g., theft of 
information). Security attacks that result in authorized modification or total destruction of 
data assets are categorized as integrity attacks (e.g., virus attacks). Security attacks that 
make data resources or systems inaccessible are classified as availability attacks (e.g., 
DOS attacks). 
Confidentiality, integrity, and availability impacts are considered as important 
vulnerability characteristics by Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) legislation and companies have to 
establish the internal control over these dimensions. This view is supported by the 
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) that requires federal agencies to 
protect information and information systems from unauthorized access, disclosure, use, 
modification, or destruction of data to strengthen information security and provide 
integrity, confidentiality and availability. Software vendors incur a higher cost from 
customer loss resulting from vulnerabilities exploited by security attackers if the 
vulnerabilities are critical (Arora et al. 2008). This view is supported by Png et al. (2008) 
who report that software vendors expend greater effort to develop patches for 
vulnerabilities having a higher severity impact. Software vendors are expected to react 
faster in developing patches for vulnerabilities having a higher impact on confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of data assets because they internalize a greater amount of 
customer loss resulting from exploitation of vulnerabilities having a higher impact on 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. Hence, this leads us to the following 
hypotheses: 
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H1: Higher confidentiality impact of vulnerabilities is associated with faster patch 
release by vendors. 
H2: Higher integrity impact of vulnerabilities is associated with faster patch release 
by vendors. 
H3: Higher availability impact of vulnerabilities is associated with faster patch 
release by vendors. 
2.4.2. Vulnerability Characteristics: Confidentiality vs. Integrity, and Availability 
Confidentiality attacks such as theft of information result in unauthorized 
information disclosure. However, violations of confidentiality in the form of information 
disclosure cannot be recoverable, while violations of integrity or availability can be 
recovered by other means, such as having backup systems. Violations of confidentiality 
may also be harder to detect than exploitations of integrity or availability. The risk of 
unauthorized information disclosure for financial institutions has been demonstrated by 
Johnson (2008). This study also provides companies with strategies on how to control 
information disclosure. The confidentiality of information is associated with privacy and 
regulated by various forms of legislation (O’Brien and Marakas 2008). The Electronic 
Communication Privacy Act and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act prohibit 
intercepting data communication and stealing data (O’Brien and Marakas 2008). The 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which includes the 
privacy rules and the security rules, addresses issues related to individual health 
insurance. The HIPAA creates the safeguards against the unauthorized use, disclosure, 
and distribution of an individual’s health care information held by health care service 
providers without the specific consent or authorization. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
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(GLBA) is another legislation that includes provisions to govern the disclosure, and 
protection of consumers’ nonpublic personal information held by companies. According 
to the GLBA, companies are required to develop information security plans to protect 
consumers from unauthorized disclosure of their nonpublic personal information. Given 
the significant legislative pressure regarding privacy and confidentiality, we expect that 
confidentiality impact is considered as more critical to respond to than availability and 
integrity impact types. This is because software vendors are likely to internalize a greater 
amount of customer loss for the violation of confidentiality than for the violation of 
integrity or availability. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H4: Confidentiality score has a greater positive impact on vendors’ patch release 
time than integrity score or availability score. 
2.4.3. Vulnerability Characteristics: Integrity vs. Availability 
Integrity attacks such as virus attacks result in unauthorized modification or total 
destruction of data assets. Modified or destructed data can be backed up and restored to a 
clean state relatively easily when compared with violations of confidentiality. However, 
in case of random data modifications by security attackers it is difficult to notice the 
violation and to determine what has been changed. Violations of integrity may also result 
in the violation of availability since modified or destructed data is not available. 
Availability attacks such as DOS attacks make a system unavailable but it can be 
recovered relatively easily since violations of availability are easier to notice than those 
of integrity. For example, the HIPAA regulates that the access to and modification of 
health care information is limited to authorized persons. This view is supported by 
Sarbanes-Oxley whose objective is to improve accountability of information (Anand 
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2008). We conclude that integrity impacts of vulnerability are more severe than 
availability impacts because software vendors internalize a greater amount of customer 
loss for the violation of integrity than for the violation of availability. This leads us to the 
following hypothesis: 
H5: Integrity score has a greater positive impact on vendors’ patch release time than 
availability score. 
2.4.4. Patch Types 
Software complexity generally refers to the characteristics of the data structures 
and procedures within software products that make it difficult to understand and change 
the software (Banker et al. 1998). A significant portion of the software developer's time is 
required to understand the functionality of the software to be changed (Banker et al. 
1998). Software complexity also affects the effectiveness of development teams (Roberts 
et al. 2004). The more complex the software product, the more effort required to mitigate 
the negative impact of software complexity on software development process. The 
structure of software development projects such as variety and interdependency of project 
elements also determine the software complexity (Xia and Lee 2005). As the number of 
project elements increases, software development becomes more difficult to control. 
Software complexity also determines the maintenance cost of software since high level of 
software complexity interferes with the process of comprehending the application and 
makes it difficult for developers to efficiently and correctly modify the application 
(Banker and Slaughter 2000). We measure software complexity in terms of patch types: 
an update or a new release. A new release patch is required to modify an entire product 
and the data structures and procedures are more complex for a new release. Typically a 
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new release is larger in size than an update patch. We assume that a new release type of 
software requires more development effort than an update type. Therefore, software 
vendors incur higher development costs for a new release type of patch than an update 
type of patch. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H6: An update type of patch is released faster than a new release type of patch by 
vendors. 
2.4.5. Software Vendor Types 
The nature of the software debugging task for proprietary and OSS vendors leads 
to two fundamentally different software development styles: the cathedral model for 
proprietary vendors and the bazaar model for OSS vendors (Raymond 1999). Software 
development involves knowledge work and its most important resources are the 
specialized skills and expertise that a developer brings to the project development 
(Espinosa et al. 2007, Roberts et al. 2004, Faraj and Sproull 2000). Proprietary vendors 
use a more closed environment and the development process is characterized by a 
relatively strong control of design and implementation. In contrast, OSS vendors depend 
mainly on voluntary contributions of software developers and, hence, a patch for OSS 
product is developed in a collective manner beyond the boundaries of a single 
organization. The network of developers becomes more important for OSS projects and 
offers various benefits. First, collaboration among software developers can facilitate 
access to and sharing of resources, allowing developers to combine their knowledge, 
skills, and expertise. Second, new insights, ideas or ways to solve problems are conceived 
by any one and accessed by others. This leads to decrease in time required to find a 
solution for fixing vulnerabilities. Third, the volunteer group of software developers does 
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not depend on the schedule of a company to release a patch for vulnerabilities in the OSS. 
In contrast, the release calendar of a patch by a proprietary vendor may be subject to the 
vendor’s marketing and strategic needs. Fourth, the cost of software development is 
mainly resulting from the investment on resources such as salaries paid to developers 
(Jaisingh et al. 2008). However, OSS vendors benefit from voluntary contributions of 
developers (Jaisingh et al. 2008). We expect that OSS vendors release patches faster than 
proprietary vendors because the voluntary contributions of software developers to OSS 
development reduces the development cost for OSS vendors. This view is consistent with 
the results of Banker et al. (2006) which show that collaboration among design teams in 
OSS projects is associated with a reduction in OSS development time. Espinosa et al. 
(2007) also concluded that collaboration leads to benefits such as shorter development 
time. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H7: Open source vendors release patches faster than proprietary vendors. 
2.4.6. Software Types 
Software is primarily categorized as application software and system software 
based on what specific tasks the software is designed to accomplish (O’Brien and 
Marakas 2008). Application software, such as word processing, spreadsheets, graphics 
programs or electronic mail applications, are stand-alone function-specific programs that 
provide individual end users with common information processing tasks. In contrast, 
system software manages and provides a vital software interface among computer 
networks, hardware, and application software of end users. Operating systems, 
application servers or network management programs are examples of system software. 
Web-based software also provides a software interface over computer networks among 
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application software. For example, web browsers run other application software such as 
web-based applications (e.g., Google Document) or other programming codes (e.g., 
ActiveX controls). Therefore, web-based software such as web browsers is categorized as 
system software in our study. System software is more critical and important than 
application software, since it provides a software interface among computer networks, 
hardware, and application software of end users. Exploitation of vulnerabilities belonging 
to system software affects the entire system and gives security attackers an OS level of 
access and control to data resources. In contrast, exploitation of vulnerabilities belonging 
to application software affects an application itself and gives security attackers a limited 
level of access and control to data resources. We argue that vulnerabilities belonging to 
system software are more serious and patched faster than those belonging to application 
software because software vendors internalize more customer loss for the exploitation of 
vulnerabilities affecting system software than vulnerabilities affecting application 
software. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H8: Vulnerabilities affecting system software are patched faster by vendors than 
those affecting application software. 
2.4.7. Patch Quality 
Software vendors choose a patch quality that minimizes the total of the patch 
development cost and the portion of total customer loss (Arora et al. 2008). Vendors 
incur higher patch development costs with the higher patch quality because of allocation 
of more resources (Arora et al. 2008, Slaughter et al. 1998) or quality improvement 
processes such as design reviews and code inspections (Slaughter et al. 1998). However, 
there are early mover advantages resulting in incentives to release products earlier despite 
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the product not being ready for release (Arora et al. 2010b). Hence, software vendors 
have incentives to release an incomplete patch with partial fix early and fix it later (Arora 
et al. 2006a) in order to offset the potential customer loss of not releasing any patch 
(Arora et al. 2008). Software vendors may sacrifice quality by eliminating quality 
improvement processes to achieve other objectives such as shorter development cycle 
time and reduced development cost (Slaughter et al. 1998). We argue that lower quality 
patches are released faster than higher quality patches because software vendors incur 
less development cost for low quality patches and further reduce the potential customer 
loss of not releasing any patch at least by releasing low quality patches early. This leads 
us to the following hypothesis: 
H9: Lower quality patches are released faster than higher quality patches.  
2.4.8. Presence of Multiple Vendors 
The impact of the presence of multiple vendors for a given vulnerability on the 
patch release time has been analyzed from the competition perspective (Arora et al. 
2010b, Cavusoglu et al. 2007). Arora et al. (2006a) study firms’ incentives to release their 
software earlier to gain more market share and avoid the threat of competition in the 
market, since the software market offers significant early mover advantages. In the 
presence of multiple vendors, there is also a possibility that the release of a patch by 
another vendor discloses the vulnerability, putting pressure on other vendors who have 
not released a patch yet. We expect that the threat of disclosure and customers' penalty on 
late patching could decrease the patch release time by vendors when multiple vendors are 
affected by the same vulnerability. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
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H10: Vulnerabilities affecting multiple vendors are patched faster than 
vulnerabilities affecting a single vendor. 
2.5. Variable Definitions and Operationalization 
2.5.1. Computation of Dependent Variable 
Patch Release Time: Patch release time is the dependent variable in our model. 
The patch release time is measured as the number of days between the vendor notification 
date and the patch release date. In our model, we have set June 20, 2009 as a cutoff date 
for our study. If patch release date is earlier than our cutoff date, the patch release time is 
the number of days between the vendor notification date and the patch release date. 
However, some vendors had not released their patches by the cutoff date. These 
observations were removed from the data set because patch release time and other patch 
related information cannot be obtained. The vendor notification date is the date when a 
vendor first knows the existence of vulnerability in its product(s). Vendors usually are 
notified by US-CERT and for these vulnerabilities we have noted the vendor notification 
date from the US-CERT website. For some vulnerabilities, vendors have been notified by 
other security sources such as SecurityFocus, iDefense, and TippingPoint. US-CERT 
referred to these sources for the vendor notification date. For these vulnerabilities, we 
have noted the vendor notification date from the links provided by US-CERT. For some 
vulnerabilities, vendors provide a date when they first became aware of the existence of 
vulnerability in their products or when they were notified about the existence of 
vulnerability in their products. We select the earliest notification date from among those 
identified from US-CERT website, other security websites, and the software vendor’s 
website. For some vulnerabilities, we use the vendor notification date as the date when 
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vulnerability information is first made public. Generally, the public date is the earliest of 
the date when the vulnerability information is first published, the date when an exploit 
was first discovered, or the date when the vendor first distributed a patch publicly. We 
have noted the vulnerability public date directly from the US-CERT website. The patch 
release date is the date when a vendor releases a patch for a vulnerability in its product. 
However, the same software vendor may release multiple patches for the same 
vulnerability. For these vulnerabilities, we selected the earliest date as the patch release 
date. US-CERT and NVD websites do not directly provide patch release dates. Instead 
they give the links for available solutions and refer us to patch release reports, security 
bulletins or security advisories published by software vendors. Patch release dates have 
been collected from these sources or from the digital signatures of patches. 
2.5.2. Independent Variables 
Vulnerability Characteristics (Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability): 
Confidentiality, integrity, and availability impacts are independent variables in our 
model, and take a value of 0 for “None”, a value of 1 for “Partial”, and a value of 2 for 
“Complete”. Data regarding vulnerability characteristics are collected from the NVD 
website. 
Patch Type (PType): Patch type data has been collected from the US-CERT 
website or software vendors’ website. We identified different types of patches such as 
configurations, scripts, updates, and new releases. We grouped configurations, scripts, 
and updates under the update type of patches. Patch type takes a value of 1 for new 
release patches and 0 for update type of patches. 
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Software Vendor Type (VType): Software vendor type has been identified for 
each vendor by referencing websites such as the Open Source Vulnerability Database 
(OSVDB). Software vendor type takes a value of 1 for open source vendors and 0 for 
proprietary vendors. 
Software Type (SWType): Software type has been identified from the list of 
affected products provided by the US-CERT website and software vendors’ website. 
Software type takes a value of 1 for system software and 0 for application software. 
Patch Quality (MPatches): Beattie et al. (2002) measured the patch quality with 
the number of patch released for the same vulnerability. Khoshgoftaar et al. (2000) 
developed a software quality model and measured software quality with multiple releases 
of software based on the idea that software is improved from faults in the last release. 
Therefore, multiple patches imply lower quality in the first released patch. We measure 
patch quality with the number of patch released for the same vulnerability. We identified 
all patch releases along with patch release dates for the same vulnerability from patch 
release reports, security bulletins, security advisories published by software vendors, and 
the digital signatures of patches. It takes a value 1 if multiple patches are released for the 
same vulnerability and 0 otherwise. 
Presence of Multiple Vendors (MVendor): The data on multiple vendors has been 
collected from the US-CERT and NVD websites. For each vulnerability, US-CERT and 
NVD lists all affected vendors. However, there are cases where US-CERT lists only one 
vendors but NVD lists multiple vendors, or vice versa. We treat both these cases as 
multiple vendor case. MVendor variable takes a value 1 if vulnerabilities affect multiple 
vendors and 0 otherwise. 
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2.5.3. Control Variable 
Disclosure: Prior research has found that disclosure affects the patch release 
behavior of software vendors. Thus, disclosure is a control variable in our model and has 
been constructed as a time-dependent covariate, consistent with prior research (Arora et 
al. 2010a). If vulnerability information is disclosed before patch release date, disclosure 
takes value 1, which means vulnerability has been made public before the patch release, 
otherwise it takes a value of zero. 
The description and operationalization of variables in our research are 
summarized in Table 1. The next section introduces the basis of our model and research 
methods that we adopted. 
 
TABLE 1: Variables and Descriptions/Measures 
Variables Descriptions/Measures 
Patch Release Time Time taken in days by vendors to release a patch 
Disclosure Whether vulnerability information is disclosed before patch release date; 
1 if vulnerability information is disclosed before patch release date, 0 otherwise 
MPatches Whether multiple patches are released for the same vulnerability; 
1 if multiple patches are released for the same vulnerability, 0 otherwise 
Confidentiality Impact The impact of unauthorized information disclosure on data assets; 
0 if none, 1 if partial, 2 if complete 
Integrity Impact The impact of unauthorized modification or total destruction of data on data assets; 
0 if none, 1 if partial, 2 if complete 
Availability Impact The impact of unavailability of data resources on data assets; 
0 if none, 1 if partial, 2 if complete 
PType The type of a patch released by a vendor; 
0 if an update, 1 if a new release 
VType The type of a software vendor; 
0 if a proprietary vendor, 1 if OSS vendor 
SWType The type of software affected by a vulnerability; 
0 if application software, 1 if system software 
MVendor Whether there are multiple vendors affected by the same vulnerability; 
1 if multiple vendors are affected by the same vulnerability, 0 otherwise 
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2.6. Research Methodology 
The purpose of this study is to understand how factors specific to vulnerability 
characteristics (i.e., confidentiality, integrity and availability impacts), patches, software 
vendors and software affect the patch release behavior of software vendors, in particular 
the time to release a patch. This study also examines the impact of the presence of 
multiple vendors exposed to the same vulnerability on the patch release behavior of 
software vendors. In order to accomplish these research objectives and test the hypothesis 
developed in the previous sections, we use survival analysis based on the vulnerability 
life cycle model.  
Arbaugh et al. (2000) developed a vulnerability life cycle model which captures 
all possible states that vulnerability can enter during its lifetime. The vulnerability life 
cycle model considers vulnerability as a birth and death process. In this study, the vendor 
notification event can be considered as the starting point of patch development process. 
However, a vendor has a choice whether to release a patch or not. If a vendor releases a 
patch for its product, the patch release date indicates the end of patch development 
process. The vulnerability survives as long as the vendor does not release a patch, and 
thus the time taken to release patch after the vendor knows about it is the survival time of 
vulnerability. In this study, we have considered the vulnerability life cycle as a survival 
model, in which the release of a patch by a software vendor is an event that ends the 
survival of a vulnerability. 
The survival model is preferred to traditional multiple regression models in our 
study for several reasons. First, survival analysis does not impose any specific 
distributional assumptions. Second, survival analysis enables us to use time-dependent 
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covariates. In our model, vulnerability disclosure is a time dependent covariate, following 
Arora et al. (2010a). In contrast to survival analysis, multiple regression cannot handle 
time-dependent covariates. 
We use Cox’s proportional hazard model which is a semi-parametric survival 
model (Cox 1972). The patch release time is the dependent variable in our model. 
Peduzzi et al. (1995) suggested that at least 10 events are required for each independent 
variable in the model, and the regression coefficients become more biased with a 
decrease in the number of events for each variable. In this study, we have 10 variables 
including time-dependent covariates and the interactions terms. Therefore, the sample 
size of 722 is considered adequate when compared to the required sample size of 100. 
Cox’s proportional hazard model is expressed as follows: 
ℎ , ℎ exp  
where h0 (t) is the baseline hazard function at time t when all values of independent 
variables are equal to zero. Xi are independent variables for i = 1…k and Xj are time-
dependent covariates or the interaction terms for j = 1…n. βi and βj are model coefficients 
for i = 1…k and j = 1…n respectively. 
2.7. Data 
2.7.1. Data Sources and Collection 
Vulnerability data analyzed in this study has been collected from two sources: 
US-CERT3 and NVD4, which are publicly available vulnerability databases. US-CERT 
                                                 
3 The US-CERT is the operational part of the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) of the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The US-CERT provides the response and defense about 
vulnerabilities against cyber-attacks. 
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publishes vulnerability information in the form of “Vulnerability Notes”. Vulnerability 
notes include vendor notification date, vulnerability public date, available solutions, the 
list of affected vendors, and the list of affected products for each vendor. US-CERT 
cross-references their vulnerability databases with NVD through the Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)5 identifiers assigned by NVD. In this study, we 
start with vulnerabilities that have been published by US-CERT, which are then cross-
referenced with NVD vulnerability list in order to acquire vulnerability characteristics. 
After learning about a vulnerability, US-CERT contacts the vendor(s) to confirm 
that their products are affected by the vulnerability. If a vendor acknowledges the 
vulnerability in its product(s), US-CERT lists the vendor’s status as “vulnerable”. If a 
vendor reports that its product(s) is not affected by the vulnerability, US-CERT lists the 
vendor’s status as “not vulnerable”. However, a vendor may choose not to respond to US-
CERT. In this case, US-CERT lists the vendors’ status as “unknown”. It may be possible 
that a vendor was affected by the vulnerability even if US-CERT listed a vendor’s status 
as “unknown”. However, there is no practical way for us to verify whether a vendor was 
actually affected by the vulnerability or not. Therefore, we select only those vendors 
whose status is listed as “vulnerable” by US-CERT. 
The unit of analysis is the vulnerability-vendor pair, since vulnerability can affect 
multiple vendors. We created a list of 792 unique vulnerabilities published by US-CERT 
from June 21, 2006 to June 20, 20096. Because more information about the vulnerabilities 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 The NVD is the U.S. government repository of standards based vulnerability management data 
represented using the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) standards. It is based on and 
synchronized with the CVE vulnerability naming standard. 
5 The CVE is a dictionary that provides common identifiers for publicly known information security 
vulnerabilities and exposures. 
6 Data, except multiple patch release data, have been collected during the period from August 2009 to 
November 2009. Multiple patch release data have been collected during the period of February 2011. 
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has to be collected from and cross-referenced with NVD, we removed 109 vulnerabilities 
from our list that have been published by US-CERT, but not by NVD. From the 256 
vendors affected by these vulnerabilities, we created the initial data set of 1222 
vulnerability-vendor pairs for 683 vulnerabilities and 256 vendors. From this list, we 
could not determine the patch release date for 251 observations involving 155 
vulnerabilities and 142 vendors and, hence, they were removed from our data set. After 
calculating the patch release time for the remaining data, 59 observations involving 57 
vulnerabilities and 33 vendors had a negative patch release time, which indicates that 
vendors released a patch before they were notified. These observations were removed 
from our data set. We dropped 183 observations, for 177 vulnerabilities and 30 vendors, 
for which the vendors discovered vulnerabilities in their products by themselves or with 
the help of third parties. Vendors disclosed these vulnerabilities to US-CERT along with 
the release of patches. In these cases, we cannot exactly determine when a vendor knew 
the existence of the vulnerability and we cannot determine the actual patch release time. 
Finally, we dropped 3 observations, for 3 vulnerabilities and 3 vendors, for which 
vendors had released their patches after the cutoff date. In these cases, patch related 
information, such as patch release time and patch type, cannot be obtained by the cutoff 
date. During the data analysis, we identified 4 observations as outliers, and hence they 
were removed from our data set. The final data set includes 722 observations involving 
388 vulnerabilities and 156 vendors. Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the 
vulnerabilities in our data set for different years. In Figure 2, we create a histogram to 
show the distribution of patch release time for the vulnerability-vendor pairs in our data 
set. The figure shows that about 50% of vulnerabilities in our data set have been patched 
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within 30 days after vendors have been notified. The percentage of vulnerabilities 
patched gradually decreases over time. 
 
TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics for Vulnerabilities across Years 
Year Number of Observations Number of Vulnerabilities Number of Vendors 
2006 280 134 28 
2007 287 175 52 
2008 132 65 59 
2009 23 14 17 
Total 722 388 156 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Distribution of Patch Release Time 
 
2.7.2. Sample Data 
We present some examples of vulnerability information in Table 3. Vulnerability 
VU#554257 was published by US-CERT and the same vulnerability was published by 
NVD under the identifier CVE-2007-2798. This vulnerability allows a remote, 
authenticated user to be able to execute arbitrary code on an affected system or cause the 
affected program to crash, resulting in a denial of service according to US-CERT. This 
vulnerability was discovered by an anonymous discoverer working with iDefense. US-
CERT lists 45 vendors whose products may be affected by this vulnerability and 
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contacted all the vendors about the possible existence of this vulnerability in their 
products. Five vendors acknowledged the vulnerability in their products and US-CERT 
lists these vendors’ status as “vulnerable”. Four vendors reported that their products are 
not affected by this vulnerability and US-CERT lists their status as “not vulnerable”. The 
remaining 36 vendors chose not to respond to US-CERT and their status is listed as 
“unknown”. In this study, we focus on the vendors whose status is listed as “vulnerable” 
by US-CERT. Sun Microsystems, and Debian GNU are illustrative examples for this 
vulnerability VU#554257. US-CERT notified both vendors on 6/18/2007 about the 
existence of this vulnerability in their products. US-CERT made this vulnerability public 
on 6/26/2007, 8 days after notifying vendors. Debian GNU released its new release type 
of patch for this vulnerability on 6/28/2007, 10 days after its notification. On the other 
hand, Sun Microsystems released its update type of patch for this vulnerability on 
8/15/2007, 58 days after its notification.  
VU#993544 vulnerability was published by the US-CERT, and published by 
NVD under the name of CVE-2007-3382. This vulnerability can increase the possibility 
of a session hijacking success according to US-CERT. This vulnerability was reported to 
US-CERT by a third party. US-CERT notified Apache Tomcat about the possible 
existence of this vulnerability on 7/2/2007, and made public this vulnerability on 
8/13/2007, 42 days after notifying vendors. This vulnerability affected Apache Tomcat 
version 4, 5, and 6. Apache Tomcat released a new version of Apache Tomcat 6 for this 
vulnerability 43 days after its notification, i.e., on 8/14/2007. Apache Tomcat released a 
new version of Apache Tomcat 5 for this vulnerability on 9/8/2007 and a new version of 
Apache Tomcat 4 for this vulnerability on 2/9/2008. Although US-CERT reported only 
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Apache Tomcat for this vulnerability, NVD listed multiple vendors such as Apple, HP, 
SUSE Linux, RedHat, and Apache Tomcat. Therefore, we record that multiple vendors 
were affected by this vulnerability. 
VU#132419 vulnerability was published by the US-CERT, and published by 
NVD under the name of CVE-2008-1585. This vulnerability allows an attacker to 
execute arbitrary code and was reported to US-CERT by a member of GNUCITIZEN, a 
white hat community working with TippingPoint’s Zero Day Initiative. Apple Computer 
was notified by TippingPoint on 5/8/2008 and, hence, the vendor notification date has 
been recorded for our study from TippingPoint website. TippingPoint and Apple 
Computer coordinated the patch release and public disclosure of the vulnerability on the 
same date, i.e., 6/9/2008. Apple Computer released a new version of Apple QuickTime 
for this vulnerability on 6/9/2008, 32 days after its notification. It also released a new 
version of Apple TV on 7/10/2008 that fixes this vulnerability. 
 
TABLE 3: Sample Observations of Vulnerability-vendor Pairs 
Vendor Sun Microsystems Debian GNU Apache Tomcat Apple Computer 
CERT Name VU#554257 VU#554257 VU#993544 VU#132419 
NVD Name CVE-2007-2798 CVE-2007-2798 CVE-2007-3382 CVE-2008-1585 
Notification Date 6/18/2007 6/18/2007 7/2/2007 5/8/2008 
Public Date 6/26/2007 6/26/2007 8/13/2007 6/9/2008 
Patch Date 8/15/2007 6/28/2007 8/14/2007 6/9/2008 
Patch Release Time 58 days 10 days 43 days 32 days 
Disclosure Time 8 days 8 days 42 days 32 days 
Confidentiality Complete Complete Partial Partial 
Integrity Complete Complete None Partial 
Availability Complete Complete None Partial 
Patch Type Update New Release New Release New Release 
Vendor Type Proprietary vendor OSS vendor OSS vendor Proprietary vendor 
Software Type System software System software System Software Application Software
Multiple Vendor Yes  Yes Yes No 
Multiple Patches No No Yes Yes 
Affected Product Solaris Debian GNU Linux Apache Tomcat Apple QuickTime 
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2.7.3. Data Analysis 
One of the assumptions of Cox’s proportional hazard model is the absence of 
outliers and the residual statistics such as deviance residuals that can be used to detect 
outliers (Allison 1995). Deviance residuals that exceed ±3 indicate possible outliers 
(Allison 1995). Our analysis showed that the deviance residuals of four observations 
exceeded -3.0 and these observations were removed from the data set.  
Cox’s proportional hazard model assumes that the hazards for each independent 
variable should be proportional over time and the hazard ratio should be constant (Allison 
1995). We tested this proportionality assumption with Shoenfeld residuals and our results 
show that the software vendor type violates the proportionality assumption. According to 
Allison (1995), one of the remedies for this violation is to treat the violating covariate as 
a time-dependent variable. Hence, the software vendor type is treated as a time-dependent 
covariate, allowing the hazard ratio for the vendor type to change over time. 
The goodness of fit of the model is tested with the chi-square value of the 
likelihood-ratio test which refers to the difference between the likelihood measures (-
2LL) for the null model and the proposed model (Allison 1995). The Chi-square statistic 
for our model is 576.41 with 10 degrees of freedom, resulting in a p-value < 0.0001. We 
reject the null hypothesis that all effects of the independent variables are zero, and, hence, 
our base model is statistically significant. The results of the model are shown in Table 4.  
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TABLE 4: Model Results (Dependent Variable: Patch Release Time, N=722) 
Variables Hazard Ratio Coefficients 
Disclosure 2.954 *** 1.083 
Multiple Patches 1.359 *** 0.307 
Confidentiality 1.226 0.204 
Integrity 1.064 0.061 
Availability 0.904 -0.101 
Patch Type 0.662 *** -0.412 
Vendor Type 10.429 *** 2.345 
Software Type 1.451 *** 0.373 
Multiple Vendor 1.681 *** 0.519 
Vendor Type x Time 0.693 *** -0.366 
*Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level 
 
In our base model, confidentiality impact, integrity impact, and availability 
impact are not statistically significant. The results are contrary to our expectations and do 
not support our hypotheses regarding vulnerability characteristics. These unexpected 
results lead us to analyze the correlation between confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. Although the definitions given for vulnerability characteristics by FIRST do 
not overlap, in practice there could be correlations between any pair of vulnerability 
characteristics. For example, if security attackers gain a right to modify data without 
authorization as a result of the exploitation of vulnerability, they may also acquire the 
content of data. Therefore, violations of integrity may also lead to the violation of 
confidentiality. The modification or destruction of data makes data unavailable or 
inaccessible. Therefore, violations of integrity may also result in violations of 
availability. 
In addition, an assumption of Cox’s proportional hazard model is the absence of 
multicolinearity (Allison 1995, Hosmer and Lemeshow 1999, Lin and Wei 1989). We 
examined the correlations between confidentiality, integrity, and availability using the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Pearson Correlation analysis (Fox 1991). 
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Pearson Correlation analysis indicates statistically significant correlation among 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, as shown in Table 5. The highest correlation 
was found between confidentiality and integrity, which may cause high standard errors 
for model coefficients. 
 
TABLE 5: Pearson Correlation Analysis (N=722) 
Variables Confidentiality Integrity Availability 
Confidentiality 1.000 0.928 *** 0.694 *** 
Integrity 0.928 *** 1.000 0.631 *** 
Availability 0.694 *** 0.631 *** 1.000 
*Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level 
 
In their study on Cox’s proportional hazard model, Poel and Lariviere (2004) 
indicated that lower correlations result in more stable parameter estimates. Their results 
show that the correlation coefficient cut-off can be 0.80 for Cox’s proportional hazard 
model (Poel and Lariviere 2004). Given the definitions for vulnerability characteristics by 
FIRST, each dimension of vulnerability is expected to be different in its impact on 
information systems security. However, correlation analysis of our data set indicates that 
confidentiality impact and integrity impact could not be separated, in part due to the 
limitation of the vulnerability scoring system (CVSS) (Mell and Scarfone 2007). We also 
tested the seriousness of high correlation between confidentiality and integrity with 
variance inflation factor (VIF) (Fox 1991). The VIF is found to be 8.40 for 
confidentiality, 7.23 for integrity, and 1.93 for availability. The VIF values greater than 
4.0 for confidentiality and integrity indicate high multicollinearity (Fox 1991). However, 
after dropping integrity impact in the model, the VIF has become 1.93 for both 
confidentiality impact and availability impact. Likewise, after dropping confidentiality 
impact from the data set, the VIF was reduced to 1.66 for both integrity impact and 
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availability impact. Therefore, we present two alternative models in our paper, with one 
retaining confidentiality impact and dropping integrity impact and other retaining 
integrity impact and dropping confidentiality impact. 
The Chi-square statistic is 576.20 for the confidentiality model and 574.20 for the 
integrity model with 9 degrees of freedom, resulting in a p-value < 0.0001. Hence, both 
of our models are found to be statistically significant. We also evaluate the differences 
between the confidentiality model and the integrity model using the Likelihood Ratio 
Test (LRT) (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1999) by creating nested models with the base 
model. In other words, we tested whether the two models show statistically different 
model fits. The chi-square value of the LRT test is found as 0.2117 for the confidentiality 
model and 2.2118 for the integrity model with 1 degree of freedom, resulting in a p-value 
> 0.10. The result of LRT tests indicates that there is no statistical difference in model fits 
between the two models, so we decided to retain both the confidentiality and integrity 
models. 
Even after resolving the multicollinearity problem with the confidentiality model 
and the integrity model, availability impact is still not found to be statistically significant 
although all other independent variables are. This led us to analyze the interaction terms 
that are missing in the models, since availability impact may not be observable by itself 
due to the interaction effect with other variables. We use backward stepwise regression 
starting with all two-way interactions in order to reach a final model, in which the 
interaction of availability impact with software vendor type is found significant. We 
                                                 
7 The chi-square value of the LRT test for the confidentiality model, which is the difference between Chi-
square statistics of two models, is calculated as follows: (0.211 = 576.41 – 576.20) 
8 The chi-square value of the LRT test for the integrity model, which is the difference between Chi-square 
statistics of two models, is calculated as follows: (2.211 = 576.41 – 574.20) 
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analyzed the vulnerability data set after including the interaction between software 
vendor type and availability impact. The Chi-square statistics is 591.349 for the 
confidentiality model and 589.3910 for the integrity model with 10 degrees of freedom, 
resulting in a p-value < 0.0001. Hence, we conclude that our revised models (with the 
interaction between software vendor type and availability impact) are statistically 
significant. The results are shown in Table 6. 
 
TABLE 6: Model Results (Dependent Variable: Patch Release Time, N=722) 
 Confidentiality Model Integrity Model 
Variables Hazard Ratio Coefficients Hazard Ratio Coefficients 
Disclosure 2.935 *** 1.077 3.028 *** 1.108 
Multiple Patches 1.371 *** 0.316 1.373 *** 0.317 
Confidentiality 1.301 *** 0.263     -     - 
Integrity     -     - 1.278 *** 0.245 
Availability 0.642 *** -0.443 0.685 *** -0.379 
Patch Type 0.672 *** -0.397 0.677 *** -0.390 
Vendor Type 5.064 *** 1.622 5.350 *** 1.677 
Software Type 1.485 *** 0.396 1.468 *** 0.384 
Multiple Vendor 1.643 *** 0.497 1.577 *** 0.455 
Vendor Type x Time 0.679 *** -0.387 0.670 *** -0.400 
Vendor Type x Availability 1.713 *** 0.538 1.712 *** 0.538 
*Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level 
 
We tested the robustness of our model by applying it on different data sets 
different time periods. First, we changed the cutoff date from June 20, 2009 to June 20, 
2008 and created one data set with 622 observations covering the period from June 21, 
2006 to June 20, 2008. Then, we changed the beginning date from June 21, 2006 to 
December 21, 2006, and created a second data set with 448 observations covering the 
period from December 21, 2006 to June 20, 2009. Lastly, we created a third data set 
                                                 
9 The chi-square value of the LRT test for the confidentiality model is found as (-15.14 = 576.20 – 591.34) 
with 1 degree of freedom, resulting in a p-value < 0.005. The result of LRT test indicates that this model 
has the better fit. 
10 The chi-square value of the LRT test is found as (-15.19 = 574.20 – 589.39) with 1 degree of freedom, 
resulting in a p-value < 0.005. The result of LRT test indicates that this model has the better fit. 
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between December 21, 2006 and June 20, 2008 with 353 observations. The results from 
the three data sets were not statistically different. In order for data sets to accurately 
represent all years studied based on the number of vulnerabilities published in each year, 
we used a stratified random sampling method, and created data sets with 216, 361, and 
505 observations. We also found that the results from these three data sets were not 
statistically different. 
2.7.4. Results 
The significance of the coefficient of each predictor is used to assess the support 
for the relevant hypothesis. The hazard ratio (HR) for each predictor is computed using 
the coefficients of the predictor and any other interactive terms involving the predictor. A 
HR value greater than 1 for a predictor implies that an increase in the value of the 
predictor will be associated with a quicker release of a patch by the vendor (positive 
impact). A HR value less than 1 implies that an increase in the value of the predictor will 
be associated with a slower release of the path (negative impact) and a HR value of 1 
implies no effect of the predictor on the patch release time. The calculations of hazard 
ratios for our model variables are presented in Appendix A. Although we created two 
models (the confidentiality model and the integrity model), we use the confidentiality 
model to explain our main results except when we explain the results regarding integrity 
impact. The results show that vendor’s patch release behavior is affected by the 
confidentiality impact score, integrity impact score, availability impact score, patch type, 
software vendor type, software type, patch quality, and the presence of multiple vendors. 
The result for disclosure (control variable in our model) is consistent with the results of 
previous studies (Arora et al. 2010a) and show that vulnerabilities that are made public 
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are patched 2.93 times faster than those that are not made public (see Table A1 in 
Appendix A). 
Vendors release patches 1.30 times faster if the vulnerability’s confidentiality 
impact score is 1 (partial) compared to vulnerabilities with no confidentiality impact. For 
vulnerabilities with a confidentiality impact score of 2 (complete), the patches are 
released 1.69 times faster compared to vulnerabilities with no confidentiality impact (see 
Table A3 in Appendix A). Therefore, our hypothesis H1 is supported.  
The integrity model shows that vendors release patches 1.28 times faster if the 
vulnerability’s integrity impact score is 1 (partial) compared to vulnerabilities with no 
integrity impact. For vulnerabilities with a integrity impact score of 2 (complete), the 
patches are released 1.63 times faster compared to vulnerabilities with no integrity impact 
(see Table A4 in Appendix A). Therefore, our hypothesis H2 is supported.  
Confidentiality and integrity have statistically similar impacts on the patch release 
time because the VIFs and Pearson Correlation analyses show high correlation between 
confidentiality and integrity. Thus, they are the most serious vulnerability characteristics 
that significantly affect the patch release behavior of vendors by decreasing the patch 
release time. Hence, H5 is supported, and H4 is partially supported. 
The model indicates that availability impact has an interaction with software 
vendor type. When we consider software vendor type, the impact of availability score on 
the patch release behavior is different for proprietary vendors and open source software 
(OSS) vendors. Vulnerabilities are patched 1.10 times faster by OSS vendors if 
availability impact is partial compared to no availability impact and 1.21 times faster if 
availability impact is complete (see Table A5 in Appendix A). Higher availability impact, 
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therefore, decreases the patch release time of OSS vendors. In contrast, proprietary 
vendors release patches slower (0.64 times slower if availability impact is partial 
compared to no availability impact and 0.41 times slower if availability impact is 
complete) (see Table A5 in Appendix A). Higher availability impact, therefore, increases 
the patch release time of proprietary vendors. The patch release behavior of proprietary 
vendors seems contrary to our expectations. One possible explanation is that proprietary 
vendors prioritize the patching needs for availability impacts differently compared to 
OSS vendors. Proprietary vendors may expect that vulnerabilities with availability 
impacts could be countered sooner by customer actions such as backup, redundant sites 
and other means without having to wait for proprietary vendor’s patch release cycle. It 
could also be that the internalization of social cost in the absence of significant legislation 
affecting availability (in contrast to confidentiality) is different for PS vendors compared 
to OSS vendors. In other words PS vendors could view the components of social cost 
(e.g., loss of reputation, loss of future business, and customer support costs) differently 
compared to OSS vendors. This is an interesting issue that merits further research.  
Vulnerabilities are patched 0.67 times slower if patch type is new release (see 
Table A6 in Appendix A). In other words, vulnerabilities are patched 1.49 times (i.e., 
1/0.67 times) faster if patch type is update. An update type of patch, therefore, is patched 
faster than a new release type of patches. Thus, H6 is supported. 
Vulnerabilities pertaining to system software are patched 1.49 times faster than 
vulnerabilities belonging to application software (see Table A7 in Appendix A) and, 
hence, H8 is supported. The results show that software vendors’ response to 
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vulnerabilities belonging to different types of software is affected by the level of access 
to and control of data resources, and a software interface provided by software.  
Software vendors release lower quality patches 1.37 times faster than higher 
quality patches (see Table A8 in Appendix A). Thus, H9 is supported. The results show 
that software vendors may choose to release lower patch quality to incur less 
development cost and also to reduce the potential customer loss by the early release of 
patches, even though of low quality. 
Vulnerabilities affecting multiple vendors are patched 1.64 times faster than 
vulnerabilities affecting single vendor (see Table A2 in Appendix A). Thus, H10 is 
supported. Vendor’s patch release decision is affected by the presence of other vendors’ 
products with the same vulnerability, and the possibility that other vendors release a 
patch earlier. The underlying incentive of software vendors to release a patch earlier 
could avoid the threat of disclosure and customers' penalty on late patching. 
The model indicates that software vendor type has interaction with availability 
impact. It has also an interaction with time. When availability impact is none, we found 
that OSS vendors release patches 3.44 times faster than proprietary vendors (see Table 
A9 in Appendix A). When availability impact is partial, we found that OSS vendors 
release patches 5.89 times faster than proprietary vendors (see Table A9 in Appendix A). 
When availability impact is complete, we found that OSS vendors release patches 10.10 
times faster than proprietary vendors (see Table A9 in Appendix A). Although the patch 
release time of software vendors is changed based on availability impact, the results show 
that OSS vendors always release patches faster than proprietary vendors, thus H7 is 
supported. 
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2.8. Discussion and Conclusion 
Studying the patch release behaviors of software vendors is an emerging research 
area with important policy implications. However, research in this area is just beginning 
to emerge, with one recent pioneering empirical study (Arora et al. 2010a). This paper 
both reinforces and adds to prior research (Arora et al. 2010a) by studying a proportional 
hazard model of patch release behavior. A major contribution of this paper is the fact that 
it highlights differential effects of confidentiality and availability impacts, and integrity 
and availability impacts on vendor patch release behavior. It also points to the possible 
importance of legislation as a means of influencing vendor patch release behavior. 
The model presented in the previous sections addresses a call in prior research 
(Arora et al. 2010a) for models with more comprehensive sets of variables to explain 
software vendor patch release behavior. We have developed a model using cost-based 
theory that includes development cost as well as internalization of social cost in the 
presence of governmental action. Such a theory allows us to study different types of 
vulnerabilities and their impact on vendor patch release behavior. The results presented in 
the previous section, reinforce prior results and, in addition, provide new results with 
important implications for policy and future research. We find that the impacts of 
vulnerability severity, vendor type (open source or proprietary vendor), software type 
(system or application software), and patch quality on patch release behavior are 
consistent with prior research (Arora et al. 2010a). Our results also illustrate that 
vulnerabilities that impact multiple vendors are patched faster than vulnerabilities that 
impact single vendors, thus reinforcing the value of competition (Arora et al. 2010b, 
Cavusoglu et al. 2007). Our results point to differential impacts of different types of 
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vulnerabilities on patch release behavior. We find that vulnerabilities that have high 
confidentiality impact or high integrity impact are patched fastest. Given that 
confidentiality impact and integrity impact are governed by legislation, our results have 
important policy implications and illustrate that legislation could influence vendor 
behavior in a socially optimal manner.  
Though our results are interesting and represent a significant addition to 
vulnerability disclosure research, additional research opportunities exist to use other 
methodologies such as survey research. It is important to recognize the limitations of 
CVSS. The CVSS mainly consists of three metric groups: 1) the base metrics which 
describe the vulnerability characteristics that are constant over time and across user 
environments, 2) the temporal metrics which describe vulnerability attributes that change 
over time but are the same across user environments, and 3) the environmental metrics 
which describe vulnerability attributes that are user environment specific. The base 
metrics is mandatory and the CVSS score is calculated based on the values of base 
metrics. However, the temporal and environmental metrics are optional and are not 
reported by the FIRST. The CVSS score can be expanded by the combination with the 
other two optional metrics. It is possible that differential impact of different types of 
vulnerability could be accentuated due to the optional metrics.  
Although the temporal and environmental metrics are not in the scope of this 
study, the impact of environmental metrics on the results of this study should be 
considered. Mell and Scarfone (2007) argued that the proper implementation of the 
CVSS score is environment dependent. This view is consistent with the idea put forth by 
Frühwirth and Männistö (2009). They argued that the actual impact of software 
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vulnerabilities may vary across different types of user environments. In particular, this 
limitation of the CVSS may have an impact on the actual interpretation of availability 
impact since losing the availability of information systems is often caused by DOS 
attacks. The availability may be more important to some organizations (e.g., 
amazon.com) for business continuity, but less important to other organizations or 
individual users. On the other hand, this limitation is not easily addressed due to the 
difficulty of collecting environment-specific information. In our study, we assume that 
vendors do not target the particular type of user groups with the release of patches for 
their products. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF 
OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE NETWORKS 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Traditionally, software has been developed by organizations that do not make the 
source code of software publicly available. In the traditional software development, 
software developers have worked in local clusters of collaboration that were generally 
isolated within firms (Fleming and Marx 2006). More recently, open source software 
(OSS) development has become the alternative way of developing software. OSS 
development has brought together software developers spanning firm boundaries 
(Raymond 1999). OSS development mainly depends on voluntary contributions of 
software developers and OSS products are developed in a collective manner beyond the 
boundaries of a single organization (Raymond 1999). Thus, formerly isolated software 
developers have become large connected networks in OSS development. The network of 
software developers becomes more important for OSS projects and offers various 
benefits. First, collaboration among software developers can facilitate access to and 
sharing of resources, allowing developers to combine their knowledge, skills, and 
expertise (Raymond 1999).  
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Second, new insights, ideas or ways to solve problems are conceived by any one and 
accessed by others (Raymond 1999). Thus, OSS development has changed the 
conception of how software can be developed. However, not all software projects are 
completed successfully (Li et al. 2010). Understanding the factors that lead to successful 
OSS projects is an interesting area of current research. OSS development offers new 
research opportunities to better understand the network structure of OSS developers.  
Software product after delivery is improved by correcting faults or enhanced by 
adding new features based on user requirements (Banker and Slaughter 2000, Banker et 
al. 1998, IEEE 1983). The total cost of software maintenance is estimated to comprise at 
least 50% of total software life cycle costs (Van Vliet 2000, Kemerer and Slaughter 1999, 
Kemerer 1995). Thus, the modification of software after delivery is one of the major 
phases of software development. In software maintenance, we identified two important 
types of OSS project activities: patch development and feature request. Patch 
development activities are used to correct faults in software while feature request 
activities are used to enhance software by adding new features. Recent research on OSS 
development focused on the analysis of OSS requirements and used feature request 
activities in their analysis (Vlas and Robinson 2012). Software is defined as a knowledge 
product (Slaughter et al. 2006) and critical inputs to software development are skills and 
experience of developers (Li et al. 2010). Therefore, each activity requires different 
structure of collaboration and knowledge sharing among the developers since each 
activity has different objectives. 
In an organizational context, exploitation and exploration have been identified as 
two types of activities for the development and use of knowledge in organizations (March 
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1991). Prior research indicates that different types of tasks require different 
communication patterns and different amount of communication based on characteristics 
and nature of a task (Katz and Tushman 1979). A task can differ along several 
dimensions including time span, specific vs. general problem orientation, and the 
generation of new knowledge vs. using existing knowledge (Katz and Tushman 1979). 
March (1991) has suggested that exploitation and exploration represent fundamentally 
incompatible and inconsistent activities. For example, exploitation represents activities 
that improve existing organizational competencies and build on the existing technological 
trajectory. Therefore, exploitation broadens existing knowledge and skills, improves 
established designs, and expands existing products and services. In contrast, exploration 
represents activities that changes the organizational competencies and build on a different 
technological trajectory. Therefore, exploration requires new knowledge, offers new 
designs, and creates new products and services. In addition, exploitation is related to 
efficiency, centralization, and tight cultures while exploration is associated with 
flexibility, decentralization, and loose cultures (Benner and Tushman 2003). Therefore, 
exploitation and exploration require different organizational structures (Benner and 
Tushman 2003, Levinthal and March 1993). Different organizational structures for 
exploitation and exploration enable exploitative teams to develop the best viable 
solutions, and enable exploratory teams to explore new ideas (Fang et al. 2010).  
Recent research on OSS development has focused on the project level (Singh et 
al. 2011, Singh 2010, Singh et al. 2007, Grewal et al. 2006). However, this stream of 
research has not recognized the fact that projects could consist of different types of 
activities, each of which could require different types of expertise and network structures. 
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Developers who engage in project activities that are exploitation-oriented may be 
networked differently compared to those who are engaged in exploration-oriented project 
activities. Therefore, recent research on OSS development has not differentiated between 
different types of OSS activities nor between different types of OSS networks. We 
propose that OSS project activities can be classified as implementation-oriented 
(exploitation) and innovation-oriented (exploration) based on organizational theory 
(March 1991). In the context of OSS development, developing a patch would be an 
example of an exploitation activity. Requesting a new software feature would be an 
example of an exploration activity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research 
to study OSS development at the activity level. 
In this dissertation, we introduce the use of organizational theory on exploration 
and exploitation together with social network analysis as a theoretical lens to study 
different types of sub-networks in OSS development. Thus, we studied exploitation and 
exploration in the content of OSS development. We empirically examined the differences 
between exploitation (patch development) and exploration (feature request) networks of 
developers in OSS projects in terms of their social network structure. We used a data set 
collected from the SourceForge database. Our results indicate that a patch development 
network has greater internal cohesion and network centrality than a feature request 
network. In contrast, a feature request network has greater external connectivity than a 
patch development network. 
3.2. Literature Review 
There are multiple streams of research that help us to understand the structural 
differences of OSS networks. A software product after delivery is improved by correcting 
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faults or enhanced by adding new features based on user requirements (Banker and 
Slaughter 2000, Banker et al. 1998, IEEE 1983). Thus, in software maintenance, we 
identified two important types of OSS project activities: patch development and feature 
request. Software is a knowledge product (Slaughter et al. 2006) and critical inputs to 
software development are skills and experience of developers (Li et al. 2010). Therefore, 
each activity requires different structure of collaboration and knowledge sharing among 
the developers since each activity has different objectives. Recent studies on social 
network literature indicated that network structures determine the structure of 
collaboration and knowledge sharing among actors. 
In an organizational context, exploitation and exploration have been identified as 
two types of activities for the development and use of knowledge in organizations (March 
1991). Prior research indicates that different types of tasks require different 
communication patterns and different amount of communication based on characteristics 
and nature of a task (Katz and Tushman 1979). March (1991) has suggested that 
exploitation and exploration represent fundamentally incompatible and inconsistent 
activities. Exploitation creates a narrow range of deeper solutions and more distinctive 
competences since exploitation results in the convergence of ideas (March 1991). In 
contrast, exploration creates a wide range of undeveloped new ideas and limited 
distinctive competence (March 1991). Therefore, exploitation and exploration require 
different organizational structures. 
3.2.1. Open Source Software Development 
Software maintenance is defined as the modification of a software product after 
delivery to correct faults, to improve performance or other attributes, and to enhance the 
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product by adapting it to a modified environment (Banker and Slaughter 2000, Banker et 
al. 1998, IEEE 1983). Thus, a software product is improved by correcting faults or 
enhanced by adding new features based on user requirements. 
Raymond (1999) indicated that the different nature of software development 
process for proprietary and OSS vendors leads to two fundamentally different software 
development styles: the cathedral model for proprietary vendors and the bazaar model for 
OSS vendors (Raymond 1999). Software development involves knowledge work and its 
most important resource is the specialized skills and expertise that a developer brings to 
the project development (Espinosa et al. 2007, Roberts et al. 2004, Faraj and Sproull 
2000). Proprietary software is developed in a more closed environment and, hence, 
proprietary software development is characterized by a relatively strong control of design 
and implementation (Raymond 1999). In contrast, OSS vendors mainly depend on 
voluntary contributions of software developers and, hence, OSS products are developed 
in the collective manner beyond the boundaries of a single organization (Raymond 1999). 
Therefore, OSS development depends on contributions and collaboration of volunteer 
software developers (Liu and Iyer 2007, Feller and Fitzgerald 2002). The network of 
developers becomes more important for OSS projects and offers various benefits. First, 
collaboration among software developers can facilitate access to and sharing of resources, 
allowing developers to combine their knowledge, skills, and expertise. Second, new 
insights, ideas or ways to solve problems are conceived by any one and accessed by 
others. This leads to increase the performance of developer teams to find a solution for 
developing patches or to add new features.  
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Given the benefits of voluntary contributions of software developers for OSS 
development, the impact of network structure of OSS developer network (Singh et al. 
2011, Singh 2010, Grewal et al. 2006) and the formation of OSS developer teams (Hahn 
et al. 2008) have been intensively studied. Recent studies showed that the network 
structure of OSS developers significantly affects OSS project success (Singh et al. 2011, 
Singh 2010, Grewal et al. 2006). 
3.2.2. Open Source Software Collaboration Network 
In social network literature, an affiliation network is a special kind of network 
which depends on the affiliation between two groups (Wasserman and Faust 1994). 
Therefore, an affiliation network has two-modes. The first mode is a set of actors such as 
developers. The second mode is a set of events such as OSS activities to which the actors 
belong. The term affiliation refers to membership or participation to events. Therefore, 
actors are related to each other through their joint affiliation with or their co-membership 
to events. Events are also related to each other through common actor(s). 
OSS software development is a community-based model which involves 
collaboration among software developers. OSS developers may work on multiple 
activities concurrently. An activity starts when a developer open new activity under a 
project. Other developers may join and start participating to an activity. An activity is 
performed by developers who joined to that activity. Thus, OSS developers belong to 
multiple activities. A co-membership relationship exists between two developers if they 
work together on the same activity. Similarly, a relationship between two activities also 
exists if they share some developer(s). This kind of relationships between developers and 
activities can be represented by an affiliation network. In OSS network, actors are 
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developers, and events are activities such as patch development and feature request 
activities. 
3.2.3. Exploitation and Exploration Networks 
March (1991) modeled two general situations involving the development and use 
of knowledge in organizations: the exploitation of old certainties and the exploration of 
new possibilities. The first is the case of mutual learning between members of an 
organization. The second is the case of learning and competitive advantage in 
competition for primacy. Exploitation includes things such as refinement, choice, 
production, efficiency, selection, implementation, and execution (March 1991). In 
contrary, exploration includes things captured by terms such as search, variation, risk 
taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, and innovation (March 1991). 
According to Benner and Tushman (2003), exploitation represents activities that involve 
improvements in existing components and build on the existing technological trajectory. 
Exploitation is incremental innovations and designed to meet the needs of existing 
customers or markets (Benner and Tushman 2003). It broadens existing knowledge and 
skills, improves established designs, and expands existing products and services. Hence, 
exploitation builds on existing knowledge and reinforces existing skills, processes, and 
structures (Benner and Tushman 2002, Levinthal and March 1993, Lewin et al. 1999). In 
contrast, exploration represents activities that involve a shift to a different technological 
trajectory and changes the organizational competencies. Exploration is radical 
innovations and designed to meet the needs of emerging customers or markets (Benner 
and Tushman 2003). It offers new designs, creates new markets. Thus, exploration 
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requires new knowledge or departures from existing knowledge (Benner and Tushman 
2002, Levinthal and March 1993).  
For March (1991), exploitation and exploration represent the fundamentally 
incompatible and inconsistent activities. Exploitation creates a narrow range of deeper 
solutions and more distinctive competences in the short-run, which comes at the cost of 
long-term performance since exploitation results in the convergence of ideas by 
eliminating the differences (March 1991). In contrary, exploration creates a wide range of 
undeveloped new ideas and too little distinctive competence in the long-term, which 
comes at the cost of short-term performance (March 1991). Moreover, exploitation is 
related to efficiency, centralization, and tight cultures while exploration is associated with 
flexibility, decentralization, and loose cultures (Benner and Tushman 2003). Therefore, 
exploitation and exploration require different organizational structures (Benner and 
Tushman 2003, Levinthal and March 1993). Different organizational structures for 
exploitation and exploration enable exploitative teams to develop the best viable 
solutions, and enable exploratory teams to explore new ideas (Fang et al. 2010). Recent 
studies found that organizational units pursuing exploration are smaller, more 
decentralized, and more flexible than those responsible for exploitation (Benner and 
Tushman 2003, Christensen 1998, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996).  
3.2.4. Social Network and Team Structure 
Software development is a highly interdependent task and requires team members 
to interact with each other intensively to produce a successful system (He et al. 2007). 
Therefore, interactions among team members are necessary activities to transform team 
members’ knowledge to team knowledge that increase the project success (He et al. 
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2007). However, the nature of OSS development characterized by volunteer contribution 
of software developers poses challenges in coordination among developers (Espinosa et 
al. 2007, Roberts et al. 2004, Banker et al. 2006). Coordination is the process of 
managing dependencies among activities (Malone and Crowston 1994). When the 
activities of multiple individuals need to interrelate, the interdependencies among 
activities should be well managed (Espinosa et al. 2007). Espinosa et al. (2007) indicated 
that when software is produced from multiple locations, it becomes more difficult to 
manage dependencies among activities and to coordinate developers, which increases the 
development time. Therefore, the coordination among developers becomes important for 
project success in software development.  
He et al. (2007) created a model of the formation and evolution of team cognition 
and analyzed the impacts of preexistent and ongoing collaboration ties on the formation 
of team cognition in software project teams. Team cognition refers to the mental models 
collectively held by a group of individuals that enable them to accomplish tasks by acting 
as a coordinated unit (He et al. 2007). Team cognition helps software project teams 
effectively manage their members’ knowledge, expertise, and skills as integrated assets 
(He et al. 2007, Espinosa et al. 2007). Team cognition is created by both preexisting 
conditions and ongoing team interactions. Preexisting conditions reflect both the prior 
knowledge of team members and any previous shared experiences that team members 
have. Team interactions refer to the interactive activities that members perform to carry 
out project tasks and facilitate team performance. He et al. (2007) showed that the 
positive relationship between team performance and team cognition. Similarly, Hahn et 
al. (2008) studied the impact of prior collaboration ties on OSS collaboration team 
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formation mechanisms and on OSS project success. They indicated that team cohesion is 
related to preference for repeat collaborations and results from prior relationships 
between developers to benefit from prior relationships. Team members also tend to 
interact more frequently with other members with whom they share some type of 
proximity or similarity (Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003, Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001). 
In social network literature, social capital is defined as resources embedded in 
social networks, and resources that can be accessed or mobilized through social ties in the 
networks (Coleman 1988, Lin 2005). Through social ties, an actor may capture other 
actors’ resources. These social resources can generate a return for the actor. In addition, 
because of the facilitative role of network structure, relationships among actors in a 
network are described as network resources (Gulati 1999). Recent studies also indicated 
that the position of a team in a network affects team outcomes (Singh et al. 2011, Singh 
2010, Zaheer and Bell 2005, Reagans and Zuckerman 2001, Jansen et al. 2006, Schilling 
and Phelps 2007, Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003, Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001).  
In social network literature, there are two contradictory perspectives about the 
form of network structures: the internal focus or social closure perspective (Coleman 
1988) and the external focus or structural holes perspective (Burt 1992). From Coleman 
(1988)’s social closure perspective, the optimal social structure is one generated by 
building dense, interconnected networks. Social closure inside a group indicates the 
presence of relationships or the absence of structural holes within a group, and is thought 
to foster identification with the group (Reagans and Zuckerman 2001) and a level of 
mutual trust, which facilitates exchange and collective action (Coleman 1988). Social 
closure enables the convergence of individual interests to pursuit common initiatives and 
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to facilitate mutual coordination (Reagans and Zuckerman 2001). From Burt (1992)’s 
structural holes perspective, constructing networks consisting of disconnected alters is the 
optimal strategy. Structural holes perspective focuses value derived from bridging gaps 
(i.e., structural holes) between nodes in a social network (Burt 1992). This boundary 
spanning structure generates information benefits since information tends to be relatively 
redundant within a given group (Burt 1992). As a result, actors who develop ties with 
disconnected groups gain access to a broader range of ideas and opportunities than those 
who have restricted access to single group (Granovetter 1973). Although prior research 
on social network analysis indicated the trade-off between two contradictory 
perspectives, these two perspectives do not conflict with one another (Reagans and 
Zuckerman 2001). While the social closure perspective highlights the importance of the 
presence of relationships in local interactions (i.e., internal cohesion), the external focus 
perspective highlights information benefits created by structural holes that divide a social 
network globally (i.e., external cohesion). 
Ahuja (2000) studied the impact of social network structures on innovation in 
terms of direct ties, indirect ties, and structural holes. The debate on structural holes 
suggests that an accurate understanding of the role of structural holes in the collaboration 
network must account for both Coleman's and Burt's variants of the argument (Ahuja 
2000). Similarly, direct and indirect ties may vary in their content, which highlights the 
importance of decomposing the firm's ego network into distinct and separate elements 
and identifying the contents transmitted through each type of tie (Ahuja 2000). According 
to Ahuja (2000), network ties are associated with two distinct kinds of network benefits. 
First, they can provide the benefit of resource sharing, allowing firms to combine 
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knowledge, and skills. Second, collaborative linkages can provide access to knowledge 
spillovers, serving as information conduits through which news of technical 
breakthroughs, new insights to problems, or failed approaches travels from one firm to 
another. In distinguishing between the resource-sharing and knowledge-spillover benefits 
of collaboration, it is important to distinguish between know-how and information (Kogut 
and Zander 1992). Know-how entails accumulated skills and expertise in some activity. 
Information refers primarily to facts that can be transmitted through communication 
(Kogut and Zander 1992, Szulanski 1996). The resource-sharing benefits of collaboration 
relate primarily to the transfer and sharing of know-how while the knowledge-spillover 
benefits are likely to involve predominantly information. Ahuja (2000) found that direct 
and indirect ties both have a positive impact on innovation but that the impact of indirect 
ties is moderated by the number of a firm's direct ties. Direct ties potentially provide both 
resource sharing and knowledge spillover benefits. However, indirect ties do not entail 
formal resource sharing benefits but can provide access to knowledge spillovers. 
Structural holes influence both resource sharing and access to novel information (Ahuja 
2000). Structural holes have both positive and negative influences on innovation. 
Specifically, increasing structural holes has a negative effect on innovation, so the 
optimal structure of networks depends on the objectives of the network members. 
Zaheer and Bell (2005) examined the impact of the network structure on the 
performance and innovativeness of companies by focusing on the external connectivity 
constructed as structural holes. They highlight the importance of connections to external 
sources for innovativeness. Zaheer and Bell (2005) found that firms bridging structural 
holes are more innovative and perform better than other firms. They also indicated that 
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the internal connectiveness enables firms to further exploit the ideas obtained from 
external resources. 
Jansen et al. (2006) focused on the differences of exploration and exploitation, 
and examined the impact of internal cohesion and centralization on exploitation and 
exploration. They found that internal connectedness within teams positively affects the 
performance of exploitation and exploration teams while centralization negatively affects 
exploration teams. However, Balkundi and Harrison (2006) indicated that teams that are 
central in their inter-group network tend to perform better. 
Schilling and Phelps (2007) examined the impact of clustering on the innovative 
output of firms that are members of the network. Innovation is characterized as a process 
in which solutions are discovered via search process that leads to the creation of new 
knowledge or the novel recombination of known elements of knowledge, problems, or 
solutions (Fleming 2001). Schilling and Phelps (2007) indicated the positive association 
between clustering and innovation output.  
Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001) studied the impact of organization and technology 
domain on subsequent technological development. They stressed the importance of 
knowledge internally acquired from the similar technology domains on exploitation, and 
the importance of knowledge externally acquired from the distinct technology domains 
on exploration. In other words, organizations can develop more distinctive competence 
and becomes more expert in their current domain if they focus on their current 
organizational domain and the similar technological areas. Distinctive competences can 
improve the performance of developer teams on exploitation (March 1991, Rosenkopf 
and Nerkar 2001). In contrast, organizations can develop more diverse and less 
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distinctive competence if they focus on their external organizational domain and the 
distinct technological areas. More diverse and less distinctive competence can improve 
the performance of developer teams on exploration (March 1991, Rosenkopf and Nerkar 
2001). Lazer and Friedman (2007) on their agent-based simulation model of information 
sharing found that a network that maintains diversity is better for exploration than other 
networks, supporting a more thorough search for solutions in the long run. 
Social network analysis (Wasserman and Faust 1994) has been used in a variety 
of contexts to study the relationship between social entities. Based on the findings of 
social network research (Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001, Ahuja 2000, Uzzi 1999, Uzzi 
1997, Uzzi 1996, Watts and Strogatz 1998, Krackhardt 1998, Wasserman and Faust 
1994, Burt 1992, Coleman 1988, Freeman, 1979, Granovetter 1973), organizational 
research (Schilling and Phelps 2007, Hansen 2002, Hansen 1999, Reagans and 
Zuckerman 2001), and OSS development research (Singh et al. 2011, Singh 2010, Singh 
et al. 2007, Grewal et al. 2006), structural properties of the networks are used to analyze 
the network. Many structural properties of these networks could have multiple social 
network measures. For example, there are different types of internal cohesion measures 
(clustering coefficient, repeat ties, third party ties, and structural equivalence), external 
connectivity measures (external cohesion, direct ties, indirect ties, and technological 
diversity), and network location measures (degree centrality, betweenness centrality, and 
closeness centrality).  
3.3. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
In software development literature, software product after delivery is improved by 
correcting faults or enhanced by adding new features based on user requirements (Banker 
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and Slaughter 2000, Banker et al. 1998, IEEE 1983). Therefore, we identified two types 
of OSS project activities: patch development and feature request. Patch development 
activities are used to correct faults in software while feature request activities are used to 
enhance software by adding new features. In organizational literature, exploitation and 
exploration have been identified as two types of activities for the development and use of 
knowledge in organizations (March 1991). Combining findings of organizational 
literature and software development literature, we propose that OSS project activities can 
be classified as implementation-oriented (exploitation) and innovation-oriented 
(exploration). In the context of OSS development, developing a patch would be an 
example of an exploitation activity. Requesting a new software feature would be an 
example of an exploration activity. 
Prior research indicates that different types of tasks require different 
communication patterns and different amount of communication based on characteristics 
and nature of a task (Katz and Tushman 1979). A task can differ along several 
dimensions including time span, specific vs. general problem orientation, and the 
generation of new knowledge vs. using existing knowledge (Katz and Tushman 1979). 
This is consistent with the view of March (1991) who has suggested that exploitation and 
exploration represent fundamentally incompatible and inconsistent activities. For 
example, exploitation represents activities that improve existing organizational 
competencies and build on the existing technological trajectory. Therefore, exploitation 
broadens existing knowledge and skills, improves established designs, and expands 
existing products and services. In contrast, exploration represents activities that changes 
the organizational competencies and build on a different technological trajectory. 
67 
 
Therefore, exploration requires new knowledge, offers new designs, and creates new 
products and services. In addition, exploitation is related to efficiency, centralization, and 
tight cultures while exploration is associated with flexibility, decentralization, and loose 
cultures (Benner and Tushman 2003). Therefore, exploitation and exploration require 
different organizational structures (Benner and Tushman 2003, Levinthal and March 
1993). Different organizational structures for exploitation and exploration enable 
exploitative teams to develop the best viable solutions, and enable exploratory teams to 
explore new ideas (Fang et al. 2010). In addition, software is a knowledge product 
(Slaughter et al. 2006) and critical inputs to the software development are skills and 
experience of developers (Li et al. 2010). Therefore, each project activity could require 
different types of expertise and network structures. In this dissertation, we empirically 
examined the differences between exploitation (patch development) and exploration 
(feature request) networks of developers in OSS projects in terms of their social network 
structure. 
3.3.1. Internal Cohesion 
OSS development mainly depends on voluntary contributions of software 
developers and OSS products are developed in the collective manner (Raymond 1999). 
OSS development process is characterized by the lack of a relatively strong control of 
design and implementation (Raymond 1999) and the lack of face-to-face communication 
(Singh et al. 2011). Therefore, OSS teams require constructive environment to foster 
trust, reciprocity norms and shared identity, and to improve collaboration and cooperation 
among developers (Singh et al. 2011).  
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Internal cohesion increases the information transmission capacity of a team 
(Schilling and Phelps 2007). First, internal cohesion improves access to information since 
the same information is available via multiple paths (Schilling and Phelps 2007). 
Information introduced into a team will quickly reach other team members through 
multiple paths. Multiple paths also enhance the fidelity of information received. 
Developers can compare information received from multiple partners, helping them to 
identify whether it is distorted or incomplete (Schilling and Phelps 2007). Second, 
internal cohesion makes information exchange meaningful and useful (Schilling and 
Phelps 2007). It can increase the dissemination of alternative interpretations of problems 
and their potential solutions, deepening the shared understanding and stimulating 
collective problem solving. Shared knowledge develops over time from prior familiarity 
with the product being developed and team members (Espinosa et al. 2007, He et al. 
2007). Shared knowledge improves coordination among team members because it 
enables team members to develop more accurate explanations and expectations about 
tasks and other team members (Espinosa et al. 2007) because prior interactions enable 
developers to acquire information about skills and capabilities of other developers 
(Granovetter 1985) and who knows what (Faraj and Sproull 2000). In addition, shared 
knowledge of problems and solutions enhances further learning (Schilling and Phelps 
2007). Third, internal cohesion can make developers more willing and able to improve 
information exchange and cooperation among team members by fostering trust, 
reciprocity norms, and shared identity (Coleman 1988, Uzzi and Spiro 2005, Adler and 
Kwon 2002, Levin and Cross 2004, Hansen 1999, Ahuja 2000). Enhanced trust, 
reciprocity norms, and shared identity results in a high level of cooperation and 
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collaboration by providing self-enforcing informal governance mechanisms (Schilling 
and Phelps 2007). Fourth, internal cohesion fosters group identification which enables the 
convergence of individual interests to pursuit common initiatives and to facilitate mutual 
coordination (Reagans and Zuckerman 2001). Fifth, internal cohesion also helps 
developers to develop team cognition which promote team coordination (Espinosa et al. 
2007, He et al. 2007). Team cognition refers to the mental models collectively held by a 
group of individuals that enable them to accomplish tasks by acting as a coordinated unit 
(He et al. 2007). Thus, team cognition helps developer teams effectively manage team 
members’ knowledge, expertise, and skills as integrated assets (He et al. 2007, Espinosa 
et al. 2007). 
Internal cohesion results in a high level of cooperation and collaboration among 
team members. By improving the information transmission capacity of a team, it also 
enables to exchange and integrate greater amounts of information and knowledge more 
rapidly. Internal cohesion allows individuals to develop a deep understanding to further 
refine and improve existing products, and processes (Rowley et al. 2000). However, 
internal cohesion diffuses strong norms and establishes shared expectations (Uzzi 1997, 
Rowley et al. 2000). Therefore, it reduces deviant behavior, limits search scope, and 
increases selective perception of alternatives. Internal cohesion may results in the 
homogenization of information within a team (Burt 1992, Granovetter 1973) and the 
convergence of knowledge and ideas (Levinthal and March 1993). Therefore, internal 
cohesion may limit access to alternative ways of thinking and novel information 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).  
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Patch development teams (exploitation teams) should be built on existing 
knowledge and reinforces existing skills, processes, and structures (Benner and Tushman 
2003, Levinthal and March 1993, Lewin et al. 1999). Patch development teams broadens 
existing knowledge and skills, improves established designs, and expands existing 
products and services (Benner and Tushman 2003). Rowley et al. (2000) indicated that 
internal cohesion enables team members to develop a deep understanding to further refine 
and improve existing products and processes. In contrast, feature request teams 
(exploration teams) should be built upon diverse knowledge that resides outside of the 
team (Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001) and require new knowledge (Benner and Tushman 
2002, Levinthal and March 1993). Therefore, feature request teams are required to 
acquire more novel information from external resources than patch development teams. 
Hence, internal cohesion is more likely to enhance patch development activities when 
compared to feature request activities. We argue that the internal cohesion of patch 
development teams is greater than the internal cohesion of feature request teams. This 
leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H1: The internal cohesion of patch development teams will be greater than the 
internal cohesion of feature request teams. 
3.3.2 External Connectivity 
Although the internal cohesion of a project team provides various benefits in 
terms of trust and information transmission capacity, project developers have access to 
external resources from their relationships to other developers outside of a project team. 
The structure and type of external relationships affect the ability of project developers to 
acquire various types of information (Singh et al. 2011). By following prior research, we 
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focus on the external network structure (the cohesion of external connections), types of 
external connections (direct ties and indirect ties) and technological characteristics of 
external connections that affect the diversity of external knowledge available to a focal 
project. 
External connections are associated with two distinct kinds of information 
benefits (Ahuja 2000). First, they can provide the benefit of resource sharing which 
allows teams to combine knowledge, and skills acquired from outside teams. Second, 
they can provide access to knowledge spillovers which serves as information conduits 
through which news of technical breakthroughs, new insights to problems, or failed 
approaches acquired from outside project teams. Although direct ties potentially provide 
both resource sharing and knowledge spillover benefits (Ahuja 2000), they more likely 
provide redundant information (Hansen 1999). However, indirect ties do not provide 
resource sharing benefits but can provide access to knowledge spillovers. Therefore, 
information provided by indirect ties is novel information (Hansen 1999). On the other 
hand, external cohesion provides both resource sharing and knowledge spillovers benefits 
(Ahuja 2000). Although how external contacts are connected with each other affects 
types of information, the characteristics of the external contacts may also affect the 
diversity of knowledge. External contacts with different technological expertise are more 
likely to provide novel information and knowledge. 
3.3.2.1 External Cohesion 
External cohesion is the cohesion among the external contacts of a project (Singh 
et al. 2011). External cohesion is based on the idea of a structural hole which means the 
absence of a connection between two developers who are connected to the common third 
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parties. Therefore, structural holes are defined as gaps in information flows between 
actors connected to the same actor but not directly connected to each other (Burt 2000). A 
structural hole separates developers on either side of the hole and creates the brokerage 
opportunities for those developers to obtain information from disconnected developers 
(Burt 1992). Therefore, structural holes provide both resource sharing and knowledge 
spillovers benefits (Granovetter 1973). 
External cohesion basically measures the extent to which external contacts of a 
project are connected to each other. If external contacts of a project are highly connected 
with each other (high external cohesion or low structural holes), a project is highly 
constrained to have access to novel information since too much cohesion results in 
homogenization of information and external contacts of a project may have relatively 
redundant information (Burt 2004, Burt 1992, Granovetter 1973). However, high external 
cohesion also enhances trust, reciprocity norms, and shared identity (Coleman 1988, Uzzi 
and Spiro 2005, Adler and Kwon 2002, Levin and Cross 2004). High external cohesion 
also improves access to external resources by enhancing information transmission 
capacity of the network since the same information is available via multiple paths 
(Schilling and Phelps 2007). Multiple paths also enhance the fidelity of the information 
received (Schilling and Phelps 2007). In contrast, if external contacts of a project are not 
connected with each other (low external cohesion or high structural holes), a project have 
access to novel information from remote parts of the network such as other disconnected 
project groups (Burt 1992). Therefore, the level of cohesion among the external contacts 
of a project determines the diversity of knowledge acquired from external contacts. 
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OSS network is made up of distinct developer teams in which developers are 
highly connected with each other within each project team, but weakly connected to other 
developers across other project teams (Singh 2010). Project teams tend to be 
heterogeneous across a network in terms of the knowledge they possess and produce 
because each team started with the different initial conditions (Fang et al. 2010). 
Therefore, external resources provide new knowledge, ideas, and insights (Rosenkopf 
and Almeida 2003).  
Knowledge is developed through combinations of existing and new knowledge 
(Kogut and Zander 1992). The process of sharing ideas with other projects that have 
novel information is to generate new knowledge, rather than merely exchanging existing 
information (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). This idea is consistent with the idea put forth 
by March (1994) that projects connected to other projects that have novel information 
may replicate innovative ideas and generate more new ideas which can be used to 
introduce new and innovative products. A project whose external contacts are not highly 
connected has access to new knowledge, ideas, and insights from disconnected external 
projects (Burt 2004, Burt 1992) and they are able to develop new knowledge through 
knowledge recombination (Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003). Therefore, a project whose 
external contacts are not highly connected is able to develop new understandings not 
possible to those whose external contacts are highly connected (Zaheer and Bell 2005). 
Combining diverse knowledge from other projects (different technology areas) also 
enhances the capacity for creative learning (Fleming 2001, Kogut and Zander 1992, 
Reagans and Zuckerman 2001). Feature request teams (exploration teams) should be built 
upon diverse knowledge that resides outside of the team (Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001) 
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and require new knowledge (Benner and Tushman 2002, Levinthal and March 1993). 
Therefore, feature request teams are required to acquire more novel information from 
external resources than patch development teams. In order to acquire more novel 
information from external resources, external contacts of a project should be diversified 
in terms of knowledge they hold, thereby they should not be highly connected (low 
external cohesion). We argue that external contacts of patch development teams are more 
connected with each other than external contacts of feature request teams. This leads us 
to the following hypothesis: 
H2: The external cohesion of patch development teams will be greater than the 
external cohesion of feature request teams. 
3.3.2.2. Direct Ties 
Direct ties in a social network potentially provide both resource sharing and 
knowledge spillover benefits (Ahuja 2000). First, direct ties enable knowledge sharing. 
When developers collaborate to develop a technology, the resultant knowledge is 
available to all developers. Thus, each developer can potentially receive a greater amount 
of knowledge from a collaborative activity than it would obtain from a comparable 
research investment made independently (Ahuja 2000). Second, collaboration facilitates 
bringing together complementary skills from different developers. In addition, direct ties 
among two developers imply opportunities for repeat interactions (Singh et al. 2011). 
Repeat interactions allow for resource pooling and joint problem solving (Kogut and 
Zander 1992). However, over time, repeated interactions using the same direct ties are 
more likely provide redundant information to a focal team (Hansen 1999). Hence, the 
knowledge spillover benefit which is important for feature request activities could 
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decrease over time. The resource sharing benefit which is important for patch 
development activities is more likely greater than knowledge spillover benefit. Direct ties 
allow developers to combine knowledge and skills using repeating interactions (Kogut 
and Zander 1992). Repeated interactions through direct ties allow for resource pooling 
and joint problem solving (Kogut and Zander 1992) which do not decrease due to 
repeated interactions. Hence, repeated interactions through direct ties are more likely to 
enhance patch development activities when compared to feature request activities. Since 
direct ties are also expensive to maintain (Hansen 1999, Hansen 2002, Shane and Cable 
2002), we argue that they are more likely to be maintained for repeated use. Therefore, 
we argue that patch development teams have a large number of direct ties than feature 
request teams. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H3: The number of direct ties of patch development teams will be greater than the 
number of direct ties of feature request teams. 
3.3.2.3. Indirect Ties 
External connection can be a channel of communication between developers 
through indirect contacts (Ahuja 2000). An indirect tie between two developers exists 
when two developers do not work together but can be reached through mutual partners. 
Therefore, indirect ties provide developers with access not just to knowledge held by 
their immediate partners but also to knowledge held by their partner's partners (Gulati 
and Garguilo 1999). However, indirect ties are distant and infrequent relationships 
(Granovetter 1973). Therefore, they are less likely to provide opportunities for repeat 
interactions and they are not as conducive to resource pooling as direct ties (Singh et al. 
2011). They provide access to novel information by bridging otherwise disconnected 
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developers (Granovetter 1973). Indirect ties can provide access to knowledge spillovers 
(Ahuja 2000), serving as information conduits through which news of technical 
breakthroughs, new insights to problems, or failed approaches travels from one developer 
to another (Ahuja 2000). Information provided by indirect ties is more likely novel 
information (Hansen 1999). Innovation is characterized as a process in which solutions 
are discovered via the creation of new knowledge or the novel recombination of known 
elements of knowledge, problems or solutions (Fleming 2001). Therefore, the knowledge 
spillover benefit provided by indirect ties is more important for feature request activities. 
Distant and infrequent interactions through indirect ties are more likely to enhance 
feature request activities when compared to patch development activities. Therefore, we 
argue that feature request teams have a large number of indirect ties than patch 
development teams. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H4: The number of indirect ties of feature request teams will be greater than the 
number of indirect ties of patch development teams. 
3.3.2.4. Technological Diversity 
Although how external contacts are connected with each other affects types of 
information, the characteristics of external contacts may also affect the diversity of 
knowledge since they may vary in terms of technological areas (Rosenkopf and Nerkar 
2001). External contacts in different technological areas are more likely to provide novel 
information and knowledge (Fleming 2001, Kogut and Zander 1992). 
Patch development and feature request teams enjoy an enhanced capacity for 
creative learning since diverse ideas provide alternative ways of thinking, more options 
for creating new combinations which enhance both problem solving (patch development 
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teams) and innovation (feature request teams) (Reagans and Zuckerman 2001). However, 
patch development teams can be built upon similar technology to create distinctive 
competence (March 1991, Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001, Henderson and Cockburn 1994). 
Patch development teams become more expert in their technology area (March 1991, 
Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001). Therefore, patch development teams can draw most of their 
members from similar technology areas to create more distinctive competence. In 
contrast, feature request teams can develop more diverse and less distinctive competence 
if they focus on different technological areas. More diverse and less distinctive 
competence enhances exploration (March 1991, Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001). Therefore, 
feature request teams can draw most of their members from different technology areas to 
create diverse and less distinctive competence. 
Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001) stressed the importance of knowledge acquired 
from similar technology areas for exploitation, and the importance of knowledge acquired 
from distinct technology areas for exploration. In other words, patch development teams 
can develop more distinctive competence and becomes more expert if they focus on their 
technological areas or similar technological areas. In contrast, feature request teams can 
develop more diverse and less distinctive competence if they focus on different 
technological areas. Therefore, we argue that the technological diversity of feature 
request teams is greater than the technological diversity of patch development teams. 
This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H5: The technological diversity of feature request teams will be greater than the 
technological diversity of patch development teams. 
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3.3.3. Network Location 
Centrality is defined as the extent to which an actor occupies a central position in 
the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Developers who are more active in the 
network act as a central actor in the network and are viewed as major channels of 
information in the network (Singh et al. 2011, Singh et al. 2007). High centrality enables 
greater amounts of information and knowledge to be exchanged and integrated more 
rapidly. First, high centrality allows developers to have a broad range of knowledge, 
including an understanding where such knowledge is located and how to obtain it 
(Hansen 2002), which is unavailable to peripheral developers (Lin et al. 2007). Central 
developers occupy a structurally advantageous position to see a more complete picture of 
all the alternatives available in the network than the peripheral developers, so they have a 
broad range of opportunities unavailable to those in the periphery (Lin et al. 2007). A 
central developer has access to unique knowledge, including an understanding where 
such knowledge is located and how to obtain it (Hansen 2002). With such information, 
centrality enables a developer to make better decisions (Balkundi and Harrison 2006). 
Second, high centrality also allows developers to have quick access to knowledge in the 
network (Uzzi 1997, Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994). High centrality also allows 
developers to rapidly disseminate knowledge in the network (Powell and Smith-Doerr 
1994). Third, high centrality allows developer to control (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), and regulate information flow among other developers 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994, Krackhardt 1996), dispensing what is needed to other team 
members (Balkundi and Harrison 2006). Thus, high centrality enhances a developer’s 
ability to be central to the flow of information and resources in the network.  
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High centrality may allow a developer to have access to greater amounts of 
relatively redundant knowledge from their immediate contacts (Hansen 2002). Once 
developers accumulate too much relatively redundant knowledge, they may tent to be 
blinded to alternative opportunities over time, which leads to learning myopia (Levinthal 
and March 1993). Central developers may have a tendency to have access to relatively 
redundant information, which results in the convergence of knowledge and ideas, and 
may incur the risks of learning myopia (Levinthal and March 1993). Therefore, centrality 
may be associated with the acquisition of relatively redundant knowledge and experience, 
which hinders the exploration of new ideas (Lin et al. 2007). Centrality also decreases the 
likelihood that team members seek innovative and new solutions (Jansen et al. 2006, 
Atuahene-Gima 2003). Therefore, we argue that centrality is more likely lower for 
feature request teams. In contrast, Jansen et al. (2006) indicated that centralized authority 
is beneficial to speeding up exploitation. Exploitation mainly depends on the existing 
competence and processes, so it is limited in scope and newness (Jansen et al. 2006). 
Therefore, we argue that the centrality of patch development teams is more likely greater 
than the centrality of feature request teams. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H6: The centrality of patch development teams will be greater than the centrality of 
feature request teams. 
3.4. Data 
3.4.1. Data Sources and Collection 
OSS network data required for this study has been collected from the SourceForge 
database (SourceForge.net). The SourceForge database is the primary repository for OSS 
projects and accounts for about 90% of all open source projects (Singh et al. 2011). 
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Although all OSS projects are not hosted at the SourgeForge database and there are other 
OSS hosting websites such as BerliOS Developer and GNU Savannah, the SourgeForge 
database is the largest OSS development and collaboration website (Xu et al 2005). It can 
be considered as the most representative of the OSS community because the large 
number of projects and developers registered the SourgeForge database (Singh et al. 
2011, Grewal et al. 2006, Xu et al 2005). Researchers analyzing issues related to OSS 
development phenomenon have predominantly used SourceForge data (Singh et al. 2011, 
Singh 2010, Singh 2007, Grewal et al 2006). The SourceForge database provides storage 
space and services to OSS projects in order to organize and coordinate software 
development activities by providing project web servers, trackers, mailing lists, 
discussion boards, and software releases (Xu et al 2005). This database contains software 
for download as well as statistics related to OSS projects. Researchers can create database 
programs to download statistics that are of interest. 
Our research objective is to empirically illustrate the differences between 
exploration (feature request) and exploitation (patch development) networks of 
developers in OSS projects in terms of their social network structure. Therefore, we need 
to collect affiliation network data in order to construct these networks. Given a set of 
activities (patch development and feature request) and developers, there are two methods 
to collect affiliation network data: Snowball method and Whole network method 
(Hanneman and Riddle 2005). The whole network method yields maximum information, 
but it can also be difficult to execute while the snowball method yields considerably less 
information about network structure, but it is often less difficult to implement (Hanneman 
and Riddle 2005).  
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The snowball method begins with a focal actor or set of actors. Then, all the 
actors connected to a focal actor or set of actors are tracked down. The snowball process 
continues until no new actors are identified, or a large enough number of observations is 
collected for analysis. However, there are major potential limitations of the snowball 
method (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). First, actors who are not connected (i.e. actors in 
different components) are not reached through this method. The snowball method may 
tend to overstate the connectedness and solidarity of populations of actors based on the 
starting actors and their connectivity to other actors. Therefore, there is no guaranteed 
way of finding all of the connected individuals in the population.  
The whole network method requires that we collect information about each 
developer's ties with all other developers. Because we collect information about ties 
between all developer-activity pairs, full network data gives the complete picture of 
relations in the population (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). Whole network data is 
necessary to properly define and measure many of the structural concepts of network 
analysis (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). Whole network data also allows for very powerful 
descriptions and analyses of social structures (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). However, 
whole network data may also be very difficult to collect. The data collection task is made 
more manageable by determining an appropriate boundary around the network since the 
whole network method examines actors that are regarded as bounded social collectives 
(Marsden 2005, Singh et al. 2011). This is the predominant method used in situation 
where an appropriate network boundary is established. Prior studies on OSS development 
used software development platforms called project foundries as a network boundary. 
Project foundries are mainly built on programming languages, thereby project foundry 
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and programming language are similar concepts. For example, Singh et al. (2011) used 
participation in Python foundry (uses Python programming language) and Grewal et al. 
(2006) used participation in Perl foundry (uses Perl programming language) as a network 
boundary. However, foundry data associated with OSS projects was not available at the 
SouceForce database after 2005. Therefore, there is no way for us to associate projects 
with foundries.  
We used the whole network method to collect affiliation network data and 
selected the C programming language as a network boundary. The selection of the C 
programming language as a network boundary is acceptable for several reasons. First, it 
is the system implementation language for the UNIX operating system and UNIX/Linux 
operating system is dominant in OSS community (Subramanian et al. 2009). Second, it is 
one of the preferred languages of OSS developers for codes that require portability, need 
faster processing, have real-time requirements, or are tightly coupled to the UNIX/Linux 
kernel (Subramanian et al. 2009). Third, developers who are familiar with the 
programming language are able to understand the source code easily (Subramanian et al. 
2009), thereby more efficient knowledge sharing may be possible within a project or 
across projects written in the same programming language. Fourth, we analyzed the 
number of projects and associated developers across programming languages and found 
that the C language is in the top three languages used by the large number of software 
developers at SourgeForge. 
Data collection started by identifying developer-activity pairs since OSS 
developers may work on multiple projects simultaneously if they are members of 
different artifact teams (either different patch development or feature request activities). 
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A relationship exists between any two developers if they are members of the same artifact 
team and consequently work together on the same activity. These kinds of relationships 
between developers and activities can be represented by an affiliation network 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994). Affiliation data for activities and developers (associated 
with projects) has been collected from the SourceForge database for projects registered 
from January 1999 to December 2008 at the SourceForge website. We have set 
December 2008 as a cutoff date for our study for several reasons. First, constructing 
feature request and patch networks (developer affiliation networks for different feature 
request and patches) and calculating a variety of social network measures are extremely 
computation intensive especially for larger networks. We used social network software 
(UCINET) (Borgatti et al. 2002) to perform calculations and wrote our own code when 
required to construct networks as well as to perform some calculations. We analyzed the 
number of developers for projects written in the C language for each year from 2003 to 
2011. We found that networks (especially project developers’ network used in Chapter 4) 
have large number of developers (≥15,000) after December 2008 as shown in Table 7. 
This results in extremely large networks that are challenging to process with UCINET. 
Second, the first data snapshot of the SourceForge database is available for January 2003. 
The difference between our cutoff date and the first data snapshot date of the 
SourceForge data is 5 years which provides sufficient variation in network 
characteristics. Third, we had a concern for data availability of our dependent variables 
(the number of versions) in Chapter 4 because the SourceForge database provides data 
for our dependent variables until December 2008.  
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TABLE 7: Project Statistics across Years 
Years Number of Projects Number of Developers 
Jan 31, 2003 741 4,371 
Dec 31, 2004 1,271 6,999 
Dec 31, 2005 1,532 8,400 
Dec 31, 2006 1,830 9,935 
Dec 31, 2007 2,117 11,330 
Dec 31, 2008 2,374 12,665 
Dec 31, 2009 2,515 14,933 
Dec 31, 2010 2,608 15,564 
Dec 31, 2011 2,665 15,950 
 
In order to identify developer-activity pairs, we identified all projects that match 
following criteria. First, we included the projects which are written in the C language (our 
network boundary). Second, we excluded projects which have neither patch nor feature 
request activities in order to ensure the creation of developer-activity pairs. If a project 
has neither patch nor feature request activities, that project does not yield a developer-
activity pair in our networks. This also ensures the calculation of project ambidexterity as 
described in Chapter 4. Prior research also indicated that a large proportion of projects 
hosted at the SourceForge database show no activity (Singh et al. 2011, Singh 2010, 
Chengalur-Smith and Sidorova 2003). These projects would be dead nodes in the 
network and the relationships involving them would not facilitate any knowledge 
transfers or spillovers (Singh et al. 2011). Therefore, including such projects in the 
network may lead to misleading results. Following prior research (Singh et al. 2011, 
Singh 2010), we excluded those projects. If a project has neither patch nor feature request 
activities, we considered those projects as inactive because we assume that they showed 
no sign of activity since their inception until December 2008. For the projects that match 
our criteria, we identified all patch development and feature request activities that have 
been successfully closed by using their “Activity ID”, “Activity Descriptions” and 
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“Status”. Patch development activities are defined as activities to correct faults in 
software (SourceForge.net). Feature request activities are defines as software 
enhancement activities to add new features based on new user requirement 
(SourceForge.net). Then, we identified the developers who joined to either patch 
development or feature request activities. This allows us to collect separate affiliation 
network data (developer-activity pairs) and construct separate affiliation networks for 
projects for patch and feature request activities. 
Based on the finding of organizational literature (Jansen et al. 2009, Gupta and 
Govindarajan 2000), some developers are expected to be members of teams involved in 
exploitative activities (patch development) and members of teams involved in exploratory 
activities (feature request). Consistent with the finding of organizational literature, we 
identified a new category of developers (ambidextrous developers) in OSS projects who 
contribute to multiple types of OSS activities. Therefore, we identified three types of 
developers in the OSS community: patch developers, feature request developers, and 
ambidextrous developers. Patch developers are developers who work on patch 
development activities while feature request developers are developers who work on 
feature request activities. Ambidextrous developers are developers who are members of 
patch development and feature request teams and consequently work on both patch 
development and feature request activities simultaneously. Therefore, there is an 
overlapping between patch developers and feature request developers and patch 
development and feature request networks. Although the focus of this chapter is to 
empirically illustrate the differences between exploration (feature request) and 
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exploitation (patch development) networks, we develop a theoretical construct for 
ambidexterity based on the concept of ambidextrous developers in Chapter 4. 
Two separate affiliation networks were constructed based on the type of activities: 
a patch network, and a feature request network. A patch network includes developers 
involved in patch development activities (patch developers and ambidextrous 
developers). A feature request network includes developers involved in feature request 
activities (feature request developers and ambidextrous developers).  
3.4.2. Network Construction 
OSS network data analyzed in this study is the affiliation data between developers 
and activities. Social network of the OSS community is represented by an affiliation 
network such as a two-mode network based on a developer-activity pair. However, in 
order to analyze the structure of OSS networks, we need a one-mode network at the 
developer level. Therefore, we construct a patch network of developer and a feature 
request network of developer in two steps. 
We construct separate affiliation networks for patch development activities and 
feature request activities based on developer-activity pairs. In these affiliation networks, 
the actors are unique developers, and the events are either patch development or feature 
request activities. A relationship exists between two developers if they work together on 
the same activity. Figure 3 illustrates the process of developer affiliation network 
construction. In Figure 3a, each activity has its own set of developers. A square node 
represents a unique activity and a circular node represents a unique developer. A link 
between any two developers exists if they work on the same activity. Figure 3b shows the 
developer network for individual activities. However, some developers (D5 and D10) 
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work on more than one activity simultaneously. Thus, they belong to more than one 
activity team and they are used to connect the individual teams in the network as shown 
in Figure 3c (which shows the affiliation network of developers across activities). In 
Figure 3c, a node represents a unique developer. We construct two separate affiliation 
networks of developers for patch development and feature request activities. 
A binary adjacency matrix (the matrix A) of affiliation networks represents the 
relationships between activities and developers in the network in Figure 4a. The 
adjacency matrix of affiliation networks lists unique developers across multiple activities 
for a patch network and a feature request network. A row represents developers, and a 
column represents activities. When a developer belongs to an activity, the corresponding 
matrix element gets a value of one, and zero otherwise. The transpose (the matrix AT) of 
an adjacency matrix of affiliation networks represents the relationships between activities 
and developers in the network in Figure 4b. A row represents activities, and a column 
represents developers. We converted two-mode network data to one-mode network data 
by multiplying an adjacency matrix (the matrix A) of affiliation networks with the dot 
product of the transpose (the matrix AT) of an adjacency matrix of affiliation networks 
expressed as follows: 
 
Adjacency matrixes (the matrix XA) of a patch network and a feature request 
network represent the relationships between any two developers in Figure 4c. The row 
and the column represent unique developers. A value of one or more corresponding to the 
pair of two developers in the network indicates a presence of a relationship between 
them, and a value of zero indicates the absence of relationship. The adjacency matrix is 
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undirected because relationship among two developers is mutual. We converted all values 
greater than one to one which simply indicates a presence of a relationship between two 
developers. These final adjacency matrices are our final patch and feature request 
networks which are used in our analysis. The final patch network includes 23,603 
artifacts and 4,727 unique developers under 1,173 projects. The final feature request 
network includes 31,504 artifacts and 6,656 unique developers under 1,892 projects. 
 
 
FIGURE 3: OSS Network Construction at the Activity Level 
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A = 
1 2 3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0
1 1 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
0 1 1
0 0 1
0 0 1
0 0 1
0 0 1
 
 
a) Two-Mode Adjacency Matrix of Activities and Developers 
 
AT = 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1
2
3
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
 
 
b) Transpose of Two-Mode Adjacency Matrix of Activities and Developers 
FIGURE 4: Matrix Representations of OSS Networks at the Activity Level 
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XA =
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
 
 
c) One-Mode Adjacency Matrix of OSS Activities 
FIGURE 4: Cont'd 
 
3.5. Variable Definitions and Operationalization 
OSS network data analyzed in this study is the affiliation network data of 
developers at the artifact level. However, we aggregated data to the project level in order 
to test our hypotheses because of following concerns. First, some projects have relatively 
more artifacts while some projects have relatively few artifacts. In Table 8, the maximum 
number of artifacts for projects is 2791 in patch development network and 862 in feature 
request network while the minimum number of artifacts for projects is 1 in both patch 
development network and feature request network. Second, artifacts under the same 
project have almost the same set of developers. Therefore, most of the observations may 
be the same at the artifact level. Therefore, OSS network data analyzed in this study is an 
aggregated data at the project level to eliminate repeated observations. 
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TABLE 8: Descriptive Statistics for Patch and Feature Request Networks 
  Patch Network FR Network 
Number of Project 1,173 1,892 
Artifact Level Statistics  
Total Number of Artifact 23,603 31,504 
Average Number Artifact per Project 20.12 16.65 
StdDev of Number Artifact per Project 123.95 52.70 
Min Number Artifact per Project 1 1 
Max Number Artifact per Project 2791 862 
Developer Level Statistics 
Total Number of Developers 4,727 6,656 
Number of Ambidextrous Developers 3,140 3,140 
Number of Artifact Developers 1,587 3,516 
Average Number of Developers per Project 4.37 3.73 
StdDev of Number of Developers per Project 5.78 5.26 
Min Number of Developers per Project 1 1 
Max Number of Developers per Project 73 75 
 
We aggregated the affiliation network data of developers to the project level in 
four steps. First, we calculated social network measures for individual developers (i.e. 
clustering coefficient, the number of direct ties) and developer pairs (i.e. the number of 
repeat ties, the number of third party ties) in patch development and feature request 
networks. These network measures are used to calculate variables. Second, we associated 
developers to activities by using “Developer ID” and “Activity ID” from their 
membership to activities. Third, we associated activities to projects by using “Activity 
ID” and “Project ID”. This allowed us to associate developers to projects by creating 
relationship between “Developer ID” and “Project ID”. Thus, we identified the set of 
unique developers for each project. However, some developers work on multiple 
activities under the same project. We ensured that those developers are represented only 
one time under each project since we identified unique developers by removing their 
multiple occurrences. Fourth, we calculated variables for each project from network 
measures of project developers. The final data set for feature request activities includes 
92 
 
1,892 projects and 6,656 unique developers. The final data set for patch development 
activities includes 1,173 projects and 4,727 unique developers.  
Social network analysis (Wasserman and Faust 1994) has been used in a variety 
of contexts to study the relationship between social entities. Structural properties of the 
networks are used to analyze the network. Many structural properties of these networks 
could have multiple social network measures. For example, there are different types of 
internal cohesion measures (clustering coefficient, repeat ties, third party ties, and 
structural equivalence), external connectivity measures (external cohesion, direct ties, 
indirect ties, and technological diversity), and network location measures (degree 
centrality, betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality). Consistent with previous 
studies on social network research (Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001, Ahuja 2000, Uzzi 
1999, Uzzi 1997, Uzzi 1996, Watts and Strogatz 1998, Krackhardt 1998, Wasserman and 
Faust 1994, Burt 1992, Coleman 1988, Freeman, 1979, Granovetter 1973), organizational 
research (Schilling and Phelps 2007, Hansen 2002, Hansen 1999, Reagans and 
Zuckerman 2001), and OSS development research (Singh et al. 2011, Singh 2010, Singh 
et al. 2007, Grewal et al. 2006), we categorized our social network variables into three 
categories: internal cohesion, external connectivity, and network location. In the 
following section, we describe our variables used in this study along with the 
construction of their measures.  
3.5.1. Internal Cohesion 
We measured internal cohesion for a project with clustering coefficient, repeat 
ties, third party ties, and structural equivalence (Jaccard similarity and correlation 
similarity). 
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Clustering Coefficient: The clustering coefficient captures the degree to which the 
overall network contains localized pockets of dense connectivity (Watts and Strogatz 
1998, Watts 1999). The clustering coefficient mainly measures the extent to which two 
related developers share a relationship with a common third.  
We measured the clustering coefficient for a project by following Watts and 
Strogatz (1998). For each project developer, we calculated the clustering coefficient (see 
Appendix B for the calculation of clustering coefficient). We took an average of each 
project developer’s clustering coefficient over all the project developers to calculate a 
measure of the clustering coefficient for a project.  
The clustering coefficient lies strictly in the range from 0 to 1. The value of 1 
indicates that all developers in the network share a direct relationship with each other. 
That means each developer is directly connected to all other developers in the network, 
which results in extreme clustering. In contrast, the value of 0 indicates that any two 
connected developers do not share a relationship with a common third. A high score of 
the clustering coefficient indicates greater clustering. 
Repeat Ties: Repeated collaboration among project members captures the strength 
of interpersonal connections among team members (Uzzi 1996, Uzzi 1999, Singh et al. 
2011). Strong interpersonal connections indicate the presence of repeat collaborations 
among project members (Uzzi 1997). As developers interact more frequently, the 
strength of the collaborative tie increases, and they develop more closer and cohesive 
relationships (Granovetter 1973, Hansen 1999). Team members rely on repeated ties 
developed through joint participation in past teams because they are motivated to 
continue to work with those with whom they have collaborated in the past (Hahn et al. 
94 
 
2008). Repeated ties from past interactions may result in greater trust and knowledge for 
developers (Uzzi and Spiro 2005). 
We measured the number of repeated ties for a project by following Singh et al. 
(2011). We counted the total number of projects on which each pair of project developers 
have worked together. We divided this number by the total number of pairs that exist in a 
project to calculate a measure of repeat ties for a project. A high score of repeat ties 
indicates that project developers have worked together on several projects. 
Third Party Ties: Third party ties support direct relationships and imply that a 
project team is composed of developers who work with many of the same collaborators 
(Szulanski 1996, Coleman 1988, Singh et al. 2011). Third part ties are important for the 
existence of effective norms and the trustworthiness in social structures (Coleman 1988). 
Similarly, the concept of simmelian ties are the same with third party ties (Krackhardt 
1998). Two people are simmelian tied to one another if they are reciprocally and strongly 
tied to each other and to another one in common (Krackhardt 1998). Simmelian ties 
enhance the conflict resolution and group norms (Krackhardt 1998). 
We measured the number of third party ties for a project by following Singh et al. 
(2011). We counted the total number of third party ties of all pairs of project developers 
around the members of a project team (besides the focal team members). We divided this 
number by the total number of pairs that exist in a project to calculate a measure of third 
party ties for a project. A high score of third party ties indicates that project developers 
have worked together with other developers on several projects. 
Structural Equivalence: The structural equivalence measures to the extent to 
which two actors have identical relationships to all other actors, i.e. they jointly occupy 
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the structurally equivalent position in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Thus, 
the structural equivalence is a pair-level measure of how similar the actors’ network 
patterns are. Structurally equivalent actors have a similar pattern of relationships to other 
actors in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994, Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001). 
Structurally equivalent actors tend to have similar profiles and behaviors (Gnyawali and 
Madhavan 2001). Structurally equivalent actors tend to interact with similar others in 
similar ways, which results in similar attitudes, resources, and behaviors (Gnyawali and 
Madhavan 2001). Therefore, structurally equivalent actors may have similar asset, 
information, and resources (Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001). 
We measured the structural equivalence for a project with two measures: Jaccard 
similarity, and Correlation similarity (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Jaccard similarity 
measures the similarity of the relationships of two developers by comparing the size of 
the overlap against the size of the relationships of two developers (Wasserman and Faust 
(1994). Correlation similarity measures the similarity of the relationships of two 
developers by calculating Pearson’s correlation of the relationships of two developers 
(Wasserman and Faust (1994). Correlation similarity measures the strength of the 
relationship between two developers and it is based on the similarity in pattern of ties 
whereas Jaccard similarity account for the identity of ties between two developers. 
We calculated Jaccard similarity and correlation similarity as follows. We 
calculated the total of Jaccard similarity and correlation similarity of all pairs of project 
developers. We divided these numbers by the total number of pairs that exist in a project 
to calculate measures of Jaccard similarity and correlation similarity for a project. Jaccard 
similarity and correlation similarity lie strictly in the range from 0 to 1. A value of one 
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represents perfect structural equivalence whereas a value of zero represents no structural 
equivalence. A high score of structural equivalence indicates that project developers 
worked with many of the same developers. 
3.5.2. External Connectivity 
We measured external connectivity for a project with external cohesion, direct 
ties, indirect ties, and technological diversity. 
External Cohesion: We measured the external cohesion with Burt’s (1992) 
network constraint. Network constraint measures the extent to which a project member’s 
external contacts share relationships with each other.  
We calculated the external cohesion for a project as follows. For each project 
developer, we calculated the network constraint (see Appendix B for the calculation of 
external cohesion). We took an average of each project developer’s network constraint 
over all the project developers to calculate a measure of the network constraint for a 
project. Higher values of external cohesion indicate that external contacts of a project are 
more directly connected with each other, which indicates greater external cohesion. In 
contrast, lower values of external cohesion indicate that external contacts of a project are 
less directly connected with each other, which indicates smaller external cohesion. 
Direct Ties: We measured direct ties by following Ahuja (2000). Direct ties 
measure the extent to which project members are directly connected to external contacts. 
Direct ties are also associated with the capacity of a project to acquire tacit knowledge 
from outside (Singh et al. 2011). 
We calculated direct ties for a project as follows. For each project developer, we 
counted the number of developers who a project developer has ties with other than the 
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other team members of the project. We took an average of this number over all the 
project developers to calculate a measure of direct ties for a project. Higher values of 
direct ties indicate that a project is more directly connected to external contacts. 
Indirect Ties: Indirect ties are ties that provide access to external developers at 
path distances of two or greater (local project developers’ partner's partners), which 
excluded direct ties. Indirect ties measure the extent to which project members are 
indirectly connected to external partner's partners. Indirect ties are also associated with 
the capacity of a project to acquire explicit knowledge from outside (Singh et al. 2011). 
We used two measures for indirect ties. The first measure is the number of 
indirect ties. For each project developer, we counted the number of developers with 
whom a project developer does not have a direct tie but can reach through others (at path 
distances of two or greater, which excluded direct ties). We took an average of this 
number over all the project developers to calculate a measure of indirect ties for a project.  
This measure does not account for the weakening or decay of tie strength as 
distance between two developer’s increases (Ahuja 2000). Burt (1992) provided a 
frequency decay measure for indirect ties that accounts for this decline in tie strength 
across distant ties (see Appendix B for the calculation of indirect ties with frequency 
decay function). Thus, our second measure for indirect ties is a frequency decay measure 
proposed by Burt (1992). The argument for the frequency decay function is that the rate 
at which the strength of a relation decreases with the increasing length of its 
corresponding path distance should vary with the social structure in which it occurs (Burt 
1992). The larger the number of developers to which the focal project developer must 
devote their time and energy, the weaker the relationship that the focal project developer 
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can sustain with any individual developer. Thus, decay in the strength of a relationship is 
related to the number of other developers reached at each path distance.  
For each project developer, we calculated a frequency decay function for indirect 
ties. We took an average of this number over all the project developers to calculate a 
measure of indirect ties with a frequency decay function for a project. Higher values of 
indirect ties indicate that a project is more indirectly connected to external partner's 
partners at path distances of two or greater. 
Technological Diversity: Technological diversity measures the extent to which 
two projects are different in terms of the angular distance of their technological positions. 
In order to calculate the technological diversity for a project, we defined the 
technological position of a project. The technological position of a project can be defined 
in terms of different dimensions such as the type of the project, programming language, 
user interface, and operating system (Singh et al. 2011). Each of these dimensions 
represents different type of technical expertise. Project type represents the application 
domain knowledge whereas the other three dimensions represent the tools knowledge and 
expertise that comprise the knowledge of process, data and functional architecture (Kim 
and Stohr 1998, Singh et al. 2011). The similarity of domain and tools affect the amount 
of knowledge that can be reused from one project to another (Singh et al. 2011).  
Following Jaffe (1986), we characterized a project’s technological position by a 
vector Fp = (F1…Fk), where k is the total number of categories under the four dimensions, 
and Fk is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the project p falls under the category k. 
A project can fall under several categories within a single dimension. Technological 
diversity between the two projects p and q is then calculated by the angular separation or 
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uncentered correlation of their vectors (see Appendix B for the calculation of 
technological diversity). 
We calculate the technological diversities of all pairs of a focal project with all of 
the projects with which it shares a developer. We summed these measures and divided it 
by the number of projects (the total number of project pairs) to calculate a measure of 
technological diversity for a project. Technological diversity lies in the range from 0 to 1. 
A value of one represents the greatest technological diversity between two projects.  
3.5.3. Network Location 
We measured network location for a project with network centralities: degree 
centrality, closeness centrality, and betweenness centrality. 
Degree Centrality: We measured the degree centrality with Freeman’s (1979) 
degree centrality. Degree centrality is the measure of how many an actor is connected to 
other actors in the network through direct connections (Freeman 1979, Wasserman and 
Frost 1994). Degree centrality of a developer reflects the activeness of a developer in the 
network. Developers who are more active in the network act as a central actor in the 
network and are viewed as major channels of information in the network (Singh et al. 
2011, Singh et al. 2007). 
We calculated the degree centrality for a project as follows. For each project 
developer, we calculated the degree centrality (see Appendix B for the calculation of 
degree centrality). We took an average of each project developer’s degree centrality over 
all the project developers to calculate a measure of the degree centrality for a project.  
The degree centrality is normalized by dividing by the maximum possible degree 
in the network which is that one actor is connected to all other actors in the network. This 
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calculation results in that the degree centrality lies in the range from 0 to 1. However, 
UCINET reports the normalized degree centrality as a percentage for each node by 
multiplying with 100 (Wasserman and Frost 1994). Therefore, the measure of degree 
centrality for a project ranges from 0 to 100. A high score of the degree centrality 
indicates a project is comprised of developers who are connected to many developers in 
the network. 
Betweenness Centrality: We measured the betweenness centrality with Freeman’s 
(1979) betweenness centrality. Betweenness centrality is the measure of how often a 
developer falls on the shortest path between pairs of other developers (Freeman 1979, 
Wasserman and Faust 1994). Developers with a high betweenness centrality lie in the 
shortest path of information flow between other developers. These developers can exert 
control over information flow among other developers, and potentially may have some 
control over the interactions between other developers (Wasserman and Faust 1994). 
Thus, betweenness centrality signifies a developer’s ability to be central to the flow of 
information and resources in the network. These developers can be important to the 
network-wide information diffusion process by occupying a central position on the 
shortest path between other developers in a network.  
We calculated the betweenness centrality for a project as follows. For each project 
developer, we calculated the betweenness centrality (see Appendix B for the calculation 
of betweenness centrality). We took an average of each project developer’s betweenness 
centrality over all the project developers to calculate a measure of the betweenness 
centrality for a project. 
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The betweenness centrality is normalized by dividing by the maximum possible 
betweenness in the network which is the number of pairs of actors not including a focal 
actor (the maximum possible paths passing through a focal actor). This calculation results 
in that the betweenness centrality lies in the range from 0 to 1. However, UCINET 
reports the normalized betweenness centrality as a percentage for each node by 
multiplying with 100 (Wasserman and Frost 1994). Therefore, the measure of 
betweenness centrality for a project ranges from 0 to 100. A high score of the 
betweenness centrality indicates a project is comprised of developers who fall on many 
shortest paths between other developers.  
Closeness Centrality: We measured the closeness centrality with Freeman’s 
(1979) closeness centrality. Closeness centrality is the measure of how close an actor is to 
all other actors in the network through direct and indirect connections (Freeman 1979, 
Wasserman and Frost 1994). It basically measures the inverse of the sum of geodesic 
distances between actors in the network, thereby an actor with high closeness centrality 
has minimum geodesic distances to other actors. Closeness centrality signifies a 
developer’s ability to reach resources in the network (Gulati and Gargiulo1999). 
Information would have to travel over shorter distances to reach a developer who is more 
central in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). A developer who is close to many 
developers can quickly interact and communicate with them without passing through 
many intermediaries (Wasserman and Faust 1994).  
We calculated the closeness centrality for a project as follows. For each project 
developer, we calculated the closeness centrality (see Appendix B for the calculation of 
closeness centrality). We took an average of each project developer’s closeness centrality 
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over all the project developers to calculate a measure of the closeness centrality for a 
project.  
The closeness centrality is normalized by multiplying by the maximum possible 
path distance in the network which is that one actor is connected to another one actor 
passing through all other actors in the network. This calculation results in that the 
closeness centrality lies in the range from 0 to 1. However, UCINET reports the 
normalized closeness centrality as a percentage for each node by multiplying with 100 
(Wasserman and Frost 1994). Therefore, the measure of closeness centrality for a project 
ranges from 0 to 100. A high score of the closeness centrality indicates a project is 
comprised of developers who are very close to all other developers in the network via 
shortest paths.  
3.6. Research Methodology 
Our research objective is to empirically examine the differences between 
exploitation (patch development) and exploration (feature request) networks of 
developers in OSS projects in terms of their social network structure. In order to 
accomplish these research objectives and test the hypothesis developed in the previous 
sections, we employed two statistical methods. First, we used the paired T-test (Cohen 
1988, Cohen 1977) to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference 
between the patch development and feature request networks in terms of their social 
network structure. With the paired T-test, we tested the difference between the patch 
development and feature request networks at the project level by using social network 
variables (internal cohesion, external connectivity, and network location). Second, we 
also used the Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) (Hubert and Schultz 1976, Hubert 
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1987) in order to examine the degree of dissimilarity between patch development and 
feature request networks. The QAP test preserves the integrity of the network structures. 
With the QAP test, we tested the difference between the patch development and feature 
request networks at the network level. The QAP test also provides greater reliability to 
the findings the paired T-test and improves its robustness. 
3.6.1. The Paired T-test 
The paired t-test compares the means of two related groups to detect whether 
there are any statistically significant differences between their means (Cohen 1988, 
Cohen 1977). The paired t-test is the within-groups design in which subjects in each 
group are matched into pairs and the same subjects contribute to independent variables in 
each group (Ha and Ha 2012). The major advantage of the within-groups design is to 
minimize the amount of error variance associated with individual differences that occur 
between subjects and this increases the power of the test (Ha and Ha 2012, Cohen 1988, 
Myers and Well 1991).  
The paired t-test requires that subjects in two groups should be paired. The mean 
difference score of two groups is a measure of independent variables that will be 
compared to the mean difference score of the null hypothesis. The mean difference score 
of the null hypothesis is assumed to be zero. If there is no difference between two groups 
in terms of independent variables, the mean difference score of paired groups will be zero 
or very close to the mean difference score of the null hypothesis. However, if there is 
difference between two groups in terms of independent variables, the mean difference 
score of two groups will be greater or less than zero. Therefore, the assumptions of the 
paired t-test are centered on the difference scores of two groups.  
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OSS network data analyzed in this study is the affiliation network data of 
developers at the artifact level. We created a list of 1,173 projects for patch development 
activities and a list of 1,892 projects for feature request activities from the SourceForge 
database for projects registered from January 1999 to December 2008. As described in 
the variable definition part, we aggregated data to the project level in order to test our 
hypotheses. The paired t-test assumes that the observations in the two groups should be 
related (Cohen 1988, Myers and Well 1991). Therefore, we have matched projects from 
patch development and feature request networks into pairs and each project contributes to 
independent variables of both patch development and feature request networks. 
Therefore, the unit of analysis is the pair of projects belonging to both patch development 
and feature request networks. 
One of important issues for the paired t-test is the absence of outliers. An outlier 
is an observation with an extreme value and univariate statistics such as a standard score 
can be used detect outliers (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). Standard scores that exceed ±3 
indicate possible univariate outliers (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). We detected outliers 
for each individual variable and then removed all observations that have at least one 
outlier for at least one variable. The final data set includes 690 observations (projects) 
belonging to both patch development and feature request networks. We tested our 
hypotheses by the final data set including 690 observations (projects). We report the 
descriptive statistics of our variables in Table 9. 
The paired t-test also assumes that the difference scores of paired groups should 
follow the normal distribution (Cohen 1988, Myers and Well 1991). We tested this 
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normality assumption with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests of 
normality. We found that the difference scores of paired groups are normally distributed. 
 
TABLE 9: Descriptive Statistics of Paired Variables (N=690) 
Variable Type Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error Mean 
Internal  
Cohesion 
Clustering Coefficient (Patch) 0.574 0.462 0.018
Clustering Coefficient (FR) 0.541 0.474 0.018
Repeat Ties (Patch) 0.771 0.473 0.018
Repeat Ties (FR) 0.752 0.474 0.018
Third Party Ties (Patch) 0.153 0.780 0.030
Third Party Ties (FR) 0.133 0.763 0.029
Jaccard Similarity (Patch) 0.495 0.458 0.017
Jaccard Similarity (FR) 0.473 0.464 0.018
Correlation Similarity (Patch) 0.659 0.437 0.017
Correlation Similarity (FR) 0.660 0.444 0.017
External  
Connectivity 
External Cohesion (Patch) 0.749 0.312 0.012
External Cohesion (FR) 0.767 0.304 0.012
Direct Ties (Patch) 5.382 6.615 0.252
Direct Ties (FR) 4.938 6.244 0.238
Indirect Ties (Patch) 2.546 4.648 0.177
Indirect Ties (FR) 6.721 18.529 0.705
Indirect Ties FD (Patch) 0.065 0.119 0.005
Indirect Ties FD (FR) 1.655 5.439 0.207
Technological Diversity (Patch) 0.195 0.276 0.011
Technological Diversity (FR) 0.184 0.273 0.010
Network  
Location 
Degree Centrality (Patch) 0.110893 0.132161 0.005031
Degree Centrality (FR) 0.072070 0.087780 0.003342
Betweenness Centrality (Patch) 0.000439 0.001819 0.000069
Betweenness Centrality (FR) 0.000092 0.000357 0.000014
Closeness Centrality (Patch) 0.021226 0.000136 0.000005
Closeness Centrality (FR) 0.011553 0.006378 0.000243
 
Pearson correlation analysis indicates statistically significant correlations between 
paired variables (see Table C1 in Appendix C). This is the within-groups design in which 
we used the same projects belonging to both patch development and feature request 
activities, thereby project characteristics are the same for patch development and feature 
request activities. The significant correlations between paired variables indicate that the 
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differences between patch development and feature request activities are associated with 
network structures of developer teams, not other random effects.  
3.6.2. Results of the Paired T-test 
The significance of the t statistic of each paired variable is used to assess the 
support for the relevant hypothesis. The null hypothesis assumes that the mean difference 
of paired variable will be zero. The mean difference displays the average difference 
between patch development and feature request teams for each variable. The mean 
difference greater than zero implies that the mean of the variable of patch development 
teams is greater than the mean of the variable of feature request teams. The mean 
difference smaller than zero implies that the mean of the variable of patch development 
teams is smaller than the mean of the variable of feature request teams. We summarize 
the results of our hypotheses in Table 10. We report the results of the paired T-test in 
Table 11. 
 
TABLE 10: Summary of Hypotheses 
Variable Type Hypotheses Tested with Variable Results Comments 
Internal  
Cohesion 
Hypothesis 1 Clustering Coefficient Supported  
Hypothesis 1 Repeat Ties Supported  
Hypothesis 1 Third Party Ties Not Supported Not significant 
Hypothesis 1 Jaccard Similarity Supported  
Hypothesis 1 Correlation Similarity Not Supported Not significant 
External  
Connectivity 
Hypothesis 2 External Cohesion Not Supported Opposite of hypothesis
Hypothesis 3 Direct Ties Supported  
Hypothesis 4 Indirect Ties Supported  
Hypothesis 4 Indirect Ties FD Supported  
Hypothesis 5 Technological Diversity Not Supported Not significant 
Network  
Location 
Hypothesis 6 Degree Centrality Supported  
Hypothesis 6 Betweenness Centrality Supported  
Hypothesis 6 Closeness Centrality Supported  
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We measured internal cohesion for a project with clustering coefficient, repeat 
ties, third party ties, Jaccard similarity, and correlation similarity. In the hypothesis H1, 
we expect that the internal cohesion of patch development teams will be greater than the 
internal cohesion of feature request teams. We found support for our first hypothesis for 
clustering coefficient, repeated ties, and Jaccard similarity. The mean of the clustering 
coefficient of patch development teams is 0.033 points greater than the mean of the 
clustering coefficient of feature request teams, and this difference is significant (2.974, p 
< 0.01). The internal cohesion of patch development teams is greater than the internal 
cohesion of feature request teams in terms of clustering coefficient. The mean of the 
repeat ties of patch development teams is 0.019 points greater than the mean of the repeat 
ties of feature request teams, and this difference is significant (1.813, p < 0.1). The 
internal cohesion of patch development teams is greater than the internal cohesion of 
feature request teams in terms of repeat ties. The mean of Jaccard similarity of patch 
development teams is 0.021 points greater than the mean of Jaccard similarity of feature 
request teams, and this difference is significant (2.130, p < 0.05).  
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The internal cohesion of patch development teams is greater than the internal cohesion of 
feature request teams in terms of Jaccard similarity. Therefore, our hypothesis H1 is 
supported by results of clustering coefficient, repeated ties, and Jaccard similarity. 
However, we did not find support for our first hypothesis for third party ties and 
correlation similarity since the difference between patch development and feature request 
teams are not significant at the 0.10 alpha level. The internal cohesion of patch 
development teams is the same as the internal cohesion of feature request teams in terms 
of third party ties and correlation similarity. Therefore, our hypothesis H1 is partially 
supported. The results of repeat ties and third party ties merit further discussion. Repeat 
ties and third party ties are based on social interactions among developers. One possible 
explanation for the insignificance of third party ties is that there may be a few social 
interactions for the pairs of developers with common third parties, and these interactions 
may not be have enough strength to support third party ties. In addition, third party ties 
measure the number of relationship of a pair of developers to common third parties 
outside the focal project team. Therefore, third party ties do not measure strong 
relationships between two developers, but measure the relative relationship of already 
connected two developers to the common third. Thus, they may represent relatively loose 
connections. The common third developer is an outside developer of a focal team, and 
thereby, that developer may not directly foster trust, reciprocity norms and shared identity 
within a focal team which facilitate collaboration and cooperation among focal project 
team members. In contrast, repeat ties capture the strength and deepness of the 
relationship between two developers. The strength and deepness of relationship indicates 
two developers interact more frequently, and they develop more closer and cohesive 
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relationships. Repeat ties from past interactions also result in greater trust within a focal 
team. The results of Jaccard similarity and correlation similarity also merit further 
discussion. Jaccard similarity and correlation similarity are measures for the structural 
equivalence of developers. Correlation similarity measures the strength of the 
relationship between two developers in terms of the similarity in a connectivity pattern of 
ties between two developers. However, Jaccard similarity accounts for the identity of ties 
between two developers, i.e. who is connected to who. Although Jaccard similarity 
considers the identity of ties, correlation similarity does not consider the identity of ties. 
Connecting to the same developers is more important than connecting the same number 
of developers in terms of internal cohesion. If developers are connected to the same 
developers, they may develop more closer and cohesive relationships which results in 
greater trust within a focal team.  
We measured external connectivity for a project with external cohesion, direct 
ties, indirect ties, and technological diversity. However, we developed different 
hypotheses for each external connectivity measures. In the hypothesis H2, we expect that 
the external cohesion of patch development teams will be greater than the external 
cohesion of feature request teams. The mean of the external cohesion of patch 
development teams is 0.017 points smaller than the mean of the external cohesion of 
feature request teams, and this difference is significant (-2.572, p < 0.01). Therefore, the 
external cohesion of patch development teams is smaller than the external cohesion of 
feature request teams. Although the network structures of patch development and feature 
request teams are different in terms of external cohesion, the result is contrary to our 
expectations and does not support our hypothesis H2. External cohesion measures the 
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extent to which external contacts of a project are connected to each other. Low external 
cohesion allows a focal project which is connected to disconnected projects to acquire 
more novel information from those disconnected projects. We selected the C 
programming language as a network boundary. Within our network boundary, all projects 
use the C programming language. Therefore, all projects in our data set are 
technologically similar in terms of programming language. This is consistent with the 
results of our fifth hypothesis. As explained later, we found that the technological 
diversity of patch development teams is the same as the technological diversity of feature 
request teams. The selection of the C programming language eliminates other projects 
using different programming languages. Projects using different programming languages 
may develop distinct knowledge from other projects using the same programming 
language. They may be technologically diverse and provide access to novel information. 
In addition, they may not be highly connected to each other. This means lower external 
cohesion for a local project. Feature request teams may be more connected to projects 
using different programming languages than patch development teams. However, the 
selection of the C programming language may remove external connections to other 
projects using different programming languages. This may result in high external 
cohesion for feature request teams since most external connections of feature request 
teams may have been removed. The inclusion of multiple programming languages may 
produce results which will be consistent with our hypothesis regarding external cohesion. 
In the hypothesis H3, we expect that the number of direct ties of patch 
development teams will be greater than the number of direct ties of feature request teams. 
The mean of direct ties of patch development teams is 0.444 points greater than the mean 
112 
 
of direct ties of feature request teams, and this difference is significant (3.283, p < 0.01). 
The number of direct ties of patch development teams is greater than the number of direct 
ties of feature request teams. Therefore, our hypothesis H3 is supported. 
In the hypothesis H4, we expect that the number of indirect ties of feature request 
teams will be greater than the number of indirect ties of patch development teams. We 
measured indirect ties for a project with the number of indirect ties, and the number of 
indirect ties calculated with frequency decay function. We found support for our fourth 
hypothesis for both measures. The mean of indirect ties of patch development teams is 
4.174 points smaller than the mean of indirect ties of feature request teams, and this 
difference is significant (-6.680, p < 0.01). In addition, the mean of frequency decayed 
indirect ties of patch development teams is 1.590 points smaller than the mean of 
frequency decayed indirect ties of feature request teams, and this difference is significant 
(-7.744, p < 0.01). The number of indirect ties of patch development teams is smaller 
than the number of indirect ties of feature request teams. Therefore, our hypothesis H4 is 
supported. 
In the hypothesis H5, we expect that the technological diversity of feature request 
teams will be greater than the technological diversity of patch development teams. 
However, we did not find support for our fifth hypothesis since the difference between 
patch development and feature request teams are not significant at the 0.10 alpha level. 
The technological diversity of patch development teams is the same as the technological 
diversity of feature request teams. Therefore, our hypothesis H5 is not supported. We 
selected the C programming language as a network boundary. Within our network 
boundary, all projects use the C programming language. Therefore, all projects in our 
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data set are technologically similar in terms of programming language. The selection of 
the C programming language eliminates other projects using different programming 
languages. Projects using different programming languages may develop distinct 
knowledge from other projects using the same programming language. They may be 
technologically diverse. The inclusion of multiple programming languages may produce 
results which will be consistent with our hypothesis regarding technological diversity. 
We measure network location for a project with network centralities: degree 
centrality, betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality. In the hypothesis H6, we 
expect that the centrality of patch development teams will be greater than the centrality 
of feature request teams. We found support for our sixth hypothesis for the degree 
centrality, betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality. The mean of the degree 
centrality of patch development teams is 0.038 points greater than the mean of the degree 
centrality of feature request teams, and this difference is significant (13.400, p < 0.01). 
The centrality of patch development teams is greater than the centrality of feature request 
teams in terms of degree centrality. The mean of the betweenness centrality of patch 
development teams is 0.00034 points greater than the mean of the betweenness centrality 
of feature request teams, and this difference is significant (5.559, p < 0.01). The centrality 
of patch development teams is greater than the centrality of feature request teams in terms 
of betweenness centrality. The mean of the closeness centrality of patch development 
teams is 0.021 points greater than the mean of the closeness centrality of feature request 
teams, and this difference is significant (40.028, p < 0.01). The centrality of patch 
development teams is greater than the centrality of feature request teams in terms of 
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closeness centrality. Therefore, our hypothesis H6 is supported by results of the degree 
centrality, betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality. 
3.6.3. Power Analysis for the Paired T-test 
The power of a statistical test is the probability that the test will reject the null 
hypothesis when the null hypothesis is false, i.e. the probability of not committing a Type 
II error (Cohen 1988, Greene 2003). The statistical power is calculated as (1 – ß) where 
the ß (beta) is the Type II error (the probability of failing to reject the null hypothesis 
when it is false).  
When the alpha (α) is set at 0.05, Cohen (1988) assumes that the risk of failure to 
find the beta (β) may be about four times less serious than the risk of finding what does 
not exist (α). The test with the power greater than 0.80 is considered statistically powerful 
at the 0.05 alpha level (Cohen 1988, Mazen et al. 1985). Given the number of 
observations (N=690 projects) and the significance alpha level (α=0.05), we calculated 
the power (1– β) of our T-tests by following Cohen (1988). We report the results of the 
power test in Table 12.  
We found that the power of all variables except unsupported variables (third party 
ties, correlation similarity, and technological diversity) is greater than the cut-off point of 
0.80. The high statistical power indicates that the T-test more likely detects the true effect 
of the phenomenon and rejects the null hypothesis. The high statistical power also 
indicates that the sample size for those variables are more than enough. However, the 
power of unsupported variables (third party ties, correlation similarity, and technological 
diversity) is lower than the cut-off point of 0.80. This indicates that the results of the T-
test for unsupported variables are not powerful. We may need more observations for 
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those variables since greater sample size reduces the standard error and increases the 
statistical power (Cohen 1988, Mazen et al. 1985). 
 
TABLE 12: The Statistical Power of the Paired T-tests (Alpha = 0.05) 
Variable Type Paired Variable Names Power 
Internal  
Connectivity 
Clustering Coefficient (Patch)  
Clustering Coefficient (FR) 
0.997 
Repeat Ties (Patch)  
Repeat Ties (FR) 
0.888 
Third Party Ties (Patch)  
Third Party Ties (FR) 
0.757 
Jaccard Similarity (Patch)  
Jaccard Similarity (FR) 
0.960 
Correlation Similarity (Patch)  
Correlation Similarity (FR) 
0.051 
External  
Connectivity 
External Cohesion (Patch)  
External Cohesion (FR) 
0.994 
Direct Ties (Patch)  
Direct Ties (FR) 
>0.999 
Indirect Ties (Patch)  
Indirect Ties (FR) 
>0.999 
Indirect Ties FD (Patch)  
Indirect Ties FD (FR) 
>0.999 
Technological Diversity (Patch)  
Technological Diversity (FR) 
0.312 
Network  
Location 
Degree Centrality (Patch)  
Degree Centrality (FR) 
>0.999 
Betweenness Centrality (Patch)  
Betweenness Centrality (FR) 
>0.999 
Closeness Centrality (Patch)  
Closeness Centrality (FR) 
>0.999 
 
3.6.3. Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) 
The QAP is a social analysis method to compare two networks (Baker and Hubert 
1981) and examine the degree of dissimilarity between them (Hubert and Schultz 1976, 
Hubert 1987). The QAP is used to test the null hypothesis that two social network are 
uncorrelated or dissimilar (Hubert and Schultz 1976, Hubert 1987). The QAP is a 
nonparametric permutation-based test that preserves the integrity of the network 
structures. The QAP can determine the distribution of all possible correlations given the 
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structures of two matrices by generating all correlations that result from permuting the 
rows and columns of one matrix to those of second matrix. 
The QAP has several advantages. First, it does not impose any specific 
distributional assumptions since it is a permutation-based nonparametric test (Baker and 
Hubert 1981). Second, it takes advantage of the dyadic information represented in each 
matrix by preserving the integrity of the network structures (Baker and Hubert 1981). 
Third, it can be used for non-independent relationships (Baker and Hubert 1981). Fourth, 
it is immune to the highly complex autocorrelation structure of network data (Krackhardt 
1987, Krackhardt 1988). Fifth, the QAP is relatively unbiased (Krackhardt 1987). 
The QAP requires social networks which should be represented in the form of 
square matrixes with equal size. However, the patch development network includes 4,727 
unique developers whereas the feature request network includes 6,656 unique developers. 
Therefore, we created separate sample networks for patch development and feature 
request activities by extracting developers along with their network connections with 
each other from patch development network and feature request networks.  
We have identified three types of developers in the OSS community: patch 
developers, feature request developers, and ambidextrous developers. The patch network 
consists of patch and ambidextrous developers whereas the feature request network 
consists of feature request and ambidextrous developers. In order to accurately represent 
ambidextrous and non-ambidextrous developers in each network, we used a stratified 
random sampling method. Each sample network consists of 1,000 developers stratified 
based on the ratios of ambidextrous and non-ambidextrous developers in each network. 
We created 25 stratified sample networks for patch development activities, and 25 
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stratified sample networks for feature request activities. We created 25 sample networks 
pairs by pairing patch development sample networks and feature request sample 
networks. 
We used the QAP test as implemented in UCINET 6 (Borgatti et al. 2002). The 
QAP test reports five (similarity) measures (Jaccard, correlation, simple matching, 
Goodman-Kruskal Gamma, and Hamming distance). Although the result of the QAP test 
is the same across five measures, we report the result of the QAP test with Jaccard 
similarity and correlation similarity between sample networks of patch development and 
feature request activities since these two measures are our variables as shown in Table 
10. 
We report the results of the QAP test in Table 13. We compared 25 stratified 
sample network pairs from patch development and feature request networks. In Table 13, 
each row is a comparison of two stratified sample networks from patch development and 
feature request networks. We found that sample patch development and sample feature 
request networks are not similar with each other. Although the correlation and Jaccard 
similarities for the network pairs 5 and 17 are significant at 0.1 alpha level, the 
correlation and Jaccard similarities are as low as 0.003 which indicates that sample patch 
development and sample feature request networks for the network pairs 5 and 17 have 
different network structures. For other pairs, we found that sample patch development 
and sample feature request networks are not similar with each other since the correlation 
and Jaccard similarities are very low (e.g., 0.002) and they are not significant. We accept 
the null hypothesis that two network are uncorrelated. The results of the QAP test are 
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consistent with the results of the paired T-test. Therefore, we found that patch 
development and feature request networks have different network structures. 
 
TABLE 13: Comparison of Stratified Sample Networks of Developers from Patch 
Development and Feature Request Networks (Network Size=1000) 
Sample Patch 
Network 
Sample FR 
Network 
Correlation 
Similarity 
Sig. 
Jaccard 
Similarity 
Sig. 
1 1 0.000 0.616 0.001 0.616 
2 2 0.000 0.621 0.001 0.648 
3 3 0.000 0.464 0.001 0.464 
4 4 0.001 0.348 0.001 0.348 
5 5 0.003 0.084 * 0.002 0.084 * 
6 6 0.001 0.308 0.001 0.308 
7 7 0.001 0.440 0.001 0.857 
8 8 0.001 0.353 0.000 0.888 
9 9 0.001 0.474 0.001 0.844 
10 10 0.001 0.420 0.000 0.858 
11 11 0.002 0.121 0.002 0.121 
12 12 0.000 0.545 0.001 0.545 
13 13 0.000 0.676 0.001 0.606 
14 14 0.001 0.475 0.001 0.834 
15 15 0.000 0.564 0.001 0.564 
16 16 0.002 0.110 0.002 0.110 
17 17 0.002 0.092 * 0.002 0.092 * 
18 18 0.001 0.420 0.000 0.858 
19 19 0.000 0.498 0.001 0.498 
20 20 0.002 0.176 0.000 1.000 
21 21 0.002 0.159 0.002 0.159 
22 22 0.001 0.321 0.001 0.321 
23 23 0.001 0.394 0.001 0.394 
24 24 0.002 0.131 0.002 0.131 
25 25 0.002 0.126 0.000 1.000 
*Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level 
 
3.7. Discussions and Contributions 
We empirically examined the differences between exploitation (patch 
development) and exploration (feature request) networks of developers in OSS projects in 
terms of their social network structure. In order to accomplish these research objectives 
and test our hypothesis, we employed two statistical methods. First, we used the paired T-
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test to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference between the patch 
development and feature request networks in terms of their social network structure. With 
the paired T-test, we tested the difference between the patch development and feature 
request networks at the project level by using social network variables for internal 
cohesion, external connectivity, and network location. Our results for the paired T-test 
show that patch development and feature request networks have different network 
structures. Our results indicate that a patch development network has greater internal 
cohesion and network centrality than a feature request network. In contrast, a feature 
request network has greater external connectivity than a patch development network. We 
tested the statistical power of the results of the paired T-test. The power analysis indicates 
that the T-test more likely detects the true effect of the phenomenon. The high statistical 
power also indicates that the sample size is more than enough. Second, we also used the 
QAP test in order to examine the degree of dissimilarity between patch development and 
feature request networks at the network level. The results of the QAP test are consistent 
with the results of the paired T-test. The QAP test provides greater reliability to the 
results of the T-test. 
We found that the internal cohesion of patch development teams is greater than 
the internal cohesion of feature request teams. As measured by clustering coefficient, 
repeated ties, and Jaccard similarity, our findings indicate that different measures of 
internal cohesion are consistent and patch development teams have greater internal 
cohesion than feature request teams. Our results indicate that developers in patch 
development teams have greater trust with each other due to high internal cohesion, 
which improves collaboration and cooperation, and facilitates information exchange in 
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patch development teams. However, the result of internal cohesion measured by third 
party ties is not significant. This could be because, although repeat ties and third party 
ties are based on social interactions among developers, repeat interactions between two 
developers are much stronger than third party interactions with common third parties. 
Thus, repeat interactions result in greater trust within a focal team. In addition, the result 
of internal cohesion measured by correlation similarity is not significant. Jaccard 
similarity and correlation similarity measures the structural equivalence of developers. 
However, Jaccard similarity considers the identity of ties whereas correlation similarity 
does not consider the identity of ties. The results could indicate that connecting to the 
same developers is more important than connecting the same number of developers since 
developers may develop more closer and cohesive relationships which results in greater 
trust within a focal team. 
We found that the external cohesion of patch development teams is smaller than 
the external cohesion of feature request teams. Our results also indicate that the 
technological diversity of patch development teams is the same as the technological 
diversity of feature request teams. These results are contrary to our expectations possibly 
because of the choice of one programming language as a network boundary. Within our 
network boundary, all projects are technologically similar in terms of programming 
language. The selection of one programming language eliminates other projects using 
different programming languages. Projects using different programming languages may 
develop distinct knowledge from other projects using the same programming language. 
They may be technologically diverse and provide access to novel information. In 
addition, they may not be highly connected to each other. This means lower external 
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cohesion for a local project. Feature request teams may be more connected to projects 
using different programming languages than patch development teams. However, the 
choice of one programming language may remove external connections to other projects 
using different programming languages. This may result in high external cohesion for 
feature request teams since most external connections of feature request teams may have 
been removed. The inclusion of multiple programming languages may produce results 
which will be consistent with our hypotheses regarding external cohesion and 
technological diversity. 
We found that the number of direct ties of patch development teams is greater 
than the number of direct ties of feature request teams. Our results indicate that direct ties 
facilitate resource pooling by enabling patch development teams to combine more 
(relatively redundant) knowledge with repeating interactions than feature request teams. 
We found that the number of indirect ties of patch development teams is smaller than the 
number of indirect ties of feature request teams. Our results indicate that indirect ties 
enable feature request teams to access more novel information through knowledge 
spillovers than patch development teams. 
We found that the centrality of patch development teams is greater than the 
centrality of feature request teams. As measured by degree centrality, betweenness 
centrality, and closeness centrality, our findings indicate that different measures of 
centrality are consistent and patch development teams have greater centrality than feature 
request teams. Our results indicate high centrality enables patch development teams to 
exchange and integrate greater amounts of information more rapidly. It also enables patch 
development teams to control and regulate information flow among developers. 
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By providing a more nuanced understanding of different types of sub-networks in 
OSS development, this dissertation makes several important theoretical and practical 
contributions. 
From a theoretical perspective, we introduce the use of organizational theory on 
exploration and exploitation together with social network analysis as a theoretical lens to 
study different types of sub-networks in OSS development. Recent research on OSS 
development has studied the social network structure of software developers as 
determinant of project success (Singh et al. 2011, Singh 2010, Singh et al. 2007, Grewal 
et al. 2006). However, this stream of research has focused on the project level, and has 
not recognized the fact that projects could consist of different types of activities, each of 
which could require different types of expertise and network structures. We propose that 
OSS project activities can be classified as implementation-oriented (exploitation) and 
innovation-oriented (exploration) based on organizational theory (March 1991). In the 
context of OSS development, developing a patch would be an example of an exploitation 
activity. Requesting a new software feature would be an example of an exploration 
activity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research to study OSS development 
at the activity level. Our data selection and analysis method are different from prior 
research and novel.  
This dissertation develops the theory for and then empirically tests the differences 
between exploration and exploitation networks in OSS development in terms of their 
social network structure. Our empirical results illustrate that these two types of networks 
are significantly different in terms of their social network structure. 
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We identify a new category of developers (ambidextrous developers) in OSS 
projects who contribute to exploitative activities (patch development) as well as 
exploratory activities (feature request). A new theoretical construct for project 
ambidexterity has been developed based on the concept of ambidextrous developers. A 
nuanced understanding of different types of activities and the concept of ambidextrous 
developers open opportunities for future research as discussed in the next chapter. 
This dissertation also makes several important contributions to practice. We show 
that exploitation and exploration activities in OSS development require specific network 
structures based on characteristics and nature of each activity. Therefore, we provide OSS 
project leaders with a way to optimize their exploitative and exploratory teams based on 
requirements of each activity. OSS project leaders can allow some developers to 
specialize in each activity. They can allow some developers to work on both activities in 
order to enhance the ability of those developers (ambidextrous developers) to integrate 
exploitative and exploratory teams. In a result, they can possibly better manage OSS 
projects. This discussion is evolved further in the next chapter.  
3.9. Limitations and Future Research 
We examine the differences between exploitation (patch development) and 
exploration (feature request) networks of developers in OSS projects in terms of their 
social network structure. We assume that network structure affects knowledge transfer. 
However, we did not observe knowledge transfer directly but rather infer it from the 
relationship between network structure and project performance. Knowledge may flow 
through other mechanisms. For example, a developer may acquire knowledge from 
unconnected activities by using their software or by analyzing their software’s source 
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code. In this dissertation, we did not consider other mechanisms for knowledge flow. We 
did not analyze characteristics of individual team members such as their experiences and 
motivations which may also influence the extent to which knowledge is transferred or 
absorbed (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). These aspects of relationships can be analyzed in 
order to understand network structures in detail. These limitations have been recognized 
in prior research on OSS social networks (Singh et al. 2011, Sing 2010). 
We selected one programming language as a network boundary. Therefore, our 
data is restricted to projects using the same programming language. Future research can 
collect data for multiple programming languages. 
We did not analyze the performance of exploitative and exploratory teams at the 
activity level. Future research can analyze the performance of exploitative and 
exploratory teams at the activity level. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: TEAM PERFORMANCE IN OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 
NETWORKS: THE EFFECT OF AMBIDEXTERITY ON THE PROJECT 
PERFORMANCE 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Traditionally, software has been developed by organizations that do not make the 
source code of software publicly available. In the traditional software development, 
software developers have worked in local clusters of collaboration that were generally 
isolated within firms (Fleming and Marx 2006). More recently, open source software 
(OSS) development has become the alternative way of developing software. OSS 
development has brought together software developers spanning firm boundaries 
(Raymond 1999). OSS development mainly depends on voluntary contributions of 
software developers and OSS products are developed in a collective manner beyond the 
boundaries of a single organization (Raymond 1999). Thus, formerly isolated software 
developers have become large connected networks in OSS development. The network of 
software developers becomes more important for OSS projects and offers various 
benefits. First, collaboration among software developers can facilitate access to and 
sharing of resources, allowing developers to combine their knowledge, skills, and 
expertise (Raymond 1999). Second, new insights, ideas or ways to solve problems are 
conceived by any one and accessed by others (Raymond 1999).  
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Thus, OSS development has changed the conception of how software can be developed. 
However, not all software projects are completed successfully (Li et al. 2010). 
Understanding the factors that lead to successful OSS projects is an interesting area of 
current research. OSS development offers new research opportunities to better understand 
the network structure of OSS developers.  
Software product after delivery is improved by correcting faults or enhanced by 
adding new features based on user requirements (Banker and Slaughter 2000, Banker et 
al. 1998, IEEE 1983). The total cost of software maintenance is estimated to comprise at 
least 50% of total software life cycle costs (Van Vliet 2000, Kemerer and Slaughter 1999, 
Kemerer 1995). Thus, the modification of software after delivery is one of the major 
phases of software development. In software maintenance, we identified two important 
types of OSS project activities: patch development and feature request. Patch 
development activities are used to correct faults in software while feature request 
activities are used to enhance software by adding new features. Recent research on OSS 
development focused on the analysis of OSS requirements and used feature request 
activities in their analysis (Vlas and Robinson 2012). Software is defined as a knowledge 
product (Slaughter et al. 2006) and critical inputs to software development are skills and 
experience of developers (Li et al. 2010). Therefore, each activity requires different 
structure of collaboration and knowledge sharing among the developers since each 
activity has different objectives. 
In an organizational context, exploitation and exploration have been identified as 
two types of activities for the development and use of knowledge in organizations (March 
1991). Prior research indicates that different types of tasks require different 
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communication patterns and different amount of communication based on characteristics 
and nature of a task (Katz and Tushman 1979). A task can differ along several 
dimensions including time span, specific vs. general problem orientation, and the 
generation of new knowledge vs. using existing knowledge (Katz and Tushman 1979). 
March (1991) has suggested that exploitation and exploration represent fundamentally 
incompatible and inconsistent activities. For example, exploitation represents activities 
that improve existing organizational competencies and build on the existing technological 
trajectory. Therefore, exploitation broadens existing knowledge and skills, improves 
established designs, and expands existing products and services. In contrast, exploration 
represents activities that changes the organizational competencies and build on a different 
technological trajectory. Therefore, exploration requires new knowledge, offers new 
designs, and creates new products and services. In addition, exploitation is related to 
efficiency, centralization, and tight cultures while exploration is associated with 
flexibility, decentralization, and loose cultures (Benner and Tushman 2003). Therefore, 
exploitation and exploration require different organizational structures (Benner and 
Tushman 2003, Levinthal and March 1993). Different organizational structures for 
exploitation and exploration enable exploitative teams to develop the best viable 
solutions, and enable exploratory teams to explore new ideas (Fang et al. 2010).  
Recent research on OSS development has studied the social network structure of 
software developers as determinant of project success (Singh et al. 2011, Singh 2010, 
Singh et al. 2007, Grewal et al. 2006). However, this stream of research has focused on 
the project level, and has not recognized the fact that projects could consist of different 
types of activities, each of which could require different types of expertise and network 
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structures. We propose that OSS project activities can be classified as implementation-
oriented (exploitation) and innovation-oriented (exploration) based on organizational 
theory (March 1991). In the context of OSS development, developing a patch would be 
an example of an exploitation activity. Requesting a new software feature would be an 
example of an exploration activity.  
While exploitation and exploration represent fundamentally incompatible and 
inconsistent activities (March 1991), recent research on organizational literature has 
stressed the importance of a balance between exploitation and exploration for 
organizational survival (Benner and Tushman 2003, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). 
Structural differentiation is a proposed mechanism for organizations to build an 
ambidextrous organization (Benner and Tushman 2003, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). 
Structural differentiation refers to the subdivision of organizational tasks into distinct 
organizational units that develop appropriate contexts for exploitation and exploration 
activities. Recent studies found that ambidextrous organizations perform better (Fang et 
al. 2010, Jansen et al. 2009, Jansen et al. 2006, Lin at al. 2007). However, the 
coordination and integration of exploitative and exploratory activities is a necessary step 
in achieving ambidexterity (Jansen et al. 2009, Gilbert 2006, Smith and Tushman 2005, 
Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). We identified a new category of developers (ambidextrous 
developers) in OSS projects who contribute to exploitative activities (patch development) 
and exploratory activities (feature request). We propose that ambidextrous developers are 
an integration mechanism between patch development and feature request activities. We 
develop a theoretical construct for project ambidexterity based on the concept of 
ambidextrous developers. We construct ambidexterity as a measure of the ability of OSS 
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projects to pursue both exploitative and exploratory activities concurrently. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first research to study ambidexterity and ambidextrous 
developers in OSS development. 
In this dissertation, we introduce the use of organizational theory on 
ambidexterity together with social network analysis as a theoretical lens to study OSS 
project performance. We studied the effects of ambidexterity and coordination 
mechanisms (ambidextrous developers) on OSS project performance. We also studied the 
effects of social network properties of OSS developers on OSS project performance. We 
used a data set collected from the SourceForge database. We empirically illustrate the 
significance of ambidexterity and network characteristics on OSS project performance. 
We illustrate that a moderate level of ambidexterity, external cohesion, and technological 
diversity are desirable for project success. 
4.2. Literature Review 
There are multiple streams of research that help us to understand the structural 
differences of OSS networks. A software product after delivery is improved by correcting 
faults or enhanced by adding new features based on user requirements (Banker and 
Slaughter 2000, Banker et al. 1998, IEEE 1983). Thus, in software maintenance, we 
identified two important types of OSS project activities: patch development and feature 
request. Software is a knowledge product (Slaughter et al. 2006) and critical inputs to 
software development are skills and experience of developers (Li et al. 2010). Therefore, 
each activity requires different structure of collaboration and knowledge sharing among 
the developers since each activity has different objectives. Recent studies on social 
network literature indicated that network structures determine the structure of 
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collaboration and knowledge sharing among actors. Recent research on OSS 
development has focused on project success as the function of the social network 
structure of software developers (Singh et al. 2011, Singh 2010). They founded that OSS 
network structure affects project success. 
In an organizational context, exploitation and exploration have been identified as 
two types of activities for the development and use of knowledge in organizations (March 
1991). Prior research indicates that different types of tasks require different 
communication patterns and different amount of communication based on characteristics 
and nature of a task (Katz and Tushman 1979). March (1991) has suggested that 
exploitation and exploration represent fundamentally incompatible and inconsistent 
activities. Exploitation creates a narrow range of deeper solutions and more distinctive 
competences since exploitation results in the convergence of ideas (March 1991). In 
contrast, exploration creates a wide range of undeveloped new ideas and limited 
distinctive competence (March 1991). Therefore, exploitation and exploration require 
different organizational structures. 
Recent research on organizational literature has argued that organizations need to 
become ambidextrous, and perform explorative and exploratory activities simultaneously 
in different organizational units (e.g., Benner and Tushman 2003, Tushman and O’Reilly 
1996). Units that engage in exploitation build on existing knowledge and extend existing 
products and services. Units that engage in exploration pursue new knowledge and 
develop new products and services. Therefore, structural differentiation is a proposed 
mechanism for organizations to build an ambidextrous organization (Benner and 
Tushman 2003, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). Structural differentiation refers to the 
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subdivision of organizational tasks into distinct organizational units that develop 
appropriate contexts for explorative and exploratory activities. However, the coordination 
and integration of explorative and exploratory activities is a necessary step in achieving 
ambidexterity (Jansen et al. 2009, Gilbert 2006, Smith and Tushman 2005, Tushman and 
O’Reilly 1996). Cross-functional interfaces have been proposed as an integration 
mechanism to enable knowledge exchange between exploitative and exploratory units 
(Jansen et al. 2009, Gupta and Govindarajan 2000). 
4.2.1. Open Source Software Development 
Software maintenance is defined as the modification of a software product after 
delivery to correct faults, to improve performance or other attributes, and to enhance the 
product by adapting it to a modified environment (Banker and Slaughter 2000, Banker et 
al. 1998, IEEE 1983). Thus, a software product is improved by correcting faults or 
enhanced by adding new features based on user requirements. 
Raymond (1999) indicated that the different nature of software development 
process for proprietary and OSS vendors leads to two fundamentally different software 
development styles: the cathedral model for proprietary vendors and the bazaar model for 
OSS vendors (Raymond 1999). Software development involves knowledge work and its 
most important resource is the specialized skills and expertise that a developer brings to 
the project development (Espinosa et al. 2007, Roberts et al. 2004, Faraj and Sproull 
2000). Proprietary software is developed in a more closed environment and, hence, 
proprietary software development is characterized by a relatively strong control of design 
and implementation (Raymond 1999). In contrast, OSS vendors mainly depend on 
voluntary contributions of software developers and, hence, OSS products are developed 
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in the collective manner beyond the boundaries of a single organization (Raymond 1999). 
Therefore, OSS development depends on contributions and collaboration of volunteer 
software developers (Liu and Iyer 2007, Feller and Fitzgerald 2002). The network of 
developers becomes more important for OSS projects and offers various benefits. First, 
collaboration among software developers can facilitate access to and sharing of resources, 
allowing developers to combine their knowledge, skills, and expertise. Second, new 
insights, ideas or ways to solve problems are conceived by any one and accessed by 
others. This leads to increase the performance of developer teams to find a solution for 
developing patches or to add new features.  
Given the benefits of voluntary contributions of software developers for OSS 
development, the impact of network structure of OSS developer network (Singh et al. 
2011, Singh 2010, Grewal et al. 2006) and the formation of OSS developer teams (Hahn 
et al. 2008) have been intensively studied. Recent studies showed that the network 
structure of OSS developers significantly affects OSS project success (Singh et al. 2011, 
Singh 2010, Grewal et al. 2006). 
4.2.2. Open Source Software Collaboration Network 
In social network literature, an affiliation network is a special kind of network 
which depends on the affiliation between two groups (Wasserman and Faust 1994). 
Therefore, an affiliation network has two-modes. The first mode is a set of actors such as 
developers. The second mode is a set of events such as OSS projects to which the actors 
belong. The term affiliation refers to membership or participation to events. Therefore, 
actors are related to each other through their joint affiliation with or their co-membership 
to events. Events are also related to each other through common actor(s). 
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OSS software development is a community-based model which involves 
collaboration among software developers. OSS developers may work on multiple projects 
concurrently. Thus, OSS developers belong to multiple projects. A co-membership 
relationship exists between two developers if they work together on the same projects. 
Similarly, a relationship between two projects also exists if they share some developer(s). 
This kind of relationships between developers and projects can be represented by an 
affiliation network. In OSS network, actors are developers, and events are projects. 
4.2.3. Ambidextrous Organization through Exploitation and Exploration Networks 
March (1991) modeled two general situations involving the development and use 
of knowledge in organizations: the exploitation of old certainties and the exploration of 
new possibilities. The first is the case of mutual learning between members of an 
organization. The second is the case of learning and competitive advantage in 
competition for primacy. Exploitation includes things such as refinement, choice, 
production, efficiency, selection, implementation, and execution (March 1991). In 
contrary, exploration includes things captured by terms such as search, variation, risk 
taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, and innovation (March 1991). 
According to Benner and Tushman (2003), exploitation represents activities that involve 
improvements in existing components and build on the existing technological trajectory. 
Exploitation is incremental innovations and designed to meet the needs of existing 
customers or markets (Benner and Tushman 2003). It broadens existing knowledge and 
skills, improves established designs, and expands existing products and services. Hence, 
exploitation builds on existing knowledge and reinforces existing skills, processes, and 
structures (Benner and Tushman 2002, Levinthal and March 1993, Lewin et al. 1999). In 
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contrast, exploration represents activities that involve a shift to a different technological 
trajectory and changes the organizational competencies. Exploration is radical 
innovations and designed to meet the needs of emerging customers or markets (Benner 
and Tushman 2003). It offers new designs, creates new markets. Thus, exploration 
requires new knowledge or departures from existing knowledge (Benner and Tushman 
2002, Levinthal and March 1993).  
For March (1991), exploitation and exploration represent the fundamentally 
incompatible and inconsistent activities. Exploitation creates a narrow range of deeper 
solutions and more distinctive competences in the short-run, which comes at the cost of 
long-term performance since exploitation results in the convergence of ideas by 
eliminating the differences (March 1991). In contrary, exploration creates a wide range of 
undeveloped new ideas and too little distinctive competence in the long-term, which 
comes at the cost of short-term performance (March 1991). Moreover, exploitation is 
related to efficiency, centralization, and tight cultures while exploration is associated with 
flexibility, decentralization, and loose cultures, (Benner and Tushman 2003). 
While exploration and exploitation represent two fundamentally different 
approaches to organizational learning, recent studies on organizational literature have 
stressed the importance of a balance between exploitation and exploration for 
organizational survival (Benner and Tushman 2003, Siggelkow and Levinthal 2003, 
O'Reilly and Tushman 2004, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996, Levinthal and March 1993). 
This view is supported by research on absorptive capacity which argues that although 
internal knowledge processing and external knowledge acquisition are both necessary, 
excessive dominance by one or the other will be dysfunctional (Cohen and Levinthal 
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1990). Consistent with March (1991)’s model of organizational learning, Narayanan et al. 
(2009) examined the impacts of task specialization and task variety on the performance 
of software maintenance teams. Task specialization is defined as the cumulative 
experience at a specific task while task variety is defined as exposure to experience that is 
dispersed across distinct tasks (Narayanan et al. 2009). They indicate that task 
specialization and task variety affect the performance of software maintenance teams 
through different mechanisms. However, task specialization and task variety jointly drive 
the performance of software maintenance teams, thereby achieving a proper balance 
between task specialization and task variety leads to the highest performance (Narayanan 
et al. 2009). 
The balanced view of exploitation and exploration is embedded in the concept of 
ambidextrous organizations. Ambidextrous organizations are composed of structurally 
differentiated exploitative and exploratory units (Benner and Tushman 2003, Siggelkow 
and Levinthal 2003, O'Reilly and Tushman 2004, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996, Levinthal 
and March 1993). Structural differentiation is a proposed mechanism for organizations to 
build an ambidextrous organization (Benner and Tushman 2003, Tushman and O’Reilly 
1996). Structural differentiation refers to “the state of segmentation of the organizational 
system into subsystems, each of which tends to develop particular attributes in relation to 
the requirements posed by its relevant external environment” (Lawrence and Lorsch 
1967). In other words, structural differentiation refers to the subdivision of organizational 
tasks into distinct organizational units that develop appropriate contexts for exploitation 
and exploration activities. Structural differentiation establishes differences across 
organizational units in terms of mindsets, time orientations, functions, and 
136 
 
product/market domains (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). Structural differentiation can help 
ambidextrous organizations to maintain multiple competencies that address paradoxical 
demands (Gilbert 2005). Structural differentiation protects ongoing operations in 
exploitative units from interfering with emerging competences being developed in 
exploratory units (Jansen et al. 2009). Therefore, exploitation and exploration activities 
can be achieved without corrupting the internal structures and processes within each 
unit’s area of operation. Distinct organizational units can develop the best viable 
solutions (i.e., exploitation), while still ensuring to explore new ideas (i.e., exploration) 
(Fang et al. 2010). In this approach, organizational units pursuing exploration are smaller, 
more decentralized, and more flexible than those responsible for exploitation (Benner and 
Tushman 2003, Christensen 1998, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). Therefore, structural 
differentiation helps ambidextrous organizations to be capable of simultaneously 
exploiting existing competencies and exploring new opportunities (Raisch et al. 2009).  
Jansen et al. (2009) recognize organizational ambidexterity as a dynamic 
capability that refers to the routines and processes by which ambidextrous organizations 
mobilize, coordinate, and integrate contradictory efforts, and allocate, reallocate, 
combine, and recombine resources and assets across differentiated exploitative and 
exploratory units. Although the structural differentiation of exploitative and exploratory 
activities is important to achieve organizational ambidexterity, ambidextrous 
organizations also need to facilitate collective action (O’Reilly and Tushman 2004, 
Jansen et al. 2009). This view is supported by O’Reilly and Tushman (2007) who argue 
that the crucial task is not the simple organizational structural design in which 
exploitative and exploratory units are separated, but the processes through which these 
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units are integrated in a value enhancing way. The structural differentiation of 
exploitation and exploration activities may lead to distinct organizational capabilities and 
competences (March 1991, Gilbert 2006). However, distinct capabilities and 
competences developed within each unit must be effectively allocated, mobilized, and 
integrated to generate new combinations (Sirmon et al. 2007). Therefore, the coordination 
and integration of exploitative and exploratory units is a necessary step in achieving 
ambidexterity (Gilbert 2006, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996, Jansen et al. 2009). Recent 
research on organizational literature recognizes different types of integration mechanisms 
such as cross-functional interfaces (Jansen et al. 2009, Jansen et al. 2006, Lawrence and 
Lorsch 1967). Cross-functional interfaces are the cross-functional team of common 
organizational members from both exploitative and exploratory units (Jansen et al. 2009). 
In the similar concept, Koza and Lewin (1998) extended March’s (1991) concepts 
into the strategic alliance literature to explore the balance between exploitative and 
explorative alliances. For example, exploitative alliances are built on a firm’s aim to 
leverage existing capabilities and competencies (Rothaermel and Deeds 2004). However, 
exploratory alliances are built on a firm’s desire to discover new opportunities, build new 
competencies, and adapt to environmental changes (Koza and Lewin 1998). The concept 
of ambidexterity in alliance formation has been conceptualized in several ways. Lavie 
and Rosenkopf (2006) identified three dimensions of ambidexterity: function-based, 
structure-based, and attribute based dimensions. Structure based dimension based on the 
network structure. For example, Lin et al. (2007) measured ambidexterity based on the 
network structure of alliances. 
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4.2.4. Social Network and Team Structure 
Software development is a highly interdependent task and requires team members 
to interact with each other intensively to produce a successful system (He et al. 2007). 
Therefore, interactions among team members are necessary activities to transform team 
members’ knowledge to team knowledge that increase the project success (He et al. 
2007). However, the nature of OSS development characterized by volunteer contribution 
of software developers poses challenges in coordination among developers (Espinosa et 
al. 2007, Roberts et al. 2004, Banker et al. 2006). Coordination is the process of 
managing dependencies among activities (Malone and Crowston 1994). When the 
activities of multiple individuals need to interrelate, the interdependencies among 
activities should be well managed (Espinosa et al. 2007). Espinosa et al. (2007) indicated 
that when software is produced from multiple locations, it becomes more difficult to 
manage dependencies among activities and to coordinate developers, which increases the 
development time. Therefore, the coordination among developers becomes important for 
project success in software development.  
He et al. (2007) created a model of the formation and evolution of team cognition 
and analyzed the impacts of preexistent and ongoing collaboration ties on the formation 
of team cognition in software project teams. Team cognition refers to the mental models 
collectively held by a group of individuals that enable them to accomplish tasks by acting 
as a coordinated unit (He et al. 2007). Team cognition helps software project teams 
effectively manage their members’ knowledge, expertise, and skills as integrated assets 
(He et al. 2007, Espinosa et al. 2007). Team cognition is created by both preexisting 
conditions and ongoing team interactions. Preexisting conditions reflect both the prior 
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knowledge of team members and any previous shared experiences that team members 
have. Team interactions refer to the interactive activities that members perform to carry 
out project tasks and facilitate team performance. He et al. (2007) showed that the 
positive relationship between team performance and team cognition. Similarly, Hahn et 
al. (2008) studied the impact of prior collaboration ties on OSS collaboration team 
formation mechanisms and on OSS project success. They indicated that team cohesion is 
related to preference for repeat collaborations and results from prior relationships 
between developers to benefit from prior relationships. Team members also tend to 
interact more frequently with other members with whom they share some type of 
proximity or similarity (Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003, Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001). 
In social network literature, social capital is defined as resources embedded in 
social networks, and resources that can be accessed or mobilized through social ties in the 
networks (Coleman 1988, Lin 2005). Through social ties, an actor may capture other 
actors’ resources. These social resources can generate a return for the actor. In addition, 
because of the facilitative role of network structure, relationships among actors in a 
network are described as network resources (Gulati 1999). Recent studies also indicated 
that the position of a team in a network affects team outcomes (Singh et al. 2011, Singh 
2010, Zaheer and Bell 2005, Reagans and Zuckerman 2001, Jansen et al. 2006, Schilling 
and Phelps 2007, Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003, Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001).  
In social network literature, there are two contradictory perspectives about the 
form of network structures: the internal focus or social closure perspective (Coleman 
1988) and the external focus or structural holes perspective (Burt 1992). From Coleman 
(1988)’s social closure perspective, the optimal social structure is one generated by 
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building dense, interconnected networks. Social closure inside a group indicates the 
presence of relationships or the absence of structural holes within a group, and is thought 
to foster identification with the group (Reagans and Zuckerman 2001) and a level of 
mutual trust, which facilitates exchange and collective action (Coleman 1988). Social 
closure enables the convergence of individual interests to pursuit common initiatives and 
to facilitate mutual coordination (Reagans and Zuckerman 2001). From Burt (1992)’s 
structural holes perspective, constructing networks consisting of disconnected alters is the 
optimal strategy. Structural holes perspective focuses value derived from bridging gaps 
(i.e., structural holes) between nodes in a social network (Burt 1992). This boundary 
spanning structure generates information benefits since information tends to be relatively 
redundant within a given group (Burt 1992). As a result, actors who develop ties with 
disconnected groups gain access to a broader range of ideas and opportunities than those 
who have restricted access to single group (Granovetter 1973). Although prior research 
on social network analysis indicated the trade-off between two contradictory 
perspectives, these two perspectives do not conflict with one another (Reagans and 
Zuckerman 2001). While the social closure perspective highlights the importance of the 
presence of relationships in local interactions (i.e., internal cohesion), the external focus 
perspective highlights information benefits created by structural holes that divide a social 
network globally (i.e., external cohesion). 
Ahuja (2000) studied the impact of social network structures on innovation in 
terms of direct ties, indirect ties, and structural holes. The debate on structural holes 
suggests that an accurate understanding of the role of structural holes in the collaboration 
network must account for both Coleman's and Burt's variants of the argument (Ahuja 
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2000). Similarly, direct and indirect ties may vary in their content, which highlights the 
importance of decomposing the firm's ego network into distinct and separate elements 
and identifying the contents transmitted through each type of tie (Ahuja 2000). According 
to Ahuja (2000), network ties are associated with two distinct kinds of network benefits. 
First, they can provide the benefit of resource sharing, allowing firms to combine 
knowledge, and skills. Second, collaborative linkages can provide access to knowledge 
spillovers, serving as information conduits through which news of technical 
breakthroughs, new insights to problems, or failed approaches travels from one firm to 
another. In distinguishing between the resource-sharing and knowledge-spillover benefits 
of collaboration, it is important to distinguish between know-how and information (Kogut 
and Zander 1992). Know-how entails accumulated skills and expertise in some activity. 
Information refers primarily to facts that can be transmitted through communication 
(Kogut and Zander 1992, Szulanski 1996). The resource-sharing benefits of collaboration 
relate primarily to the transfer and sharing of know-how while the knowledge-spillover 
benefits are likely to involve predominantly information. Ahuja (2000) found that direct 
and indirect ties both have a positive impact on innovation but that the impact of indirect 
ties is moderated by the number of a firm's direct ties. Direct ties potentially provide both 
resource sharing and knowledge spillover benefits. However, indirect ties do not entail 
formal resource sharing benefits but can provide access to knowledge spillovers. 
Structural holes influence both resource sharing and access to novel information (Ahuja 
2000). Structural holes have both positive and negative influences on innovation. 
Specifically, increasing structural holes has a negative effect on innovation, so the 
optimal structure of networks depends on the objectives of the network members. 
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Zaheer and Bell (2005) examined the impact of the network structure on the 
performance and innovativeness of companies by focusing on the external connectivity 
constructed as structural holes. They highlight the importance of connections to external 
sources for innovativeness. Zaheer and Bell (2005) found that firms bridging structural 
holes are more innovative and perform better than other firms. They also indicated that 
the internal connectiveness enables firms to further exploit the ideas obtained from 
external resources. 
Jansen et al. (2006) focused on the differences of exploration and exploitation, 
and examined the impact of internal cohesion and centralization on exploitation and 
exploration. They found that internal connectedness within teams positively affects the 
performance of exploitation and exploration teams while centralization negatively affects 
exploration teams. However, Balkundi and Harrison (2006) indicated that teams that are 
central in their inter-group network tend to perform better. 
Schilling and Phelps (2007) examined the impact of clustering on the innovative 
output of firms that are members of the network. Innovation is characterized as a process 
in which solutions are discovered via search process that leads to the creation of new 
knowledge or the novel recombination of known elements of knowledge, problems, or 
solutions (Fleming 2001). Schilling and Phelps (2007) indicated the positive association 
between clustering and innovation output.  
Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001) studied the impact of organization and technology 
domain on subsequent technological development. They stressed the importance of 
knowledge internally acquired from the similar technology domains on exploitation, and 
the importance of knowledge externally acquired from the distinct technology domains 
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on exploration. In other words, organizations can develop more distinctive competence 
and becomes more expert in their current domain if they focus on their current 
organizational domain and the similar technological areas. Distinctive competences can 
improve the performance of developer teams on exploitation (March 1991, Rosenkopf 
and Nerkar 2001). In contrast, organizations can develop more diverse and less 
distinctive competence if they focus on their external organizational domain and the 
distinct technological areas. More diverse and less distinctive competence can improve 
the performance of developer teams on exploration (March 1991, Rosenkopf and Nerkar 
2001). Lazer and Friedman (2007) on their agent-based simulation model of information 
sharing found that a network that maintains diversity is better for exploration than other 
networks, supporting a more thorough search for solutions in the long run. 
Social network analysis (Wasserman and Faust 1994) has been used in a variety 
of contexts to study the relationship between social entities. Based on the findings of 
social network research (Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001, Ahuja 2000, Uzzi 1999, Uzzi 
1997, Uzzi 1996, Watts and Strogatz 1998, Krackhardt 1998, Wasserman and Faust 
1994, Burt 1992, Coleman 1988, Freeman, 1979, Granovetter 1973), organizational 
research (Schilling and Phelps 2007, Hansen 2002, Hansen 1999, Reagans and 
Zuckerman 2001), and OSS development research (Singh et al. 2011, Singh 2010, Singh 
et al. 2007, Grewal et al. 2006), structural properties of the networks are used to analyze 
the network. Many structural properties of these networks could have multiple social 
network measures. For example, there are different types of internal cohesion measures 
(clustering coefficient, repeat ties, third party ties, and structural equivalence), external 
connectivity measures (external cohesion, direct ties, indirect ties, and technological 
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diversity), and network location measures (degree centrality, betweenness centrality, and 
closeness centrality). 
4.3. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
In software development literature, software product after delivery is improved by 
correcting faults or enhanced by adding new features based on user requirements (Banker 
and Slaughter 2000, Banker et al. 1998, IEEE 1983). Therefore, we identified two types 
of OSS project activities: patch development and feature request. Patch development 
activities are used to correct faults in software while feature request activities are used to 
enhance software by adding new features. In organizational literature, exploitation and 
exploration have been identified as two types of activities for the development and use of 
knowledge in organizations (March 1991). Combining findings of organizational 
literature and software development literature, we propose that OSS project activities can 
be classified as implementation-oriented (exploitation) and innovation-oriented 
(exploration). In the context of OSS development, developing a patch would be an 
example of an exploitation activity. Requesting a new software feature would be an 
example of an exploration activity. 
Prior research indicates that different types of tasks require different 
communication patterns and different amount of communication based on characteristics 
and nature of a task (Katz and Tushman 1979). A task can differ along several 
dimensions including time span, specific vs. general problem orientation, and the 
generation of new knowledge vs. using existing knowledge (Katz and Tushman 1979). 
This is consistent with the view of March (1991) who has suggested that exploitation and 
exploration represent fundamentally incompatible and inconsistent activities. For 
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example, exploitation represents activities that improve existing organizational 
competencies and build on the existing technological trajectory. Therefore, exploitation 
broadens existing knowledge and skills, improves established designs, and expands 
existing products and services. In contrast, exploration represents activities that changes 
the organizational competencies and build on a different technological trajectory. 
Therefore, exploration requires new knowledge, offers new designs, and creates new 
products and services. In addition, exploitation is related to efficiency, centralization, and 
tight cultures while exploration is associated with flexibility, decentralization, and loose 
cultures (Benner and Tushman 2003). Therefore, exploitation and exploration require 
different organizational structures (Benner and Tushman 2003, Levinthal and March 
1993). Different organizational structures for exploitation and exploration enable 
exploitative teams to develop the best viable solutions, and enable exploratory teams to 
explore new ideas (Fang et al. 2010). In addition, software is a knowledge product 
(Slaughter et al. 2006) and critical inputs to the software development are skills and 
experience of developers (Li et al. 2010). Therefore, each project activity could require 
different types of expertise and network structures.  
While exploitation and exploration are fundamentally incompatible and 
inconsistent activities (March 1991), recent research on organizational literature has 
stressed the importance of a balance between exploitation and exploration for 
organizational survival (Benner and Tushman 2003, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). The 
balance between exploitation and exploration is embedded in the concept of 
ambidextrous organizations. Ambidextrous organizations are composed of structurally 
differentiated exploitative and exploratory units (Benner and Tushman 2003, Siggelkow 
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and Levinthal 2003, O'Reilly and Tushman 2004, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996, Levinthal 
and March 1993). However, the coordination and integration of exploitative and 
exploratory activities is a necessary step in achieving ambidexterity (Jansen et al. 2009, 
Gilbert 2006, Smith and Tushman 2005, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). Ambidextrous 
organizations may use cross-functional interfaces (Jansen et al. 2009, Gupta and 
Govindarajan 2000) such as ambidextrous developers as an integration mechanism 
between exploitative activities (patch development) and exploratory activities (feature 
request). In this dissertation, we studied the effects of ambidexterity and coordination 
mechanisms (ambidextrous developers) on OSS project performance. We also studied the 
effects of social network properties of OSS developers on OSS project performance. 
4.3.1. Ambidexterity 
Structural differentiation is a proposed mechanism for organizations to build an 
ambidextrous organization (Benner and Tushman 2003, Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). 
Structural differentiation establishes differences across organizational units in terms of 
mindsets, time orientations, functions, and product/market domains (Lawrence and 
Lorsch 1967). Therefore, structural differentiation can help project teams to develop and 
maintain different competencies that are required for patch development and feature 
request activities (Gilbert 2005). Structural differentiation protects ongoing operations in 
patch development activities from interfering with emerging competences being 
developed in feature request activities. Patch development and feature request activities 
can be achieved without corrupting the internal structures and processes within each 
unit’s area of operation. The structural differentiation of patch development and feature 
request activities may lead to distinct organizational capabilities and competences within 
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each unit (March 1991, Gilbert 2006). However, these differentiated competences must 
be effectively allocated, mobilized, coordinated, and integrated to achieve ambidexterity 
(Sirmon et al. 2007). The important task in building ambidextrous organization is not the 
simple organizational structural design in which patch development and feature request 
activities are separated, but the processes by which these units are integrated in a value 
enhancing way. Therefore, the coordination and integration of patch development and 
feature request activities is a necessary step to achieve ambidexterity (Gilbert 2006, 
Tushman and O’Reilly 1996, Jansen et al. 2009). 
We identified a new category of developers (ambidextrous developers) in OSS 
projects who contribute to exploitative activities (patch development) and exploratory 
activities (feature request). We propose that ambidextrous developers are an integration 
mechanism between patch development and feature request activities. Ambidextrous 
developers facilitate knowledge exchange and combination between patch development 
and feature request activities (Kogut and Zander 1992, Jansen et al. 2009). Through 
combination and integration of differentiated skills and experiences, project teams are 
able to synchronize, maintain, and further build portfolios of patch development and 
feature request activities simultaneously (Tushman et al. 2006). Ambidextrous developers 
facilitate new value creation through linking knowledge developed by patch development 
and feature request teams (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). They also provide opportunities 
to leverage common resources and obtaining synergies across patch development and 
feature request activities (O’Reilly and Tushman 2007). In this way, knowledge 
developed by patch development teams may be revisited, reinterpreted, and applied in 
feature request teams, or vice versa (Garud and Nayyar 1994, Postrel 2002). 
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Ambidextrous developers facilitate other team members to reach a common frame of 
reference and to build understanding and agreement (Daft and Lengel 1986, Egelhoff 
1991). Ambidextrous developers also resolve differences across patch development and 
feature request teams to overcome disagreement over organizational goals (Daft and 
Lengel 1986). We develop a theoretical construct for project ambidexterity based on the 
concept of ambidextrous developers. We construct ambidexterity as a measure of the 
ability of OSS projects to pursue both patch development and feature request activities 
concurrently. 
Consistent with March (1991)’s model of organizational learning, Narayanan et 
al. (2009) examined the impacts of task specialization and task variety on the 
performance of software maintenance teams. Task specialization and task variety 
represent fundamentally contradictory perspectives. Task specialization refers to gaining 
cumulative experience from a specific task (Narayanan et al. 2009). In contrast, task 
variety refers to gaining diverse experience from a variety of different tasks (Narayanan 
et al. 2009). Consistent with Narayanan et al. (2009), we argue that ambidextrous 
developers are project developers who gain diverse experience from a variety of different 
tasks since they work on both patch development and feature request activities 
concurrently. In contrast, we argue that non-ambidextrous developers are project 
developers who are specialized in a specific task (either patch development or feature 
request activities).  
Project teams can gain more and deeper experience from specializing in one task 
because the task becomes more routine and developers become more familiar with the 
task (Narayanan et al. 2009). Specialized experience can improve project teams’ ability to 
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understand, enhance, and modify the source code through different mechanisms 
(Narayanan et al. 2009). First, the experience gained from previous tasks is transferred to 
perform the current task. Second, the experience gained from previous tasks is applied to 
make further adjustments in the way of performing the current task. Third, the experience 
gained from previous tasks enables project teams to better learn from the current task. 
Therefore, the higher level of experience gained from a focused task increases project 
performance.  
Project teams can gain diverse knowledge from different types of tasks 
(Narayanan et al. 2009). First, diverse knowledge can improve project teams’ ability to 
better delineate knowledge that is more relevant to the current task from knowledge that 
is less relevant (Narayanan et al. 2009). Therefore, it prevents situations in which project 
teams spend time and effort in mastering new knowledge that is not really useful to the 
current task. For example, project teams can better understand the various patterns of 
software elements, and the interdependency and relationships of software elements. It 
may provide project teams with a better appreciation of the software product itself and 
the functionality of software elements. Therefore, project teams can make more informed 
inferences regarding the source code with limited examination of the specific software 
elements that is being worked on. Second, diverse knowledge allows project teams to 
make correlations between tasks, and then apply them to solve a broader range of 
problems (Narayanan et al. 2009). For example, when project teams work across different 
tasks, they can develop rules regarding how to solve problems with underlying common 
remedies. This knowledge may enable them to use preexisting solutions to known 
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problems. Furthermore, exposure to other tasks can help them better anticipate and avoid 
problems when working within a given task. 
Task specification and task variety represent the fundamentally contradictory 
perspectives. Task specification is associated with gaining cumulative experience from a 
specific task (Narayanan et al. 2009). In contrast, task variety is associated with gaining 
diverse experience from a variety of different tasks (Narayanan et al. 2009). Therefore, 
there is a trade-off between task specialization and task variety. However, Narayanan et 
al. (2009) indicated that task specialization and task variety jointly drive the performance 
of software maintenance teams, and achieving a proper balance between task 
specialization and task variety leads to the highest performance. Excessive exposure to 
task variety without adequate opportunity to specialize can lead to a lot of shallow 
learning that ultimately does not enhance the performance (Narayanan et al. 2009). In 
contrast, overspecialization on a small set of tasks can reduce the ability of project teams 
to absorb and integrate new knowledge that will ultimately lead to higher performance 
(Narayanan et al. 2009). Therefore, we argue that ambidextrous developers have access 
to diverse knowledge from a different task types, and exchange and integrate greater 
amounts of knowledge among other project developers. On the other hand, non-
ambidextrous developers specialize in a specific type of task, and they may benefit from 
knowledge exchanged by ambidextrous developers applying to a specific task type. We 
argue that a moderate level of ambidexterity enables project teams to access diverse 
knowledge from different types of tasks, and to exchange relevant knowledge within a 
project team, while ensuring adequate specialization to absorb and integrate new 
knowledge. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
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H1: A moderate level of ambidexterity results in higher project performance rather 
than very high or very low levels of ambidexterity. 
4.3.2. Internal Cohesion 
OSS development mainly depends on voluntary contributions of software 
developers and OSS products are developed in the collective manner (Raymond 1999). 
OSS development process is characterized by the lack of a relatively strong control of 
design and implementation (Raymond 1999) and the lack of face-to-face communication 
(Singh et al. 2011). Therefore, OSS teams require constructive environment to foster 
trust, reciprocity norms and shared identity, and to improve collaboration and cooperation 
among developers (Singh et al. 2011).  
Internal cohesion increases the information transmission capacity of a team 
(Schilling and Phelps 2007). First, internal cohesion improves access to information since 
the same information is available via multiple paths (Schilling and Phelps 2007). 
Information introduced into a team will quickly reach other team members through 
multiple paths. Multiple paths also enhance the fidelity of information received. 
Developers can compare information received from multiple partners, helping them to 
identify whether it is distorted or incomplete (Schilling and Phelps 2007). Second, 
internal cohesion makes information exchange meaningful and useful (Schilling and 
Phelps 2007). It can increase the dissemination of alternative interpretations of problems 
and their potential solutions, deepening the shared understanding and stimulating 
collective problem solving. Shared knowledge develops over time from prior familiarity 
with the product being developed and team members (Espinosa et al. 2007, He et al. 
2007). Shared knowledge improves coordination among team members because it 
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enables team members to develop more accurate explanations and expectations about 
tasks and other team members (Espinosa et al. 2007) because prior interactions enable 
developers to acquire information about skills and capabilities of other developers 
(Granovetter 1985) and who knows what (Faraj and Sproull 2000). In addition, shared 
knowledge of problems and solutions enhances further learning (Schilling and Phelps 
2007). Third, internal cohesion can make developers more willing and able to improve 
information exchange and cooperation among team members by fostering trust, 
reciprocity norms, and shared identity (Coleman 1988, Uzzi and Spiro 2005, Adler and 
Kwon 2002, Levin and Cross 2004, Hansen 1999, Ahuja 2000). Enhanced trust, 
reciprocity norms, and shared identity results in a high level of cooperation and 
collaboration by providing self-enforcing informal governance mechanisms (Schilling 
and Phelps 2007). Fourth, internal cohesion fosters group identification which enables the 
convergence of individual interests to pursuit common initiatives and to facilitate mutual 
coordination (Reagans and Zuckerman 2001). Fifth, internal cohesion also helps 
developers to develop team cognition which promote team coordination (Espinosa et al. 
2007, He et al. 2007). Team cognition refers to the mental models collectively held by a 
group of individuals that enable them to accomplish tasks by acting as a coordinated unit 
(He et al. 2007). Thus, team cognition helps developer teams effectively manage team 
members’ knowledge, expertise, and skills as integrated assets (He et al. 2007, Espinosa 
et al. 2007). 
Internal cohesion results in a high level of cooperation and collaboration among 
team members. By improving the information transmission capacity of a team, it also 
enables to exchange and integrate greater amounts of information and knowledge more 
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rapidly. Internal cohesion allows project developers to develop a deep understanding to 
further refine and improve existing products, and processes (Rowley et al. 2000). 
Therefore, we argue that internal cohesion is positively related to the performance of a 
project11. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H2: The performance of a project will be positively related to the internal cohesion of 
a project. 
4.3.3. External Connectivity 
Although the internal cohesion of a project team provides various benefits in 
terms of trust and information transmission capacity, project developers have access to 
external resources from external relationships to other developers outside of a project 
team. The structure and type of these relationships affect the ability of project developers 
to acquire various types of information that potentially affect the success of a project 
(Singh et al. 2011). By following prior research, we focus on the external network 
structure (the cohesion of external connections), types of external connections (direct ties 
and indirect ties) and technological characteristics of external connections that affect the 
diversity of external knowledge available to a focal project. 
External connections are associated with two distinct kinds of information 
benefits (Ahuja 2000). First, they can provide the benefit of resource sharing which 
allows teams to combine knowledge, and skills acquired from outside teams. Second, 
they can provide access to knowledge spillovers which serves as information conduits 
through which news of technical breakthroughs, new insights to problems, or failed 
approaches acquired from outside project teams. Although direct ties potentially provide 
                                                 
11 Prior research hypothesized that a moderate level of internal cohesion results in higher project 
performance rather than very high or very low levels of internal cohesion (Singh et al. 2011). However, 
their results did not prove it. 
154 
 
both resource sharing and knowledge spillover benefits (Ahuja 2000), they more likely 
provide redundant information (Hansen 1999). However, indirect ties do not provide 
resource sharing benefits but can provide access to knowledge spillovers. Therefore, 
information provided by indirect ties is novel information (Hansen 1999). On the other 
hand, external cohesion provides both resource sharing and knowledge spillovers benefits 
(Ahuja 2000). Although how external contacts are connected with each other affects 
types of information, the characteristics of the external contacts may also affect the 
diversity of knowledge. External contacts with different technological expertise are more 
likely to provide novel information and knowledge. 
4.3.3.1. External Cohesion 
External cohesion is the cohesion among the external contacts of a project (Singh 
et al. 2011). External cohesion is based on the idea of a structural hole which means the 
absence of a connection between two developers who are connected to the common third 
parties. Therefore, structural holes are defined as gaps in information flows between 
actors connected to the same actor but not directly connected to each other (Burt 2000). A 
structural hole separates developers on either side of the hole and creates the brokerage 
opportunities for those developers to obtain information from disconnected developers 
(Burt 1992). Therefore, structural holes provide both resource sharing and knowledge 
spillovers benefits (Granovetter 1973). 
External cohesion basically measures the extent to which external contacts of a 
project are connected to each other. If external contacts of a project are highly connected 
with each other (high external cohesion or low structural holes), a project is highly 
constrained to have access to novel information since too much cohesion results in 
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homogenization of information and external contacts of a project may have relatively 
redundant information (Burt 2004, Burt 1992, Granovetter 1973). However, high external 
cohesion also enhances trust, reciprocity norms, and shared identity (Coleman 1988, Uzzi 
and Spiro 2005, Adler and Kwon 2002, Levin and Cross 2004). High external cohesion 
also improves access to external resources by enhancing information transmission 
capacity of the network since the same information is available via multiple paths 
(Schilling and Phelps 2007). Multiple paths also enhance the fidelity of the information 
received (Schilling and Phelps 2007). In contrast, if external contacts of a project are not 
connected with each other (low external cohesion or high structural holes), a project have 
access to novel information from remote parts of the network such as other disconnected 
project groups (Burt 1992). Therefore, the level of cohesion among the external contacts 
of a project determines the diversity of knowledge acquired from external contacts. 
OSS network is made up of distinct developer teams in which developers are 
highly connected with each other within each project team, but weakly connected to other 
developers across other project teams (Singh 2010). Project teams tend to be 
heterogeneous across a network in terms of the knowledge they possess and produce 
because each team started with the different initial conditions (Fang et al. 2010). 
Therefore, external resources provide new knowledge, ideas, and insights (Rosenkopf 
and Almeida 2003).  
Knowledge is developed through combinations of existing and new knowledge 
(Kogut and Zander 1992). The process of sharing ideas with other projects that have 
novel information is to generate new knowledge, rather than merely exchanging existing 
information (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). This idea is consistent with the idea put forth 
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by March (1994) that projects connected to other projects that have novel information 
may replicate innovative ideas and generate more new ideas which can be used to 
introduce new and innovative products. A project whose external contacts are not highly 
connected has access to new knowledge, ideas, and insights from disconnected external 
projects (Burt 2004, Burt 1992) and they are able to develop new knowledge through 
knowledge recombination (Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003). Therefore, a project whose 
external contacts are not highly connected is able to develop new understandings not 
possible to those whose external contacts are highly connected (Zaheer and Bell 2005). 
Combining diverse knowledge from other projects (different technology areas) also 
enhances the capacity for creative learning (Fleming 2001, Kogut and Zander 1992, 
Reagans and Zuckerman 2001). Therefore, project teams that acquire knowledge from 
unique parts of their network improve their performance. This view is supported by 
Zaheer and Bell (2005) that actors bridging structural holes have been frequently shown 
to perform better than other actors not so positioned.  
Aforementioned discussions indicate that the impact of external cohesion on 
resource sharing benefits is opposite to knowledge spillover benefits (Ahuja 2000). 
Resource sharing benefits arise from the sharing and combination of knowledge and 
skills acquired from outside project teams (Ahuja 2000, Uzzi 1997, Walker et al. 1997). 
The development of mutual trust and shared norms are preconditions for successful 
resource sharing (Coleman 1988, Uzzi and Spiro 2005, Adler and Kwon 2002, Levin and 
Cross 2004). Without mutual trust and shared norms, the sharing and combination of 
knowledge and skills are difficult and unproductive (Coleman 1988). High external 
cohesion enhances mutual trust and shared norms (Coleman 1988, Uzzi and Spiro 2005, 
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Adler and Kwon 2002, Levin and Cross 2004). High external cohesion also improves 
access to external resources by enhancing information transmission capacity of the 
network through multiple paths (Schilling and Phelps 2007). Multiple paths also enhance 
the fidelity of the information received (Schilling and Phelps 2007). However, high 
external cohesion limits the ability of a project to have access to novel information since 
too much cohesion results in homogenization of information and external contacts of a 
project may have relatively redundant information (Burt 2004, Burt 1992, Granovetter 
1973). In contrast, knowledge spillover benefits arises from access to novel information 
in the forms of information conduits through which news of technical breakthroughs, new 
insights to problems, or failed approaches acquired from outside project teams (Ahuja 
2000, Uzzi 1997, Walker et al. 1997). Low external cohesion enables a project to have 
access to novel information (Burt 1992), but reduces mutual trust and shared norms 
among the external contacts of a project, thereby hinder the transmission of knowledge 
(Coleman 1988). Therefore, there is a trade-off between resource sharing and knowledge 
spillover benefits of external cohesion. We argue that a moderate level of external 
cohesion enables project teams to develop mutual trust and shared norms, and to enable 
successful resource sharing, while ensuring access to relatively diverse knowledge from 
external resources which enables knowledge spillover. This leads us to the following 
hypothesis: 
H3: A moderate level of external cohesion results in higher project performance 
rather than very high or very low levels of external cohesion. 
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4.3.3.2. Direct Ties 
Direct ties in a social network potentially provide both resource sharing and 
knowledge spillover benefits (Ahuja 2000). First, direct ties enable knowledge sharing. 
When developers collaborate to develop a technology, the resultant knowledge is 
available to all developers. Thus, each developer can potentially receive a greater amount 
of knowledge from a collaborative activity than it would obtain from a comparable 
research investment made independently (Ahuja 2000). Second, collaboration facilitates 
bringing together complementary skills from different developers. By accessing to 
complementary skills from different developers, a project team can enhance their own 
knowledge base and improve their performance. In addition, direct ties among two 
developers imply opportunities for repeat interactions (Singh et al. 2011). Repeat 
interactions allow for resource pooling and joint problem solving (Kogut and Zander 
1992). However, over time, repeated interactions using the same direct ties are more 
likely provide redundant information to a focal team (Hansen 1999). Hence, the 
knowledge spillover effect could decrease over time. Thus, the resource sharing benefit 
of direct ties is more likely greater than knowledge spillover benefit. Direct ties allow 
developers to combine knowledge and skills using repeating interactions (Kogut and 
Zander 1992). Repeated interactions through direct ties allow for resource pooling and 
joint problem solving (Kogut and Zander 1992) which do not decrease due to repeated 
interactions. Therefore, we argue that the number of direct ties is positively related to the 
performance of a project. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H4: The performance of a project will be positively related to the number of direct 
ties of a project. 
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4.3.3.3. Indirect Ties 
External connection can be a channel of communication between developers 
through indirect contacts (Ahuja 2000). An indirect tie between two developers exists 
when two developers do not work together but can be reached through mutual partners. 
Therefore, indirect ties provide developers with access not just to knowledge held by 
their immediate partners but also to knowledge held by their partner's partners (Gulati 
and Garguilo 1999). However, indirect ties are distant and infrequent relationships 
(Granovetter 1973). Therefore, they are less likely to provide opportunities for repeat 
interactions and they are not as conducive to resource pooling as direct ties (Singh et al. 
2011). They provide access to novel information by bridging otherwise disconnected 
developers (Granovetter 1973). Indirect ties can provide access to knowledge spillovers 
(Ahuja 2000), serving as information conduits through which news of technical 
breakthroughs, new insights to problems, or failed approaches travels from one developer 
to another (Ahuja 2000). Information provided by indirect ties is more likely novel 
information (Hansen 1999). Organizations develop knowledge through combinations of 
existing and new knowledge (Kogut and Zander 1992). Novel information provided by 
indirect ties can be useful to develop knowledge through knowledge recombination 
(Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003). Combining diverse knowledge enhances the capacity for 
creative learning (Fleming 2001, Kogut and Zander 1992, Reagans and Zuckerman 
2001). Therefore, we argue that the number of indirect ties is positively related to the 
performance of a project. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H5: The performance of a project will be positively related to the number of indirect 
ties of a project. 
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4.3.3.4. Direct and Indirect Tie Interaction 
The degree to which a focal team benefits from indirect ties is contingent on the 
number of direct ties of a focal team (Ahuja 2000). Project teams with few direct ties are 
more likely to have greater benefits from their indirect ties than project teams with many 
direct ties (Ahuja 2000). The relative addition to knowledge through indirect ties is 
greater for teams with few direct ties than for teams with many direct ties (Ahuja 2000). 
For teams with limited access to the network through direct ties, information provided by 
indirect ties may represent a significant increment to a focal team’s existing information 
base. Therefore, we argue that project teams with many direct ties are more likely to add 
to less knowledge to their existing information base through their indirect ties than teams 
with few direct ties. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H6: The impact of indirect ties on the performance of a project will be moderated by 
the number of direct ties of a project: the greater the number of direct ties, the 
smaller the benefit from indirect ties. 
4.3.3.5. Technological Diversity 
Although how external contacts are connected with each other affects types of 
information, the characteristics of external contacts may also affect the diversity of 
knowledge since they may vary in terms of technological areas (Rosenkopf and Nerkar 
2001). External contacts in different technological areas are more likely to provide novel 
information and knowledge (Fleming 2001, Kogut and Zander 1992). 
There is the trade-off between two contradictory perspectives in terms of the 
effect of diversity on team performance (Reagans and Zuckerman 2001). According to 
the first perspective, diversity provides creative learning benefits. In contract, according 
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to the second perspective, diversity creates coordination problems. Recent studies 
indicated that combining diverse knowledge from different technology areas has a 
positive impact on team performance (Fleming 2001, Kogut and Zander 1992). 
Therefore, teams which draw their members from different technological areas perform 
better since team members have different technical skills and expertise (Reagans and 
Zuckerman 2001). These teams enhance their capacity for creative learning since diverse 
ideas provide alternative ways of thinking, more options for creating new combinations 
which enhance both problem solving and innovation (Reagans and Zuckerman 2001). 
However, diversity introduces social divisions that hinder effective teamwork (Reagans 
and Zuckerman 2001) or create tensions among team members (Pfeffer 1983). Therefore, 
homogeneous teams may be expected to perform better since they can coordinate their 
members more easily than diverse teams (McCain et al. 1983, O'Reilly et al. 1989, 
Zenger and Lawrence 1989). However, the performance of homogeneous teams is 
restricted by relatively redundant information of team developers (Ancona and Caldwell 
1992, Pelled et al. 1999). In addition, teams vary widely in their capability to develop, 
understand, or use knowledge based on their technological base and their prior 
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Absorptive capacity of teams reflects their 
ability to exploit novel knowledge (Zahra and George 2002) and determines their ability 
to utilize and benefit from novel and unfamiliar ideas (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). 
Teams can recognize and absorb knowledge close to their existing knowledge base 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990). When teams seek to expand their knowledge base, the 
resultant search processes are restricted to familiar and proximate areas (Rosenkopf and 
Almeida 2003). Therefore, we argue that a moderate level of technological diversity 
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enables project teams to access diverse knowledge from different technological areas and 
provide creative learning benefits, while ensuring to absorb and integrate new knowledge 
as well as to eliminate coordination problems. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H7: A moderate level of technological diversity results in higher project performance 
rather than very high or very low levels of technological diversity. 
4.3.4. Network Location 
Centrality is defined as the extent to which an actor occupies a central position in 
the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Developers who are more active in the 
network act as a central actor in the network and are viewed as major channels of 
information in the network (Singh et al. 2011, Singh et al. 2007). High centrality enables 
greater amounts of information and knowledge to be exchanged and integrated more 
rapidly. First, high centrality allows developers to have a broad range of knowledge, 
including an understanding where such knowledge is located and how to obtain it 
(Hansen 2002), which is unavailable to peripheral developers (Lin et al. 2007). Central 
developers occupy a structurally advantageous position to see a more complete picture of 
all the alternatives available in the network than the peripheral developers, so they have a 
broad range of opportunities unavailable to those in the periphery (Lin et al. 2007). A 
central developer has access to unique knowledge, including an understanding where 
such knowledge is located and how to obtain it (Hansen 2002). With such information, 
centrality enables a developer to make better decisions (Balkundi and Harrison 2006). 
Second, high centrality also allows developers to have quick access to knowledge in the 
network (Uzzi 1997, Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994). High centrality also allows 
developers to rapidly disseminate knowledge in the network (Powell and Smith-Doerr 
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1994). Third, high centrality allows developer to control (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), and regulate information flow among other developers 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994, Krackhardt 1996), dispensing what is needed to other team 
members (Balkundi and Harrison 2006). Thus, high centrality enhances a developer’s 
ability to be central to the flow of information and resources in the network. Therefore, 
we argue that the centrality of a project is positively related to the performance of a 
project. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H8: The performance of a project will be positively related to the centrality of a 
project. 
4.3.5. Network Location of Ambidextrous Developers 
Ambidextrous developers facilitate knowledge exchange and combination among 
other developers (Kogut and Zander 1992, Jansen et al. 2009). We assume that 
ambidextrous developers play an integration role by speeding up information flow and 
allowing information and knowledge to be exchanged and integrated more rapidly among 
other developers. Ambidextrous developers also play a control role to control and 
regulate information flow among other developers. A node in a structurally advantageous 
position in the network tends to receive benefits of information exchange and control 
(Burt 1992). Centrality measures the extent to which an actor occupies a central position 
in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Therefore, central developers are viewed as 
major channels of information in the network (Singh et al. 2011, Singh et al. 2007). High 
centrality enables greater amounts of information and knowledge to be exchanged and 
integrated more rapidly. Central developers occupy a central position in the flow of 
information and resources in the network, which allows them to control and regulate 
164 
 
information flow among other developers. First, high centrality allows developers to have 
a broad range of knowledge, including an understanding where such knowledge is 
located and how to obtain it (Hansen 2002), which is unavailable to peripheral developers 
(Lin et al. 2007). Central developers occupy a structurally advantageous position to see a 
more complete picture of all the alternatives available in the network than the peripheral 
developers, so they have a broad range of opportunities unavailable to those in the 
periphery (Lin et al. 2007). A central developer has access to unique knowledge, 
including an understanding where such knowledge is located and how to obtain it 
(Hansen 2002). With such information, centrality enables a developer to make better 
decisions (Balkundi and Harrison 2006). Second, high centrality also allows developers 
to have quick access to knowledge in the network (Uzzi 1997, Powell and Smith-Doerr 
1994). High centrality also allows developers to rapidly disseminate knowledge in the 
network (Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994). Therefore, high centrality more likely improves 
an integration role of ambidextrous developers by speeding up information flow and 
allowing information and knowledge to be exchanged and integrated more rapidly among 
other developers. Third, high centrality allows developer to control (Wasserman and 
Faust 1994, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), and regulate information flow among other 
developers (Wasserman and Faust 1994, Krackhardt 1996), dispensing what is needed to 
other team members (Balkundi and Harrison 2006). Therefore, high centrality enhances 
ambidextrous developers’ ability to be central to the flow of information and resources in 
the network. High centrally more likely improves a control role of ambidextrous 
developers to control and regulate information flow among other developers. Therefore, 
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we argue that the centrality of ambidextrous developers is positively related to the 
performance of a project. 
The centrality of ambidextrous developers may be higher when they work on 
more projects. Thus, high centrality may imply that ambidextrous developers are working 
on more projects and may be exposed to too much information. However, individuals 
have the cognitive limitations to learning (Simon 1991). Exposure to too much 
information may lead to cognitive overload and poorer performance, which results in 
lower performance (Jansen et al. 2006). If ambidextrous developers are exposed to too 
much information, they may spend much time and effort to deal with overloaded 
information, which reduces their learning and performance (Narayanan et al. 2009). 
Therefore, we argue that the impact of the centrality of ambidextrous developers on the 
performance of a project will be moderated by the number of projects on which 
ambidextrous developers work. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H9: The performance of a project will be positively related to the centrality of 
ambidextrous developers. 
H10: The impact of the centrality of ambidextrous developers on the performance of 
a project will be moderated by the number of projects on which ambidextrous 
developers work: the greater number of projects on which ambidextrous developers 
work, the lower impact of the centrality of ambidextrous developers on the 
performance of a project. 
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4.4. Data 
4.4.1. Data Sources and Collection 
OSS network data required for this study has been collected from the SourceForge 
database (SourceForge.net). The SourceForge database is the primary repository for OSS 
projects and accounts for about 90% of all open source projects (Singh et al. 2011). 
Although all OSS projects are not hosted at the SourgeForge database and there are other 
OSS hosting websites such as BerliOS Developer and GNU Savannah, the SourgeForge 
database is the largest OSS development and collaboration website (Xu et al 2005). It can 
be considered as the most representative of the OSS community because the large 
number of projects and developers registered the SourgeForge database (Singh et al. 
2011, Grewal et al. 2006, Xu et al 2005). Researchers analyzing issues related to OSS 
development phenomenon have predominantly used SourceForge data (Singh et al. 2011, 
Singh 2010, Singh 2007, Grewal et al 2006). The SourceForge database provides storage 
space and services to OSS projects in order to organize and coordinate software 
development activities by providing project web servers, trackers, mailing lists, 
discussion boards, and software releases (Xu et al 2005). This database contains software 
for download as well as statistics related to OSS projects. Researchers can create database 
programs to download statistics that are of interest. 
Our research objective is to study the effect of social network properties of OSS 
developers and ambidexterity on project performance. Therefore, we need to collect 
affiliation network data in order to construct the network of OSS developers. Given a set 
of projects and developers, there are two methods to collect affiliation network data: 
Snowball method and Whole network method (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). The whole 
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network method yields maximum information, but it can also be difficult to execute while 
the snowball method yields considerably less information about network structure, but it 
is often less difficult to implement (Hanneman and Riddle 2005).  
The snowball method begins with a focal actor or set of actors. Then, all the 
actors connected to a focal actor or set of actors are tracked down. The snowball process 
continues until no new actors are identified, or a large enough number of observations is 
collected for analysis. However, there are major potential limitations of the snowball 
method (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). First, actors who are not connected (i.e. actors in 
different components) are not reached through this method. The snowball method may 
tend to overstate the connectedness and solidarity of populations of actors based on the 
starting actors and their connectivity to other actors. Therefore, there is no guaranteed 
way of finding all of the connected individuals in the population.  
The whole network method requires that we collect information about each 
developer's ties with all other developers. Because we collect information about ties 
between all developer-project pairs, full network data give a complete picture of relations 
in the population (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). Whole network data is necessary to 
properly define and measure many of the structural concepts of network analysis 
(Hanneman and Riddle 2005). Whole network data also allows for very powerful 
descriptions and analyses of social structures (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). However, 
whole network data can also be very difficult to collect. The data collection task is made 
more manageable by determining an appropriate boundary around the network since the 
whole network method examines actors that are regarded as bounded social collectives 
(Marsden 2005, Singh et al. 2011). This is the predominant method used in situation 
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where an appropriate network boundary is established. Prior studies on OSS development 
used software development platforms called project foundries as a network boundary. 
Project foundries are mainly built on programming languages, thereby project foundry 
and programming language are similar concepts. For example, Singh et al. (2011) used 
participation in Python foundry (uses Python programming language) and Grewal et al. 
(2006) used participation in Perl foundry (uses Perl programming language) as a network 
boundary. However, foundry data associated with OSS projects was not available at the 
SouceForce database after 2005. Therefore, there is no way for us to associate projects 
with foundries.  
We used the whole network method to collect affiliation network data and 
selected the C programming language as a network boundary. The selection of the C 
programming language as a network boundary is acceptable for several reasons. First, it 
is the system implementation language for the UNIX operating system and UNIX/Linux 
operating system is dominant in OSS community (Subramanian et al. 2009). Second, it is 
one of the preferred languages of OSS developers for codes that require portability, need 
faster processing, have real-time requirements, or are tightly coupled to the UNIX/Linux 
kernel (Subramanian et al. 2009). Third, developers who are familiar with the 
programming language are able to understand the source code easily (Subramanian et al. 
2009), thereby more efficient knowledge sharing may be possible within a project or 
across projects written in the same programming language. Fourth, we analyzed the 
number of projects and associated developers across programming languages and found 
that the C language is in the top three languages used by the large number of software 
developers at SourgeForge. 
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Data collection started by identifying developer-project pairs since OSS 
developers may work on multiple projects simultaneously if they are members of 
different project teams. A relationship exists between any two developers if they are 
members of different project teams and consequently work together on the same project. 
These kinds of relationships between developers and projects can be represented by an 
affiliation network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Affiliation data for projects and 
developers has been collected from the SourceForge database for projects registered from 
January 1999 to December 2008 at the SourceForge website. We have set December 
2008 as a cutoff date for our study for several reasons. First, constructing a network and 
calculating a variety of social network measures are extremely computation intensive 
especially for larger networks. We used social network software (UCINET) (Borgatti et 
al. 2002) to perform calculations and wrote our own code when required to construct a 
network as well as to perform some calculations. We analyzed the number of developers 
for projects written in the C language for each year from 2003 to 2011. We found that 
networks (especially project developers’ network used in Chapter 4) have large number 
of developers (≥15,000) after December 2008 as shown in Table 14. This results in 
extremely large networks that are challenging to process with UCINET. Second, the first 
data snapshot of the SourceForge database is available for January 2003. The difference 
between our cutoff date and the first data snapshot date of the SourceForge data is 5 years 
which provides sufficient variation in network characteristics. Third, we had a concern 
for data availability of our dependent variables (the number of versions) because the 
SourceForge database provides data for our dependent variables until December 2008.  
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TABLE 14: Project Statistics across Years 
Years Number of Projects Number of Developers 
Jan 31, 2003 741 4,371  
Dec 31, 2004 1,271 6,999  
Dec 31, 2005 1,532 8,400  
Dec 31, 2006 1,830 9,935  
Dec 31, 2007 2,117 11,330  
Dec 31, 2008 2,374 12,665  
Dec 31, 2009 2,515 14,933  
Dec 31, 2010 2,608 15,564  
Dec 31, 2011 2,665 15,950  
 
In order to identify developer-project pairs, we identified all projects that match 
following criteria. First, we included the projects which are written in the C language (our 
network boundary). Second, we excluded projects which have neither patch nor feature 
request activities in order to ensure the calculation of project ambidexterity. Prior 
research also indicated that a large proportion of projects hosted at the SourceForge 
database show no activity (Singh et al. 2011, Singh 2010, Chengalur-Smith and Sidorova 
2003). These projects would be dead nodes in the network and the relationships involving 
them would not facilitate any knowledge transfers or spillovers (Singh et al. 2011). 
Therefore, including such projects in the network may lead to misleading results. By 
following prior research (Singh et al. 2011, Singh 2010), we excluded those projects. If a 
project has neither patch nor feature request activities, we considered those projects as 
inactive because we assume that they showed no sign of activity since their inception 
until December 2008. Third, among the projects matching previous criteria, we selected 
the projects whose patch development and feature request activities have been 
successfully closed. In this way, our data collection procedure is the consistent with our 
data collection procedure in Chapter 3. This is important since project ambidexterity is 
calculated based on ambidextrous developers identified in Chapter 3. For the projects that 
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match our criteria, we identified the developers who joined to projects. This allows us to 
collect affiliation network data (developer-project pairs) and construct an affiliation 
network for projects.  
4.4.2. Network Construction 
OSS network data analyzed in this study is the affiliation data between developers 
and projects. Social network of the OSS community is represented by an affiliation 
network such as a two-mode network based on a developer-project pair. However, in 
order to analyze the structure of OSS networks, we need a one-mode network at the 
developer level. Therefore, we construct a project network in two steps. 
We construct an affiliation network for projects based on the developer-project 
pairs. In this affiliation network, the actors are unique developers, and the events are 
projects. A relationship exists between two developers if they work together on the same 
project. Figure 5 illustrates the process of developer affiliation network construction. In 
Figure 5a, each project has its own set of developers. A square node represents a unique 
project and a circular node represents a unique developer. A link between any two 
developers exists if they work on the same project. Figure 5b shows the developer 
network for individual projects. However, some developers (D5 and D10) work on more 
than one project simultaneously. Thus, they belong to more than one project team and 
they are used to connect the individual teams in the network as shown in Figure 5c 
(which shows the network of developers across projects). In Figure 5c, a node represents 
a unique developer.  
A binary adjacency matrix (the matrix P) of affiliation networks represents the 
relationships between projects and developers in the network in Figure 6a. The adjacency 
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matrix of affiliation networks lists unique developers across multiple projects. A row 
represents developers, and a column represents projects. When a developer belongs to a 
project, the corresponding matrix element gets a value of one, and zero otherwise. The 
transpose (the matrix PT) of an adjacency matrix of affiliation networks represents the 
relationships between projects and developers in the network in Figure 6b. A row 
represents projects, and a column represents developers. We converted two-mode 
network data to one-mode network data by multiplying an adjacency matrix (the matrix 
P) of affiliation networks with the dot product of the transpose (the matrix PT) of an 
adjacency matrix of affiliation networks expressed as follows: 
 [3]
An adjacency matrix (the matrix XP) of a project network represents the 
relationships between any two developers in Figure 6c. The row and the column represent 
unique developers. A value of one or more corresponding to the pair of two developers in 
the network indicates a presence of a relationship between them, and a value of zero 
indicates the absence of relationship. The adjacency matrix is undirected because 
relationship among two developers is mutual. We converted all values greater than one to 
one which simply indicates a presence of a relationship between two developers. This 
final adjacency matrix is our final network which is used in our analysis. The final 
network includes 2,374 projects and 12,665 developers. 
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FIGURE 5: OSS Network Construction at the Project Level 
 
P = 
1 2 3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0
1 1 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
0 1 1
0 0 1
0 0 1
0 0 1
0 0 1
 
 
a) Two-Mode Adjacency Matrix of Projects and Developers 
FIGURE 6: Matrix Representations of OSS Project Network at the Project Level 
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PT = 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1
2
3
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
 
 
b) Transpose of Two-Mode Adjacency Matrix of Projects and Developers 
 
XP =
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
 
 
c) One-Mode Adjacency Matrix of OSS Projects 
FIGURE 6: Cont'd 
 
4.5. Variable Definitions and Operationalization 
4.5.1. Dependent Variables 
Our theoretical background and associated hypotheses rely on the effect of social 
network properties of OSS developers and ambidexterity on project performance. Recent 
studies on OSS project performance measured OSS project performance in terms of the 
technical performance of a project which represents the rate of knowledge creation by a 
project (Singh et al. 2011, Singh 2010, Greval at al. 2006), and the commercial 
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performance of a project (Singh 2010, Greval at al. 2006). We measured the technical 
performance (knowledge creation) of OSS projects with two types of dependent 
variables. First, by following the prior research on OSS project performance, we 
measured the technical performance of OSS projects with the Concurrent Versions 
System (CVS) which commonly used in the OSS literature (Singh et al. 2011, Singh 
2010, Grewal et al. 2006, Rai et al. 2002). Second, we measured the technical 
performance of OSS projects with the Subversion System (SVN). CVS and SVN are 
commonly used Source Code Management (SCM) tools to manage and track changes in 
software source code (SourceForge.net). The number of the CVS commits and SVN 
commits are our technical performance measures. Although we did not expect two types 
of technical performance measures, in the data collection, we found that there are two 
types of technical performance measures. Therefore, we focused on the technical 
performance of a project. The commercial performance model is the topic of future 
research since significant time involves collecting and analyzing data for the commercial 
performance of a project. 
4.5.1.1. Technical Performance of a Project 
Based on Grant (1996)’s knowledge-based theory, a project is a structure to turn 
team members’ knowledge into products. Therefore, software is a knowledge product 
(Slaughter et al. 2006) and the amount of knowledge created by a project measures the 
performance of a project (Singh et al. 2011). The dependent variable should represent the 
amount of knowledge created by a project. 
Extant research on software development has suggested the use of modification 
requests (MR’s) as a measure of the rate of knowledge creation by a project that follows 
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an incremental software development approach (Singh et al. 2011, Singh 2010, Boh et al. 
2007, Grewal et al. 2006). The MR measure represents the addition of new functionality 
as well as the modification or repair of old functionality (Singh et al. 2011). In OSS 
development literature, the CVS and SVN commit transactions measure a basic addition 
of functionality similar to that taken into account by the MR measure in a commercial 
development environment (Mockus et al. 2002). Therefore, the MR measure is equivalent 
to CVS and SVN commits (Van Antwerp and Madey 2008). 
Software developers use the CVS and SVN to manage the software development 
process. The CVS and SVN enable project teams to store source code at a central 
location, thus enabling team members to retrieve the source code to make changes. The 
CVS and SVN also help project teams to keep track of every change, including what was 
changed, when it was changed, and who made the change, and help in blending changes 
made by different developers, including ensuring that developers do not accidentally 
overwrite each other’s alterations. CVS and SVN commits occur when a developer 
uploads the altered source code file, and the CVS and SVN tool updates the changed files 
automatically. 
Recent studies on OSS development have used CVS commits as a measure of the 
technical performance of a project, and have not use SVN commits since the SVN is 
relatively new (Van Antwerp and Madey 2008). After the SVN has been made available, 
the adoption of the SVN was widespread throughout the OSS community and many 
projects have migrated from the CVS to the SVN (Van Antwerp and Madey 2008). 
Therefore, many projects have used the CVS in their first years and then started using the 
SVN by migrating from the CVS to the SVN. The CVS and SVN may not be used in 
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parallel mode because this potentially creates difficulties for projects to track the same 
changes in different systems. Projects may use the CVS and SVN for different modules 
of their projects. Therefore, the same file (changes in source code) may not be submitted 
to both systems. The overlapping between the CVS and SVN commits is very low. Based 
on our assumptions, the marginal error to use the CVS and SVN commits as a combined 
measure may be very low.  
As CVS and SVN commits reflect changes to source code, we used the number of 
CVS commits as well as the sum of CVS and SVN commits (combined score) as 
measures of the technical performance of a project (the rate of knowledge creation by a 
project). These measures of the technical performance of a project are consistent with the 
literature on information system success (DeLone and McLean 1992). Recent studies 
which are closely related to our study have used the number of CVS commits as a 
measure of the technical performance of a project (Singh et al. 2011, Singh 2010, Grewal 
et al. 2006, Rai et al. 2002). 
4.5.2. Independent Variables 
Based on the finding of organizational literature (Jansen et al. 2009, Gupta and 
Govindarajan 2000), we identified a new category of developers (ambidextrous 
developers) in OSS projects. We develop a new theoretical construct for OSS project 
ambidexterity based on the concept of ambidextrous developers.  
Social network analysis (Wasserman and Faust 1994) has been used in a variety 
of contexts to study the relationship between social entities. Structural properties of the 
networks are used to analyze the network. Many structural properties of these networks 
could have multiple social network measures. For example, there are different types of 
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internal cohesion measures (clustering coefficient, repeat ties, third party ties, and 
structural equivalence), external connectivity measures (external cohesion, direct ties, 
indirect ties, and technological diversity), and network location measures (degree 
centrality, betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality). Consistent with previous 
studies on social network research (Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001, Ahuja 2000, Uzzi 
1999, Uzzi 1997, Uzzi 1996, Watts and Strogatz 1998, Krackhardt 1998, Wasserman and 
Faust 1994, Burt 1992, Coleman 1988, Freeman, 1979, Granovetter 1973), organizational 
research (Schilling and Phelps 2007, Hansen 2002, Hansen 1999, Reagans and 
Zuckerman 2001), and OSS development research (Singh et al. 2011, Singh 2010, Singh 
et al. 2007, Grewal et al. 2006), we categorized our social network variables into three 
categories: internal cohesion, external connectivity, and network location. In the 
following section, we describe our variables used in this study along with the 
construction of their measures.  
4.5.2.1. Ambidexterity 
Recent research on organizational performance has realized the importance of 
ambidexterity and begun to study ambidexterity based on perceptual (survey) data in the 
context of formal organizations (Jansen et al. 2009, Jansen et al. 2006, Jansen et al. 2005, 
Lin et al. 2007). These studies have used ambidexterity as a measure of the ability of 
organizations to pursue both exploitative and exploratory activities concurrently.  
Based on the finding of organizational literature (Jansen et al. 2009, Gupta and 
Govindarajan 2000), some developers are expected to be members of teams involved in 
exploitative activities (patch development) and members of teams involved in exploratory 
activities (feature request). Consistent with the finding of organizational literature, we 
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identified a new category of developers (ambidextrous developers) in OSS projects who 
are members of teams involved in exploitative activities (patch development) and 
members of teams involved in exploratory activities (feature request), and contribute to 
both types of OSS activities. We develop a theoretical construct for project ambidexterity 
based on the concept of ambidextrous developers. We assume that the contribution of 
ambidextrous developers to patch development activities is independent from their 
contribution to feature request activities, or vice versa.  
We measured project ambidexterity as the percentage of ambidextrous developers 
in a project. We calculated ambidexterity for a project as follows. First, we identified 
ambidextrous developers from their memberships to exploitative activities (patch 
development) and exploratory activities (feature request) for each project in Chapter 3. 
Second, for each project, we identified project developers from their memberships to 
projects. Third, we calculated the percentage of ambidextrous developers in a project as a 
measure of ambidexterity for a project. Therefore, the measure of ambidexterity ranges 
from 0 to 1. A high score of project ambidexterity indicates a project is mostly consisted 
of ambidextrous developers rather than non-ambidextrous developers. The square of 
ambidexterity is also included as an independent variable to capture the curvilinear 
relationship as hypothesized in Hypothesis 1. 
4.5.2.2. Internal Cohesion 
We measured internal cohesion for a project with clustering coefficient, repeated 
ties, third party ties, and structural equivalence (Jaccard similarity and correlation 
similarity). 
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Clustering Coefficient: The clustering coefficient captures the degree to which the 
overall network contains localized pockets of dense connectivity (Watts and Strogatz 
1998, Watts 1999). The clustering coefficient mainly measures the extent to which two 
related developers share a relationship with a common third.  
We measured the clustering coefficient for a project by following Watts and 
Strogatz (1998). For each project developer, we calculated the clustering coefficient (see 
Appendix B for the calculation of clustering coefficient). We took an average of each 
project developer’s clustering coefficient over all the project developers to calculate a 
measure of the clustering coefficient for a project.  
The clustering coefficient lies strictly in the range from 0 to 1. The value of 1 
indicates that all developers in the network share a direct relationship with each other. 
That means each developer is directly connected to all other developers in the network, 
which results in extreme clustering. In contrast, the value of 0 indicates that any two 
connected developers do not share a relationship with a common third. A high score of 
the clustering coefficient indicates greater clustering. 
Repeat Ties: Repeated collaboration among project members captures the strength 
of interpersonal connections among team members (Uzzi 1996, Uzzi 1999, Singh et al. 
2011). Strong interpersonal connections indicate the presence of repeat collaborations 
among project members (Uzzi 1997). As developers interact more frequently, the 
strength of the collaborative tie increases, and they develop more closer and cohesive 
relationships (Granovetter 1973, Hansen 1999). Team members rely on repeated ties 
developed through joint participation in past teams because they are motivated to 
continue to work with those with whom they have collaborated in the past (Hahn et al. 
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2008). Repeated ties from past interactions may result in greater trust and knowledge for 
developers (Uzzi and Spiro 2005). 
We measured the number of repeated ties for a project by following Singh et al. 
(2011). We counted the total number of projects on which each pair of project developers 
have worked together. We divided this number by the total number of pairs that exist in a 
project to calculate a measure of repeat ties for a project. A high score of repeat ties 
indicates that project developers have worked together on several projects. 
Third Party Ties: Third party ties support direct relationships and imply that a 
project team is composed of developers who work with many of the same collaborators 
(Szulanski 1996, Coleman 1988, Singh et al. 2011). Third part ties are important for the 
existence of effective norms and the trustworthiness in social structures (Coleman 1988). 
Similarly, the concept of simmelian ties are the same with third party ties (Krackhardt 
1998). Two people are simmelian tied to one another if they are reciprocally and strongly 
tied to each other and to another one in common (Krackhardt 1998). Simmelian ties 
enhance the conflict resolution and group norms (Krackhardt 1998). 
We measured the number of third party ties for a project by following Singh et al. 
(2011). We counted the total number of third party ties of all pairs of project developers 
around the members of a project team (besides the focal team members). We divided this 
number by the total number of pairs that exist in a project to calculate a measure of third 
party ties for a project. A high score of third party ties indicates that project developers 
have worked together with other developers on several projects. 
Structural Equivalence: The structural equivalence measures to the extent to 
which two actors have identical relationships to all other actors, i.e. they jointly occupy 
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the structurally equivalent position in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Thus, 
the structural equivalence is a pair-level measure of how similar the actors’ network 
patterns are. Structurally equivalent actors have a similar pattern of relationships to other 
actors in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994, Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001). 
Structurally equivalent actors tend to have similar profiles and behaviors (Gnyawali and 
Madhavan 2001). Structurally equivalent actors tend to interact with similar others in 
similar ways, which results in similar attitudes, resources, and behaviors (Gnyawali and 
Madhavan 2001). Therefore, structurally equivalent actors may have similar asset, 
information, and resources (Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001). 
We measured the structural equivalence for a project with two measures: Jaccard 
similarity, and Correlation similarity (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Jaccard similarity 
measures the similarity of the relationships of two developers by comparing the size of 
the overlap against the size of the relationships of two developers (Wasserman and Faust 
(1994). Correlation similarity measures the similarity of the relationships of two 
developers by calculating Pearson’s correlation of the relationships of two developers 
(Wasserman and Faust (1994). Correlation similarity measures the strength of the 
relationship between two developers and it is based on the similarity in pattern of ties 
whereas Jaccard similarity accounts for the identity of ties between two developers. 
We calculated Jaccard similarity and correlation similarity as follows. We 
calculated the total of Jaccard similarity and correlation similarity of all pairs of project 
developers. We divided these numbers by the total number of pairs that exist in a project 
to calculate measures of Jaccard similarity and correlation similarity for a project. Jaccard 
similarity and correlation similarity lie strictly in the range from 0 to 1. A value of one 
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represents perfect structural equivalence whereas a value of zero represents no structural 
equivalence. A high score of structural equivalence indicates that project developers 
worked with many of the same developers. 
4.5.2.3. External Connectivity 
We measured external connectivity for a project with external cohesion, direct 
ties, indirect ties, and technological diversity. 
External Cohesion: We measured the external cohesion with Burt’s (1992) 
network constraint. Network constraint measures the extent to which a project member’s 
external contacts share relationships with each other.  
We calculated the external cohesion for a project as follows. For each project 
developer, we calculated the network constraint (see Appendix B for the calculation of 
external cohesion). We took an average of each project developer’s network constraint 
over all the project developers to calculate a measure of the network constraint for a 
project. Higher values of external cohesion indicate that external contacts of a project are 
more directly connected with each other, which indicates greater external cohesion. In 
contrast, lower values of external cohesion indicate that external contacts of a project are 
less directly connected with each other, which indicates smaller external cohesion. The 
square of the external cohesion is also included as an independent variable to capture the 
curvilinear relationship as hypothesized in Hypothesis 2. 
Direct Ties: We measured direct ties by following Ahuja (2000). Direct ties 
measure the extent to which project members are directly connected to external contacts. 
Direct ties are also associated with the capacity of a project to acquire tacit knowledge 
from outside (Singh et al. 2011). 
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We calculated direct ties for a project as follows. For each project developer, we 
counted the number of developers who a project developer has ties with other than the 
other team members of the project. We took an average of this number over all the 
project developers to calculate a measure of direct ties for a project. Higher values of 
direct ties indicate that a project is more directly connected to external contacts. 
Indirect Ties: Indirect ties are ties that provide access to external developers at 
path distances of two or greater (local project developers’ partner's partners), which 
excluded direct ties. Indirect ties measure the extent to which project members are 
indirectly connected to external partner's partners. Indirect ties are also associated with 
the capacity of a project to acquire explicit knowledge from outside (Singh et al. 2011). 
We used two measures for indirect ties. The first measure is the number of 
indirect ties. For each project developer, we counted the number of developers with 
whom a project developer does not have a direct tie but can reach through others (at path 
distances of two or greater, which excluded direct ties). We took an average of this 
number over all the project developers to calculate a measure of indirect ties for a project.  
This measure does not account for the weakening or decay of tie strength as 
distance between two developer’s increases (Ahuja 2000). Burt (1992) provided a 
frequency decay measure for indirect ties that accounts for this decline in tie strength 
across distant ties (see Appendix B for the calculation of indirect ties with frequency 
decay function). Thus, our second measure for indirect ties is a frequency decay measure 
proposed by Burt (1992). The argument for the frequency decay function is that the rate 
at which the strength of a relation decreases with the increasing length of its 
corresponding path distance should vary with the social structure in which it occurs (Burt 
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1992). The larger the number of developers to which the focal project developer must 
devote their time and energy, the weaker the relationship that the focal project developer 
can sustain with any individual developer. Thus, decay in the strength of a relationship is 
related to the number of other developers reached at each path distance.  
For each project developer, we calculated a frequency decay function for indirect 
ties. We took an average of this number over all the project developers to calculate a 
measure of indirect ties with a frequency decay function for a project. Higher values of 
indirect ties indicate that a project is more indirectly connected to external partner's 
partners at path distances of two or greater. The interaction terms of the number of direct 
ties with the number of indirect ties and indirect ties with frequency decay function are 
also included to capture the interaction effect between direct and indirect ties as 
hypothesized in Hypothesis 6. 
Technological Diversity: Technological diversity measures the extent to which 
two projects are different in terms of the angular distance of their technological positions. 
In order to calculate the technological diversity for a project, we defined the 
technological position of a project. The technological position of a project can be defined 
in terms of different dimensions such as the type of the project, programming language, 
user interface, and operating system (Singh et al. 2011). Each of these dimensions 
represents different type of technical expertise. Project type represents the application 
domain knowledge whereas the other three dimensions represent the tools knowledge and 
expertise that comprise the knowledge of process, data and functional architecture (Kim 
and Stohr 1998, Singh et al. 2011). The similarity of domain and tools affect the amount 
of knowledge that can be reused from one project to another (Singh et al. 2011).  
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Following Jaffe (1986), we characterized a project’s technological position by a 
vector Fp = (F1…Fk), where k is the total number of categories under the four dimensions, 
and Fk is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the project p falls under the category k. 
A project can fall under several categories within a single dimension. Technological 
diversity between the two projects p and q is then calculated by the angular separation or 
uncentered correlation of their vectors (see Appendix B for the calculation of 
technological diversity). 
We calculate the technological diversities of all pairs of a focal project with all of 
the projects with which it shares a developer. We summed these measures and divided it 
by the number of projects (the total number of project pairs) to calculate a measure of 
technological diversity for a project. Technological diversity lies in the range from 0 to 1. 
A value of one represents the greatest technological diversity between two projects. The 
square of technological diversity is also included as an independent variable to capture 
the curvilinear relationship as hypothesized in Hypothesis 7. 
4.5.2.4. Network Location 
We measured network location for a project with network centralities: degree 
centrality, closeness centrality, and betweenness centrality. 
Degree Centrality: We measured the degree centrality with Freeman’s (1979) 
degree centrality. Degree centrality is the measure of how many an actor is connected to 
other actors in the network through direct connections (Freeman 1979, Wasserman and 
Frost 1994). Degree centrality of a developer reflects the activeness of a developer in the 
network. Developers who are more active in the network act as a central actor in the 
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network and are viewed as major channels of information in the network (Singh et al. 
2011, Singh et al. 2007). 
We calculated the degree centrality for a project as follows. For each project 
developer, we calculated the degree centrality (see Appendix B for the calculation of 
degree centrality). We took an average of each project developer’s degree centrality over 
all the project developers to calculate a measure of the degree centrality for a project.  
The degree centrality is normalized by dividing by the maximum possible degree 
in the network which is that one actor is connected to all other actors in the network. This 
calculation results in that the degree centrality lies in the range from 0 to 1. However, 
UCINET reports the normalized degree centrality as a percentage for each node by 
multiplying with 100 (Wasserman and Frost 1994). Therefore, the measure of degree 
centrality for a project ranges from 0 to 100. A high score of the degree centrality 
indicates a project is comprised of developers who are connected to many developers in 
the network. 
Betweenness Centrality: We measured the betweenness centrality with Freeman’s 
(1979) betweenness centrality. Betweenness centrality is the measure of how often a 
developer falls on the shortest path between pairs of other developers (Freeman 1979, 
Wasserman and Faust 1994). Developers with a high betweenness centrality lie in the 
shortest path of information flow between other developers. These developers can exert 
control over information flow among other developers, and potentially may have some 
control over the interactions between other developers (Wasserman and Faust 1994). 
Thus, betweenness centrality signifies a developer’s ability to be central to the flow of 
information and resources in the network. These developers can be important to the 
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network-wide information diffusion process by occupying a central position on the 
shortest path between other developers in a network.  
We calculated the betweenness centrality for a project as follows. For each project 
developer, we calculated the betweenness centrality (see Appendix B for the calculation 
of betweenness centrality). We took an average of each project developer’s betweenness 
centrality over all the project developers to calculate a measure of the betweenness 
centrality for a project. 
The betweenness centrality is normalized by dividing by the maximum possible 
betweenness in the network which is the number of pairs of actors not including a focal 
actor (the maximum possible paths passing through a focal actor). This calculation results 
in that the betweenness centrality lies in the range from 0 to 1. However, UCINET 
reports the normalized betweenness centrality as a percentage for each node by 
multiplying with 100 (Wasserman and Frost 1994). Therefore, the measure of 
betweenness centrality for a project ranges from 0 to 100. A high score of the 
betweenness centrality indicates a project is comprised of developers who fall on many 
shortest paths between other developers.  
Closeness Centrality: We measured the closeness centrality with Freeman’s 
(1979) closeness centrality. Closeness centrality is the measure of how close an actor is to 
all other actors in the network through direct and indirect connections (Freeman 1979, 
Wasserman and Frost 1994). It basically measures the inverse of the sum of geodesic 
distances between actors in the network, thereby an actor with high closeness centrality 
has minimum geodesic distances to other actors. Closeness centrality signifies a 
developer’s ability to reach resources in the network (Gulati and Gargiulo1999). 
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Information would have to travel over shorter distances to reach a developer who is more 
central in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). A developer who is close to many 
developers can quickly interact and communicate with them without passing through 
many intermediaries (Wasserman and Faust 1994).  
We calculated the closeness centrality for a project as follows. For each project 
developer, we calculated the closeness centrality (see Appendix B for the calculation of 
closeness centrality). We took an average of each project developer’s closeness centrality 
over all the project developers to calculate a measure of the closeness centrality for a 
project.  
The closeness centrality is normalized by multiplying by the maximum possible 
path distance in the network which is that one actor is connected to another one actor 
passing through all other actors in the network. This calculation results in that the 
closeness centrality lies in the range from 0 to 1. However, UCINET reports the 
normalized closeness centrality as a percentage for each node by multiplying with 100 
(Wasserman and Frost 1994). Therefore, the measure of closeness centrality for a project 
ranges from 0 to 100. A high score of the closeness centrality indicates a project is 
comprised of developers who are very close to all other developers in the network via 
shortest paths.  
4.5.2.5. Network Location of Ambidextrous Developers 
We measured network location of ambidextrous developers for a project with 
their network centralities: degree centrality, closeness centrality, and betweenness 
centrality. 
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Degree Centrality of Ambidextrous Developers: We measured the degree 
centrality of ambidextrous developers with Freeman’s (1979) degree centrality. Degree 
centrality is the measure of how many an actor is connected to other actors in the network 
through direct connections (Freeman 1979, Wasserman and Frost 1994). We calculated 
the degree centrality ambidextrous developers for a project as follows. For each 
ambidextrous developer, we calculated the degree centrality (see Appendix B for the 
calculation of degree centrality). We took an average of each ambidextrous developer’s 
degree centrality over all ambidextrous project developers to calculate a measure of the 
degree centrality of ambidextrous developers for a project.  
The degree centrality is normalized by dividing by the maximum possible degree 
in the network which is that one actor is connected to all other actors in the network. This 
calculation results in that the degree centrality lies in the range from 0 to 1. However, 
UCINET reports the normalized degree centrality as a percentage for each node by 
multiplying with 100 (Wasserman and Frost 1994). Therefore, the measure of degree 
centrality for a project ranges from 0 to 100. A high score of the degree centrality 
indicates a project is comprised of ambidextrous developers who are connected to many 
developers in the network. 
Betweenness Centrality of Ambidextrous Developers: We measured the 
betweenness centrality of ambidextrous developers with Freeman’s (1979) betweenness 
centrality. Betweenness centrality is the measure of how often a developer falls on the 
shortest path between pairs of other developers (Freeman 1979, Wasserman and Faust 
1994).  
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We calculated the betweenness centrality of ambidextrous developers for a project 
as follows. For each ambidextrous developer, we calculated the betweenness centrality 
(see Appendix B for the calculation of betweenness centrality). We took an average of 
each ambidextrous project developer’s betweenness centrality over all ambidextrous 
project developers to calculate a measure of the betweenness centrality of ambidextrous 
developers for a project. 
The betweenness centrality is normalized by dividing by the maximum possible 
betweenness in the network which is the number of pairs of actors not including a focal 
actor (the maximum possible paths passing through a focal actor). This calculation results 
in that the betweenness centrality lies in the range from 0 to 1. However, UCINET 
reports the normalized betweenness centrality as a percentage for each node by 
multiplying with 100 (Wasserman and Frost 1994). Therefore, the measure of 
betweenness centrality for a project ranges from 0 to 100. A high score of the 
betweenness centrality of ambidextrous developers indicates a project is comprised of 
ambidextrous developers who fall on many shortest paths between other developers.  
Closeness Centrality of Ambidextrous Developers: We measured the closeness 
centrality of ambidextrous developers with Freeman’s (1979) closeness centrality. 
Closeness centrality is the measure of how close an actor is to all other actors in the 
network through direct and indirect connections (Freeman 1979, Wasserman and Frost 
1994).  
We calculated the closeness centrality of ambidextrous developers for a project as 
follows. For each ambidextrous developer, we calculated the closeness centrality (see 
Appendix B for the calculation of closeness centrality). We took an average of each 
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ambidextrous developer’s closeness centrality over all ambidextrous project developers 
to calculate a measure of the closeness centrality of ambidextrous developers for a 
project.  
The closeness centrality is normalized by multiplying by the maximum possible 
path distance in the network which is that one actor is connected to another one actor 
passing through all other actors in the network. This calculation results in that the 
closeness centrality lies in the range from 0 to 1. However, UCINET reports the 
normalized closeness centrality as a percentage for each node by multiplying with 100 
(Wasserman and Frost 1994). Therefore, the measure of closeness centrality for a project 
ranges from 0 to 100. A high score of the closeness centrality indicates a project is 
comprised of ambidextrous developers who are very close to all other developers in the 
network via shortest paths. 
4.5.2.6. Number of Projects which Ambidextrous Developers Work 
The number of projects is the measure of how many projects ambidextrous 
developers work on. We calculated the number of projects for a project as follows. For 
each ambidextrous developer, we counted the number of projects on which that 
ambidextrous developer works. We took an average of this number over all ambidextrous 
project developers to calculate a measure of the number of projects for a project. The 
interaction terms of the number of projects with the degree, betweenness and closeness 
centralities of ambidextrous developers are also included to capture the interaction effect 
the number of projects and ambidextrous developers’ centralities as hypothesized in 
Hypothesis 9. 
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4.5.3. Control Variables 
Consistent with prior research, we included control variables in order to control 
effects of factors other than independent variables. We categorized control variable into 
following categories: team human capital and ability, user input and market potential, 
project age, and project characteristics (Singh et al. 2011, Singh 2010, Greval at al. 
2006).  
Team Human Capital and Ability: We included the number of developers (project 
team size) associated with a project to account for human capital actively involved in the 
project.  
User Input and Market Potential: Although all projects use the C programming 
language, the software developed by the project team may differ in terms of market 
potential and extent of user participation (Singh et al. 2011). Users often play a critical 
role in the development and evolution of an open source product (Von Hippel and Von 
Krogh 2003). Activities such as bug reports, bug fixes, and user support requests are 
user-driven activities since bugs and support requests represent user inputs to OSS 
projects (Greval at al. 2006). Bugs play an important role to identify defects in software 
(SourceForge.net). Support request made by users are associated with specific questions 
and offered solutions which represent the collection of feedbacks (SourceForge.net). 
Following Singh et al. (2011) and Greval at al. (2006), we controlled user inputs to OSS 
projects by constructing two variables: the number of support requests and the number of 
bugs. The number of support requests is constructed as the cumulative number of support 
requests answered. The number of bugs is constructed as the cumulative number of bugs 
closed.  
194 
 
Page views directly signals the general interest of users in the project and its 
market potential (Greval at al. 2006). Following Singh et al. (2011) and Greval at al. 
(2006), we controlled the general interest of users in the project and its market potential 
with the number of page views which is constructed as the cumulative number of project 
pages viewed. 
Project Life-Cycle Effects: The software life cycle may also affect the dependent 
variables (the number of CVS commits and the sum of CVS and SVN commits) since the 
dependent variables are more likely to increase with the age of a project (Singh et al. 
2011 and Greval at al. 2006). We controlled the effect of project life-cycle on the 
dependent variables with a project age which is constructed as the number of months 
since a project’s inception at SourceForge by network construction date. However, 
projects are more likely to see a relatively higher CVS and SVN commits rate close to the 
inception of the project as compared to later stages where the complexity of the software 
increases with growth, making it harder to make improvements (Singh et al. 2011). To 
control for potential nonlinear effect of project age on the dependent variables, we also 
included the square of the project age. This accounts for the potential complexity 
associated with software as the code grows. 
Project Characteristics: Following Singh et al. (2011), we construct a broad range 
of variables to control the effects of software characteristics on the dependent variables. 
We control for a project type, intended audience, and user interface, language, and 
development status by constructing dummy variables.  
The type of the project may indicate the potential market size of the software. We 
controlled the type of the project with 18 measures: Communications, Database, 
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Education, Formats Protocols, Games and Entertainment, Internet, Mobile, Multimedia, 
Office Business, Printing, Religion Philosophy, Scientific Engineering, Security, 
Sociology, Software Development, System, Terminals, Text Editors. A project can fall 
under several categories. The measure of the project type takes a value 1 if the project is 
categorized under that project type and 0 otherwise. 
Intended audience may influence the quality of developers that are attracted 
towards a project. For example, software that is aimed towards system administrators is 
likely to attract more sophisticated developers (Lerner and Tirole 2002, Roberts et al. 
2006). We controlled intended audience with 7 measures: Advanced End Users, 
Developers, Desktop End Users, Industry and Sector Users, Quality Engineers, System 
Administrators, Other Audience. A project can fall under several categories. The measure 
of intended audience takes a value 1 if the project is categorized under that intended 
audience and 0 otherwise. 
User interface may also have an influence on the market size of a project. For 
example, software with graphical user interface is easier to use and is likely to be adopted 
more widely. We controlled user interface with 7 measures: Graphical Interface, 
Grouping and Descriptive Interface, Non-interactive Interface, Plugins, Textual Interface, 
Toolkits Libraries, Web Based Interface. A project can fall under several categories. The 
measure of user interface takes a value 1 if the project is categorized under that user 
interface and 0 otherwise. 
Project’s whose language is not English restrict both the number of users and 
developers that can participate in it. We construct the language as a dummy variable for 
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English. The measure of the language takes a value 1 if the project language is English 
and 0 otherwise. 
We also controlled the development status of software. Software can be at one of 
the development stage: Planning, Pre-Alpha, Alpha, Beta, Production/Stable, and Mature. 
The measure of the development status of software takes a value of 1 for a planning 
stage, 2 for a pre-alpha stage, 3 for an alpha stage, 4 for a beta stage, 5 for a 
production/stable stage, and 6 a mature stage. 
4.6. Research Methodology 
Our research objective is to study the effect of social network properties of OSS 
developers and ambidexterity on OSS project performance. This study also examines the 
impact of coordination mechanisms (ambidextrous developers) on OSS project 
performance. In order to accomplish these research objectives and test the hypothesis 
developed in the previous sections, we employed the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression.  
OSS network data analyzed in this study is the affiliation network data of 
developers at the project level. We created a list of 2,374 projects from the SourceForge 
database for projects registered from January 1999 to December 2008. One of important 
issues for the OLS regression is the absence of outliers. An outlier is an observation with 
large residual and the multivariate statistics such as standardized residuals can be used to 
detect outliers (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, Pedhazur 1997, Myers 1990). Standardized 
residuals that exceed ±3 indicate possible outliers (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). We 
detected outliers for each individual model and then removed all observations from our 
data set. We identified 14 observations as outliers, and hence they were removed from 
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our data set. We tested our hypotheses by using the final data set including 2,360 
observations (projects). 
The required sample size for the OLS regression depends on a number of factors 
including the power (1-β), the alpha level (α), and the number of predictors (Tabachnick 
and Fidell 2007, Green 1991). When the alpha (α) is set at the 0.05 level, Cohen (1988) 
assumes that the risk of failure to find the beta (β) may be about four times less serious 
than the risk of finding what does not exist (α). The test with the power greater than 0.80 
level is considered statistically powerful at the 0.05 alpha level (Green 1991, Cohen 
1988). Given the significance alpha level (α=0.05) and the power level (1-β=0.80), Green 
(1991) suggested that at least N > 50 + 8m (where m is the number of independent 
variables) observations are required for testing the significance of the multiple 
correlation, and at least N > 104 + m observations are required for testing the significance 
of the individual predictors. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) also recommended to choose 
the larger number of observations required by these two rules. In this study, we have 26 
independent variables including the squares of independent variables and the interaction 
terms, and 40 control variables. As explained later, we also incorporated 3 interaction 
terms that are missing in the models since some independent variables may not be 
observable by themselves due to the interaction effect with other variables. We have 69 
variables in total. Therefore, the sample size of 2360 is considered adequate when 
compared to the required sample size of 603 (50+8*69) for testing the multiple 
correlation. The sample size of 2360 is also considered adequate when compared to the 
required sample size of 173 (104+69) for testing the individual predictors. 
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The OLS regression assumes that the relationship between the dependent variable 
and each independent variable should be linear. However, we expect the curvilinear 
relationship (inverse U-shaped relationship) for some of our independent variables 
(ambidexterity, external cohesion, and technological diversity), and one of our control 
variables (project age). Therefore, these variables violate the linearity assumption. One of 
the remedies for this violation is to add the quadratic component of these variables as an 
independent variable (Myers 1990, Allison 1999). Thus, we included the squares of 
ambidexterity, external cohesion, technological diversity, and project age as independent 
variables in the model in order to capture the curvilinear relationship. 
The OLS regression also assumes that the error term should follow the normal 
distribution. We tested this normality assumption with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality. We found that the error terms are normally distributed. 
We found that the dependent variables (the number of CVS commits and the sum 
of CVS and SVN commits), some of the independent variables (repeat ties, third party 
ties, direct ties, indirect ties, indirect ties with frequency decay function, and the number 
of projects which ambidextrous developers work) and some of control variables (the 
number of support requests answered, the number of bugs closed, and the number of page 
views) were not normally distributed. In such a case, the OLS regression may yield 
biased parameter estimates that cannot be easily interpreted (Gelman and Hill 2007). 
Therefore, as suggested by Gelman and Hill (2007), we performed a logarithmic 
transformation on dependent, non-normally distributed independent and control variables. 
In addition, following Singh et al. (2011), we scaled down the number of direct ties, 
indirect ties, and frequency decayed indirect ties by the factor of 100 before performing a 
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logarithmic transformation. Based on a review of prior OSS literature, we identified two 
types of theoretical models in terms of analyzing of OSS project performance. We term 
them as the forecasting model (Singh et al. 2011 and Singh 2010) and the cumulative 
model (Grewal et al. 2006). We first reviewed the forecasting model used by Singh et al. 
(2011) and Singh (2010) which based on the use of a lag between network variables and 
the project performance measure. For example, Singh et al. (2011) measured the 
dependent variable (CVS Commits) as the number of CVS commits for a project in one 
year subsequent to network construction date. Thus, the dependent variable leads the 
independent variables by one year. However, the choice of network construction date is 
arbitrary. In addition, they used the cumulative number of CVS commits (the presample 
CVS in Singh et al. 2011) until the network construction date as a control variable in 
order to gauge the prior capacities of the project teams. However, there are major 
potential limitations of the forecasting model. First, network data used in the forecasting 
model is based on the cumulative social network interactions of software developers. The 
SourceForge database provides monthly snapshots of projects hosted at the SourceForge 
website. Each monthly data snapshot includes data associated with the current month and 
all previous months (from the inception date of a project). Therefore, the forecasting 
model implicitly tests the effect of cumulative network characteristics on project 
performance over a short future period of time, i.e., one year in Singh et al. (2011) and 
Singh (2010). Second, we analyzed the number of CVS commits for each year from 2003 
to 2011, and found that the distribution of CVS commits is not uniform over years. For 
example, a project may perform well for some periods and may not perform well for 
other periods. Therefore, forecasting for short future time periods based on long 
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cumulative performance is sensitive choice of network construction date. Therefore, the 
forecasting model is vulnerable to the arbitrary selection of time for both network 
structure and project performance. Third, we analyzed the correlations among the 
cumulative number of CVS commits (a control variable in Singh et al. 2011), and the 
number of CVS commits in a subsequent year. We found that they are highly correlated, 
hence, the cumulative number of CVS commits as a control variable may suppress the 
importance of other independent variables since most of the variation in CVS commits 
may explained by only one variable. In other words, if a project team has performed well 
over a long period of time in the past, it is more likely to perform well in the future time 
period. However, past performance is not a good predictor for performance if future time 
periods are short. 
The second model is a cumulative model used by Grewal et al. (2006). This 
model is based on the project performance measures over the life span of a project. They 
measured the dependent variable (CVS Commits) as the number of CVS commits for a 
project over the life span of a project until network construction date. We used the 
cumulative model for several reasons. First, both network data and performance data used 
in the cumulative model are based on the cumulative social network interactions of 
software developers. Therefore, the cumulative model measures the cumulative 
performance of resulting developer teams. At any point in time, a social network is the 
result of cumulative interactions of software developers. It makes sense to measure the 
cumulative effects of network structures until network construction date. The cumulative 
model tests the effect of cumulative network characteristics on project performance over 
a long period of time (compared to the forecasting model). Second, the cumulative model 
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is not vulnerable to the arbitrary selection of time for network construction date. Third, 
the cumulative model captures the final results of social network interactions of software 
developers. Fourth, the cumulative model has been used in prior research (Grewal et al. 
2006). 
We present multiple technical performance models. With the first set of models, 
we test the impacts of independent variables on the technical performance of a project 
measured with the number of CVS commits. With the second set of models, we test the 
impacts of independent variables on the technical performance of a project measured with 
the sum of CVS and SVN commits. These models are variants of the following models: 
CVS = f (β0 + β1 Ambi + β2 SQ_Ambi + β3 CCoeff + β4 RT + β5 TPT + β6 JS + β7 CS + 
β8 EC + β9 SQ_EC + β10 DT + β11 IT + β12 (DT x IT) + β13 ITFD + β14 
(DT x ITFD) + β15 TD + β16 SQ_TD + β17 DC + β18 BC + β19 CC + β20 
Ambi_DC + β21 Ambi_BC + β22 Ambi_CC + β23 NP + β24 (Ambi_DC 
x NP) + β25 (Ambi_BC x NP) + β26 (Ambi_CC x NP)) 
CVS and SVN = f (β0 + β1 Ambi + β2 SQ_Ambi + β3 CCoeff + β4 RT + β5 TPT + β6 JS + 
β7 CS + β8 EC + β9 SQ_EC + β10 DT + β11 IT + β12 (DT x IT) + β13 
ITFD + β14 (DT x ITFD) + β15 TD + β16 SQ_TD + β17 DC + β18 BC + 
β19 CC + β20 Ambi_DC + β21 Ambi_BC + β22 Ambi_CC + β23 NP + β24 
(Ambi_DC x NP) + β25 (Ambi_BC x NP) + β26 (Ambi_CC x NP)) 
where the CVS is the dependent variable of the technical performance model 
which is measures as the number of CVS commits. The CVS and SVN is the another 
dependent variable of the technical performance model which is measures as the sum of 
CVS and SVN commits. The Ambi is project ambidexterity, the SQ_Ambi is the square 
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of project ambidexterity, the CCoeff is clustering coefficient for a project, the RT is the 
number of repeat ties for a project, the TPT is the number of third part ties for a project, 
the JS is Jaccard similarity for a project, the CS is correlation similarity for a project, the 
EC is the external cohesion for a project, SQ_EC is the square of external cohesion, the 
DT is the number of direct ties for a project, the IT is the number of indirect ties for a 
project, the (DT x IT) is the interaction term between the number of direct ties and 
indirect ties, the ITFD is the number of indirect ties calculated with frequency decay 
function, the (DT x ITFD) the interaction term between the number of direct ties and 
frequency decayed indirect ties, the TD is the technological diversity of a project, the 
SQ_TD is the square of technological diversity, the DC is the degree centrality of a 
project, the BC is the betweenness centrality of a project, the CC is the closeness 
centrality of a project, the Ambi_DC is the degree centrality of ambidextrous developers 
for a project, the Ambi_BC the betweenness centrality of ambidextrous developers for a 
project, the Ambi_CC is the closeness centrality of ambidextrous developers for a 
project, the NP is the number of projects on which ambidextrous developers work , the 
(Ambi_DC x NP) is the interaction term between the degree centrality of ambidextrous 
developers and the number of projects, the (Ambi_BC x NP) is the interaction term 
between the betweenness centrality of ambidextrous developers and the number of 
projects, the (Ambi_CC x NP) is the interaction term between the closeness centrality of 
ambidextrous developers and the number of projects. In Table 15, the model variables, 
their notations, and transformations applied to dependent and independent variables are 
shown. In Table 16, the descriptive statistics of the untransformed dependent and 
independent variables are shown. 
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Another important issue the OLS regression is the absence of multicollinearity 
among independent variables. High multicollinearity results in reduced stability of the 
corresponding parameter estimates, increased standard errors associated with coefficients 
of predictors, and reduced power to measure effects (Cohen et al. 2003, Stevens 1992, 
Myers 1990). We examined the correlations among independent variables including the 
squares of independent variables and the interaction terms by using the Pearson 
Correlation analysis (Allison 1999) and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) (Myers 1990, 
Stevens 1992). Allison (1999) indicated that the cut-off value of a correlation coefficient 
can be 0.70 for the OLS regression although the correlation coefficient greater than 0.60 
may pose difficulties in testing and interpreting regression coefficients (Tabachnick and 
Fidell 2007). Thus, we set the cut-off value of a correlation coefficient as 0.60. We report 
correlation coefficients among untransformed independent variables in Table 17, and 
correlation coefficients among transformed independent variables in Table 18. Pearson 
Correlation analysis indicates statistically significant correlation among some 
independent variables including the squares of independent variables and the interaction 
terms. Therefore, we tested the seriousness of high correlations with the VIF. The VIF 
values greater than 10 for the OLS regression indicate high multicollinearity problem 
(Myers 1990, Stevens 2002).  
We found that the squares of ambidexterity, external cohesion, technological 
diversity, and project age were highly correlated with ambidexterity, external cohesion, 
technological diversity, and project age respectively. Aiken and West (1991) and Myers 
(1990) suggested that when the squared variables are included in the model, the 
independent variables should be centered in order to reduce the correlation between them 
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to acceptable levels. Therefore, we mean centered ambidexterity, external cohesion, 
technological diversity, and project age before taking their squares. Our approach is also 
consistent with Singh et al. (2011) since they found a curvilinear relationship for external 
cohesion, technological diversity, and project age. They included the squares of non-
linear variables (external cohesion, technological diversity, and project age), and mean 
centered non-linear variables before taking their squares. After mean centering, the VIF 
values for ambidexterity, external cohesion, technological diversity and project age, and 
their squares are lower than 10. Thus, the VIF analysis does not indicate any 
multicollinearity problems for these variables. 
We also found that ambidextrous developers’ degree, betweenness and closeness 
centralities, and the number of projects are highly correlated with their interaction terms. 
Aiken and West (1991) and Myers (1990) suggested that when the interaction terms are 
included in the model, the independent variables should be centered in order to reduce the 
correlation between them to acceptable levels. Therefore, we mean centered 
ambidextrous developers’ degree, betweenness and closeness centralities before 
calculating their interaction terms with the number of projects. However, after mean 
centering, the VIF values for ambidextrous developers’ degree, betweenness and 
closeness centralities, the number of projects, and their interaction terms are found higher 
than 10. Therefore, the VIF analysis still indicates multicollinearity problems. We chose 
to report results with multicollinearity problems.  
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We found that the pair of log transformed direct ties and indirect ties, and the pair 
of log transformed direct ties and frequency decayed indirect ties were highly correlated 
with their interaction terms. However, the VIF values for direct ties, indirect ties, 
frequency decayed indirect ties, and their interaction terms are lower than 10. Thus, the 
VIF analysis does not indicate any multicollinearity problems, and we did not use any 
additional transformation such as mean centered transformation for them. 
The correlation analysis also indicates the high correlation among variables within 
and between variable groups (internal cohesion, external connectivity, network location 
of projects, and network location of ambidextrous developers). For example, there are 
high correlations among the pairs of internal cohesion variables: clustering coefficient 
and Jaccard similarities, correlation similarities and repeat ties, correlation similarities 
and Jaccard similarities. There are high correlations among the pairs of external 
connectivity variables: indirect ties and frequency decayed indirect ties, indirect ties and 
technological diversity. External connectivity variable are also correlated with centrality 
variables of projects and centrality variables of ambidextrous developers. For example, 
there are high correlations among the pairs of following variables: direct ties and 
projects’ degree centrality, direct ties and ambidextrous developers’ degree centrality, 
indirect ties and projects’ closeness centrality, indirect ties and ambidextrous developers’ 
closeness centrality, indirect ties and the number of projects, frequency decayed indirect 
ties and projects’ closeness centrality, frequency decayed indirect ties and ambidextrous 
developers’ closeness centrality, frequency decayed indirect ties and the number of 
projects, technological diversity and projects’ closeness centrality, technological diversity 
and ambidextrous developers’ closeness centrality, technological diversity and the 
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number of projects. In addition, centrality variables of projects and centrality variables of 
ambidextrous developers are also correlated with each other. For example, there are high 
correlations among the pairs of following variables: projects’ degree centrality and 
ambidextrous developers’ degree centrality, projects’ betweenness centrality and 
ambidextrous developers’ betweenness centrality, projects’ closeness centrality and 
ambidextrous developers’ closeness centrality. Because of high correlations among 
independent variables within and between variable groups, we cannot test all variables in 
one model. Therefore, we tested each independent variable along with ambidexterity in 
separate models. We also created illustrative combined models in order to show that 
further combined models are possible. However, there is no basis for which an 
independent variable should be used for a representative for each variable group (internal 
cohesion, external connectivity, network location of projects, and network location of 
ambidextrous developers). Prior studies use one variable for internal cohesion as well as 
one variable for external connectivity to test their hypotheses (Singh et al. 2011). 
Consistent with prior studies, we select one variable for internal cohesion as well as one 
variable for external connectivity along with ambidexterity to create our illustrative 
combined models. 
In the data analysis, we found that projects’ degree, betweenness and closeness 
centralities were not statistically significant. The results are contrary to our expectations 
and do not support our hypotheses regarding projects’ network locations. These 
unexpected results lead us to analyze the interaction terms that are missing in the models. 
We used backward stepwise regression starting with all two-way interactions in order to 
reach a final model, in which the interaction of degree centrality with closeness centrality 
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and the interaction of degree centrality with betweenness centrality were found 
significant. We analyzed the data set after including the interaction between degree 
centrality with closeness centrality, and the interaction between degree centrality with 
betweenness centrality. However, we found that projects’ degree, betweenness and 
closeness centralities were highly correlated with their interaction terms. Aiken and West 
(1991) and Myers (1990) suggested that when the interaction terms are included in the 
model, the independent variables should be centered in order to reduce the correlation 
between them to acceptable levels. Therefore, we mean centered projects’ degree, 
betweenness and closeness centralities before calculating their interaction terms. After 
mean centering, the VIF values for a projects’ degree, betweenness and closeness 
centralities, and their interaction terms are lower than 10. Thus, the VIF analysis does not 
indicate any multicollinearity problems for them. 
In the data analysis, we also found that project ambidexterity and its square were 
not statistically significant in testing hypothesis regarding to the network locations of 
ambidextrous developers. The results are contrary to our expectations for project 
ambidexterity. These unexpected results lead us to analyze the interaction terms that are 
missing in the models. We used backward stepwise regression starting with all two-way 
interactions in order to reach a final model, in which the interaction of the number of 
projects with a project team size was found significant. We analyzed the data set after 
including the interaction between the numbers of projects with a project team size.  
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4.6.1. Technical Performance Models 
4.6.1.1. Results of Independent Variables 
The significance of an overall regression model is tested with the analysis of 
variance (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007, Myers 1990). Therefore, the F statistic is used to 
assess the significance of the proposed model against the null model which assumes that 
that all effects of the independent variables are zero (all regression coefficients are zero).  
We measured the technical performance of a project using two measures (the number of 
CVS commits and the sum of CVS and SVN commits). In Table 20, we report the results 
of regression analyses for technical performance models in which the dependent variable 
is the number of CVS commits. In Table 21, we report the results of regression analyses 
for technical performance models in which the dependent variable is the sum of CVS and 
SVN commits. In each table, Model 1 presents the base model with only ambidexterity 
and control variables. Model 2.1 through Model 2.5 add internal cohesion measures to 
Model 1 (clustering coefficient, repeat ties, third party ties, Jaccard similarity, and 
correlation similarity respectively). Model 3.1 through Model 3.4 add external 
connectivity measures to Model 1 (external cohesion, direct ties/indirect ties, direct 
ties/frequency decayed indirect ties, and technological diversity respectively). Model 4 
adds projects’ centralities measures to Model 1 (degree centrality, betweenness centrality, 
and closeness centrality together). Model 5 adds ambidextrous developers’ centralities 
measures and the number of projects to Model 1 (the degree centrality of ambidextrous 
developers, the betweenness centrality of ambidextrous developers, the closeness 
centrality of ambidextrous developers, and the number of projects together). The F 
statistics of all models across two technical performance measures are significant at the 
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0.01 alpha level. We rejected the null hypotheses that the effects of the independent 
variables are zero, and, hence, all models are found to be statistically significant. We 
summarize the results of our hypotheses in Table 19. 
 
TABLE 19: Summary of Hypotheses 
Variable Type Hypotheses Tested with Variable Results Comments 
Ambidexterity Hypothesis 1 Ambidexterity Supported   
Internal  
Cohesion 
Hypothesis 2 Clustering Coefficient Supported   
Hypothesis 2 Repeat Ties Supported   
Hypothesis 2 Third Party Ties Not Supported Not significant 
Hypothesis 2 Jaccard Similarity Supported   
Hypothesis 2 Correlation Similarity Supported   
External  
Connectivity 
Hypothesis 3 External Cohesion Supported   
Hypothesis 4 Direct Ties Supported   
Hypothesis 5 Indirect Ties Supported   
Hypothesis 6 Direct Ties x Indirect Ties  Supported   
Hypothesis 5 Indirect Ties FD Supported   
Hypothesis 6 Direct Ties x Indirect Ties FD Supported   
Hypothesis 7 Technological Diversity Supported   
Network  
Location 
Hypothesis 8 Degree Centrality Supported   
Hypothesis 8 Betweenness Centrality Not Supported Opposite of hypothesis 
Hypothesis 8 Closeness Centrality Supported   
Network 
Location of  
Ambidextrous 
Developers 
Hypothesis 9 Ambi Degree Centrality Not Supported Opposite of hypothesis 
Hypothesis 9 Ambi Betweenness Centrality Supported   
Hypothesis 9 Ambi Closeness Centrality Supported   
Hypothesis 10 Ambi DC x NP Not Supported Opposite of hypothesis 
Hypothesis 10 Ambi BC x NP Supported   
Hypothesis 10 Ambi CC x NP Supported   
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The adjusted R2 statistics indicate a reasonable fit for all models with the adjusted 
R2 around 0.450 for the number of CVS commits, and 0.370 for the sum of CVS and 
SVN commits. The overall fit of models with the sum of CVS and SVN commits is lower 
than the overall fit of models with the number of CVS commits. One possible explanation 
for the relatively lower support for the CVS and SVN commits is that the SVN was not 
mature enough to fully capture project performance until our network construction date 
(December 2008) since it started being used around the end of 2006. After the SVN has 
been available, the adoption of the SVN was widespread throughout the OSS community 
and many projects have migrated from the CVS to the SVN (Van Antwerp and Madey 
2008). Therefore, many projects have used the CVS in their first years and then started 
using the SVN by migrating from the CVS system to the SVN system. However, the 
CVS and SVN may not be used in parallel mode because this potentially creates 
difficulties for projects to track the same changes in different systems. Projects may use 
the CVS and SVN for different modules of their projects. Projects may still use the CVS 
to track changes in core project modules which have been developed at the first years of 
projects and submitted to the CVS system. Projects may not migrate these core modules 
from the CVS system to the SVN system because of the following reasons. First, there 
are difficulties to migrate these core modules from the CVS system to the SVN system. 
Second, there are difficulties to track changes in both systems because of the impact of 
variety and interdependency of project elements on software development process. In 
Chapter 2, we analyzed the impact of variety and interdependency of project elements 
(i.e., software complexity) on the software development process. The variety and 
interdependency of project elements affect the effectiveness of development teams 
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(Roberts et al. 2004). The more complex the software product, the more effort required to 
mitigate the negative impact of software complexity on software development process. 
As the number of project elements increases, software development becomes more 
difficult to control. Software complexity also determines the maintenance cost of 
software since high level of software complexity interferes with the process of 
comprehending the application and makes it difficult for developers to efficiently and 
correctly modify the application (Banker and Slaughter 2000). Therefore, migrating core 
modules from the CVS system to the SVN system and tracking changes in both systems 
may be very challenging for project teams to effectively manage the interdependencies 
among project modules. Projects may use the SVN system for non-core modules which 
may not have interdependency to core project modules. Therefore, the SVN system may 
be used to track changes which may have relatively lower impact on project performance. 
Therefore, SVN commits should be analyzed over a long time period with very recent 
data.  
The t statistic is used to check the significance of each individual regression 
coefficients, and hence, to assess the support for the relevant hypotheses. The results of 
regression coefficients are consistent across two technical performance measures. We 
found strong support for all of our ten hypotheses across two technical performance 
measures as shown in Table 19.  
Our first hypothesis states that ambidexterity has a curvilinear effect on project 
performance, i.e. a moderate level of ambidexterity results in higher project performance 
rather than very high or very low levels of ambidexterity. We found that ambidexterity 
has a curvilinear effect on project performance. The coefficient for ambidexterity is 
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positive and significant (CVS commits: 5.143, p < 0.01; CVS and SVN commits: 4.773, 
p < 0.01) whereas the coefficient for the square of ambidexterity is negative and 
significant (CVS commits: –4.850, p < 0.01; CVS and SVN commits: -4.614, p < 0.01). 
Therefore, our hypothesis H1 is supported. We propose ambidexterity as a measure of the 
ability of projects to pursue both exploitative and exploratory activities concurrently. It is 
based on the concept of ambidextrous developers who contribute to exploitative and 
exploratory activities concurrently. Ambidextrous developers play important roles for 
projects. First, they integrate exploitative and exploratory project teams. Second, they 
facilitate knowledge exchange and combination between exploitative and exploratory 
project teams, in turn they facilitate new value creation through linking knowledge 
sources held by exploitative and exploratory project teams. Therefore, their important 
roles are based on the idea that exploitative and exploratory project teams develop and 
maintain distinct capabilities and competences. This view is consistent with the idea of 
task specialization and task variety (Narayanan et al. 2009). Project teams can gain 
diverse knowledge from different types of tasks since ambidextrous developers work on 
both exploitative and exploratory activities (Narayanan et al. 2009). In contrast, project 
teams can gain more and deeper experience from specializing in one task since non-
ambidextrous developers work on either exploitative or exploratory activities, and 
become more familiar with the task (Narayanan et al. 2009). Therefore, ambidextrous 
developers have access to diverse knowledge from exploitative and exploratory activities, 
and quickly exchange and integrate greater amounts of knowledge with other project 
developers. On the other hand, non-ambidextrous developers specialize in either 
exploitative or exploratory activities, and they may benefit from knowledge exchanged 
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by ambidextrous developers. Therefore, ambidextrous developers play the same or 
similar roles in both exploitative and exploratory activities. On the other hand, non-
ambidextrous developers play unique roles depending on their specializations on either 
exploitative or exploratory activities. In addition, their roles are also different from the 
roles of ambidextrous developers. Therefore, the results show that a moderate level of 
ambidexterity enables project teams to access diverse knowledge from different types of 
tasks, and to exchange relevant knowledge within a project team, while ensuring 
adequate specialization to absorb and integrate new knowledge. 
Our second hypothesis states that the performance of a project will be positively 
related to the internal cohesion of a project. We measured internal cohesion for a project 
with clustering coefficient, repeated ties, third party ties, Jaccard similarity, and 
correlation similarity. We found support for our second hypothesis for clustering 
coefficient (CVS commits: 5.677, p < 0.01; CVS and SVN commits: 7.659, p < 0.01), 
repeated ties (CVS commits: 5.244, p < 0.01; CVS and SVN commits: 7.385, p < 0.01), 
Jaccard similarity (CVS commits: 5.857, p < 0.01; CVS and SVN commits: 7.439, p < 
0.01), and correlation similarity (CVS commits: 5.326, p < 0.01; CVS and SVN commits: 
6.836, p < 0.01). Their coefficients are positive and significant. However, we found that 
the number of third party ties is insignificant for the CVS measure, but significant for the 
CVS and SVN measures. The results of repeat ties and third party ties merit further 
discussion. Repeat ties and third party ties are based on social interactions among 
developers. One possible explanation for the insignificance of third party ties is that there 
may be a few social interactions for the pairs of developers with common third parties, 
and these interactions may not be have enough strength to support third party ties. In 
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addition, third party ties measure the number of relationship of a pair of developers to 
common third parties outside the focal project team. Therefore, third party ties do not 
measure the strong relationship between two developers, but measure the relative 
relationship of already connected two developers to the common third Thus, they may 
represent relatively loose connections. The common third developer is an outside 
developer of a focal team, and thereby, that developer may not directly foster trust, 
reciprocity norms and shared identity within a focal project team which facilitate 
collaboration and cooperation among focal project team members. In contrast, repeat ties 
capture the strength and deepness of the relationship between two developers. The 
strength and deepness of relationship indicates two developers interact more frequently, 
and they develop more closer and cohesive relationships. Repeat ties from past 
interactions also result in greater trust within a focal team. This contributes more to 
project performance. Therefore, our hypothesis H2 is supported by results of the 
clustering coefficient, repeated ties, Jaccard similarity, and correlation similarity. 
Our third hypothesis states that external cohesion has a curvilinear effect on 
project performance, i.e. a moderate level of external cohesion results in higher project 
performance rather than very high or very low levels of external cohesion. We found that 
external cohesion has a curvilinear effect on project performance. The coefficient for 
external cohesion is positive and significant (CVS commits: 2.079, p < 0.01; CVS and 
SVN commits: 2.609, p < 0.01) whereas the coefficient for the square of external 
cohesion is negative and significant (CVS commits: –4.731, p < 0.01; CVS and SVN 
commits: -6.754, p < 0.01). Therefore, our hypothesis H3 is supported. Although external 
cohesion has resource sharing and knowledge spillovers benefits, the impact of external 
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cohesion on the resource sharing benefits is opposite to the impact of external cohesion 
on knowledge spillover benefits. From the perspective of resource sharing benefits, a 
moderate level of external cohesion enables project teams to access to a greater amount 
of external knowledge by enhancing information transmission capacity of the external 
network of a project, but does not limit the ability of project teams to access to novel 
information. From the perspective of knowledge spillovers benefits, a moderate level of 
external cohesion enables project teams to access to novel information in the forms of 
information conduits, but does not reduce mutual trust and shared norms which facilitate 
collaboration and cooperation among developers. Therefore, we found that a moderate 
level of external cohesion facilitates both the access to and the diversity of external 
knowledge resources available to a project team. 
Our fourth hypothesis states that the performance of a project will be positively 
related to the number of direct ties of a project. Our fifth hypothesis states that the 
performance of a project will be positively related to the number of indirect ties of a 
project. In the hypothesis H6, we expect that the impact of indirect ties on the 
performance of a project will be moderated by the number of direct ties of a project, i.e., 
the greater the number of direct ties, the smaller the benefit from indirect ties. We used 
two measures for indirect ties: the number of indirect ties and the number of indirect ties 
calculated with the frequency decay function. Therefore, direct ties have been tested with 
each measure of indirect ties in separate models. We found that direct ties have a positive 
effect on project performance. The coefficient for direct ties is positive and significant 
(CVS commits: 3.913, p < 0.01; CVS and SVN commits: 5.969, p < 0.01) when we 
consider its interaction with the number of indirect ties. The coefficient for direct ties is 
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also positive and significant (CVS commits: 3.638, p < 0.01; CVS and SVN commits: 
5.848, p < 0.01) when we consider its interaction with the number of frequency decayed 
indirect ties. We found that indirect ties have a positive effect on project performance. 
The coefficient for indirect ties is positive and significant (CVS commits: 2.724, p < 
0.01; CVS and SVN commits: 4.422, p < 0.01). The coefficient for frequency decayed 
indirect ties is also positive and significant (CVS commits: 2.269, p < 0.01; CVS and 
SVN commits: 3.908, p < 0.01). Regarding the interaction of indirect ties with direct ties, 
we found that the impact of indirect ties on project performance is moderated by the 
number of direct ties. The coefficient for the interaction term of direct and indirect ties is 
negative and significant (CVS commits: -4.031, p < 0.01; CVS and SVN commits: -
5.975, p < 0.01). The coefficient for the interaction term of direct and frequency decayed 
indirect ties is negative and significant (CVS commits: -3.626, p < 0.01; CVS and SVN 
commits: -5.752, p < 0.01). Although direct ties have both resource sharing and 
knowledge spillover benefits, the resource sharing benefit of direct ties is greater than 
knowledge spillover benefit, hence they facilitate resource pooling by enabling project 
teams to combine knowledge and skills with repeating interactions. Indirect ties provide 
novel information by enabling project teams to access to knowledge spillovers. However 
knowledge spillover benefits provided by indirect ties are contingent on the number of 
direct ties. We found that the ability of project teams to access novel knowledge is 
constrained by many direct ties. Therefore, project teams with few direct ties enjoy 
greater knowledge spillovers benefits from their indirect ties than teams with many direct 
ties. 
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Our seventh hypothesis states that technological diversity has a curvilinear effect 
on project performance, i.e. a moderate level of technological diversity results in higher 
project performance rather than very high or very low levels of technological diversity. 
We found that technological diversity has a curvilinear effect on project performance. 
The coefficient for technological diversity is positive and significant (CVS commits: 
3.437, p < 0.01; CVS and SVN commits: 3.916, p < 0.01) whereas the coefficient for the 
square of external cohesion is negative and significant (CVS commits: –2.625, p < 0.01; 
CVS and SVN commits: -1.906, p < 0.01). Therefore, our hypothesis H7 is supported. 
OSS developer may work on multiple projects concurrently. When they join to another 
project, they choose to work on projects that are moderately technologically diverse from 
each other since they can recognize and absorb knowledge close to their existing 
knowledge base (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Therefore, a moderate level of 
technological diversity between two projects improves the performance of developers on 
each project.  
Our eighth hypothesis states that the performance of a project will be positively 
related to the centrality of a project. We measured network location for a project with 
degree centrality, betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality. In the data analysis, 
we found that degree centrality has interaction with closeness centrality and betweenness 
centrality. During the analysis, we considered the interaction of degree centrality with 
closeness centrality and betweenness centrality. In support for the hypothesis 8, we found 
that degree centrality has a positive effect on project performance. The coefficient for 
degree centrality is positive and significant (CVS commits: 2.804, p < 0.01; CVS and 
SVN commits: 4.459, p < 0.01) when we consider its interaction with betweenness 
226 
 
centrality and closeness centrality. We also found that closeness centrality has a positive 
effect on project performance. The coefficient for closeness centrality is positive and 
significant (CVS commits: 1.737, p < 0.1; CVS and SVN commits: 2.735, p < 0.01) when 
we consider its interaction with degree centrality. Therefore, we found support for our 
eighth hypothesis for degree centrality and closeness centrality. Degree centrality is the 
measure of how many an actor is connected to other actors in the network through direct 
connections (Freeman 1979, Wasserman and Frost 1994). If a developer is connected to 
many other developers through direct ties, a developer may access to greater amounts of 
information and knowledge (Hansen 2002). However, direct ties more likely provide 
relatively redundant information (Hansen 1999). Therefore, high degree centrality allows 
a developer to have access to greater amounts of (relatively redundant) knowledge 
(Hansen 2002). Therefore, a developer with high degree centrality may have access to 
greater amounts of (relatively redundant) knowledge. As explained later, the results of 
our ninth and tenth hypothesis indicates that ambidextrous developers play an integration 
role. The integration role of ambidextrous developers on project performance depends on 
access to novel information through indirect ties or from multiple projects: the greater the 
access to novel information, the higher the impact on project performance. While high 
degree centrality is undesirable for ambidextrous developers, it could be desirable for a 
project as a whole. This is because, if every developer has access to greater amounts of 
knowledge, the project, as a whole, could be positively affected. Closeness centrality is 
the measure of how close an actor is to all other actors in the network through direct and 
indirect connections (Freeman 1979, Wasserman and Frost 1994). If a developer is very 
close to many other developers through direct and indirect ties, a developer may have 
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quick access to knowledge (Uzzi 1997, Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994). However, indirect 
ties more likely provide access to novel information (Hansen 1999). Therefore, high 
closeness centrality may allow a developer to have quick access to both redundant and 
novel knowledge (Uzzi 1997, Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994). We found that high 
closeness centrality provides quick access to knowledge, and in turn improves project 
performance. However, we found that betweenness centrality has a negative effect on 
project performance. The coefficient for betweenness centrality is negative and 
significant (CVS commits: -2.494, p < 0.05; CVS and SVN commits: -2.716, p < 0.01) 
when we consider its interaction with degree centrality. The effect of betweenness 
centrality on project performance seems contrary to our expectations. Betweenness 
centrality is the measure of how often a developer falls on the shortest path between pairs 
of other developers (Freeman 1979, Wasserman and Faust 1994). Therefore, high 
between centrality allows a developer to control (Wasserman and Faust 1994, Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978), and regulate information flow among other developers (Wasserman and 
Faust 1994, Krackhardt 1996). Therefore, a developer with high betweenness centrality 
may control and regulate too much information passing through him. As explained later, 
the results of our ninth and tenth hypothesis indicates that ambidextrous developers play 
a control role. The control role of ambidextrous developers on project performance 
depends on the level of control on information flow among other developers: the greater 
the level of control on information flow, the higher the impact on project performance. 
While high betweenness centrality (high control) is desirable for ambidextrous 
developers, it could be undesirable for a project as a whole. This is because, if every 
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developer has a high degree of control, the project, as a whole, could be negatively 
affected.  
Regarding the interaction of degree centrality with closeness centrality, we found 
that the impact of closeness centrality on project performance is moderated by degree 
centrality. The coefficient for the interaction term of closeness centrality and degree 
centrality is negative and significant (CVS commits: -3.861, p < 0.01; CVS and SVN 
commits: -5.858, p < 0.01). The ability of project teams to have quick access to the novel 
information is constrained by high degree centrality. Degree centrality considers direct 
connections whereas closeness centrality considers direct and indirect connections 
(Freeman 1979, Wasserman and Frost 1994). Project teams with few direct ties add a 
significant increment to their existing information base through indirect ties (Ahuja 
2000). Project teams with many direct ties may be more constrained in their ability to 
absorb new information (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Therefore, the effect of closeness 
centrality of project teams with lower degree centrality is greater than the effect of 
closeness centrality of project teams with higher degree centrality. The result indicates 
that project teams with high closeness centrality have quick access to more novel 
information if their degree centrality is low, which improves project performance. 
Regarding the interaction of degree centrality with betweenness centrality, we found that 
the impact of betweenness centrality on project performance is moderated by degree 
centrality. The coefficient for the interaction term of betweenness centrality and degree 
centrality is positive and significant (CVS commits: 2.021, p < 0.05; CVS and SVN 
commits: 1.966, p < 0.05). The ability of project teams to control and regulate 
information flow is constrained by degree centrality. Therefore, the effect of betweenness 
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centrality of project teams with higher degree centrality is greater than the effect of 
betweenness centrality of project teams with lower degree centrality. The results indicate 
that project teams can more easily control and regulate information acquired from 
immediate contacts through direct ties. The results also indicate that information acquired 
from remote contacts may be more challenging to be controlled and regulated since 
remote developers more likely provide novel information. Therefore, project teams can 
more easily control and regulate information acquired from immediate developers than 
information acquired from remote developers. People vary widely in their capability to 
develop, understand, or use knowledge based on their technological base and their prior 
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). People recognize and absorb knowledge close to 
their existing knowledge base (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Therefore, too much novel 
information acquired from remote contacts restricts the capability of project teams to 
develop, understand, or use knowledge. This result is also consistent with the results of 
technological diversity. 
Our ninth hypothesis states that the performance of a project will be positively 
related to the centrality of ambidextrous developers. We measured network location for 
ambidextrous developers with degree centrality, betweenness centrality, and closeness 
centrality. We expect the interaction of the number of projects with ambidextrous 
developers’ degree centrality, betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality. We found 
that ambidextrous developers’ betweenness centrality has a positive effect on project 
performance. The coefficient for ambidextrous developers’ betweenness centrality is 
positive and significant for the dependent variable of CVS commits, but not significant 
for the dependent variable of CVS and SVN commits (CVS commits: 2.284, p < 0.05; 
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CVS and SVN commits: 1.416, p < 0.1) when we consider its interaction with the 
number of projects. Therefore, we found support for our ninth hypothesis for 
betweenness centrality. High betweenness centrality allows a developer to control 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), and regulate information flow 
among other developers (Wasserman and Faust 1994, Krackhardt 1996). In our eighth 
hypothesis, we found that high betweenness centrality of a project negatively affect 
project performance since project developers do not take advantage to control and 
regulate information flow among other developers. However, we expect that 
ambidextrous developers play an important role to control and regulate information flow 
among other developers. On the other hand, non-ambidextrous developers play unique 
roles depending on their specializations on either exploitative or exploratory activities. In 
addition, their roles are also different from the roles of ambidextrous developers. They 
may benefit from knowledge exchanged by ambidextrous developers. The result of 
ambidextrous developers’ betweenness centrality indicates that ambidextrous developers 
play an important role to control and regulate information flow among other developers. 
Combined with the results of our tenth hypothesis, our results indicate that the control 
role of ambidextrous developers on project performance depends on the level of control 
on information flow among other developers: the greater the level of control on 
information flow, the higher the impact on project performance. Therefore, an 
ambidextrous developer with high betweenness centrality performs better than an 
ambidextrous developer with low betweenness centrality. We found that ambidextrous 
developers’ closeness centrality has a positive effect on project performance. The 
coefficient for ambidextrous developers’ closeness centrality is positive and significant 
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(CVS commits: 3.960, p < 0.1; CVS and SVN commits: 3.864, p < 0.01) when we 
consider its interaction with the number of projects. Therefore, we found support for our 
ninth hypothesis for closeness centrality. High closeness centrality allows a developer to 
have quick access to information (Uzzi 1997, Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994). Moreover, 
high closeness centrality may allow a developer to have quick access to both redundant 
and novel knowledge (Uzzi 1997, Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994). We expect that 
ambidextrous developers play an integration role by speeding up information flow and 
allowing information to be exchanged and integrated more rapidly among other 
developers. The result of ambidextrous developers’ closeness centrality indicates that 
ambidextrous developers play an integration role by speeding up information flow and 
allowing information and knowledge to be exchanged and integrated more rapidly among 
other developers. Therefore, an ambidextrous developer with high closeness centrality 
performs better than an ambidextrous developer with low closeness centrality. However, 
we found that degree centrality has a negative effect on project performance. The 
coefficient for degree centrality is negative and significant (CVS commits: -2.205, p < 
0.05; CVS and SVN commits: -1.673, p < 0.1) when we consider its interaction with the 
number of projects. The effect of degree centrality on project performance seems 
contrary to our expectations. High degree centrality may allow a developer to have access 
to greater amounts of (relatively redundant) knowledge from immediate contacts (Hansen 
2002). We expect that ambidextrous developers play an integration role by allowing 
greater amounts of information and knowledge to be exchanged and integrated among 
other developers. The result of ambidextrous developers’ degree centrality indicates that 
ambidextrous developers with high degree centrality may have access to relatively 
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redundant information from immediate contacts which negatively affects their integration 
role since most information exchanged by ambidextrous developers are redundant held 
by all project developers. However, we expect that ambidextrous developers perform 
well since they have access to diverse knowledge from both exploitative and exploratory 
activities. Therefore, an ambidextrous developer with low degree centrality performs 
better than an ambidextrous developer with high degree centrality since they may 
exchange more novel information with other developers. Combined with the results of 
our tenth hypothesis, our results indicate that the integration role of ambidextrous 
developers on project performance depends on access to novel information through 
indirect ties or from multiple projects: the greater the access to novel information, the 
higher the impact on project performance. 
Our tenth hypothesis states that that the impact of the centrality of ambidextrous 
developers on the performance of a project will be moderated by the number of projects 
on which ambidextrous developers work, i.e., the greater number of projects on which 
ambidextrous developers work, the lower impact of the centrality of ambidextrous 
developers on the performance of a project. We found that the number of projects has a 
positive effect on project performance. The coefficient for the number of projects is 
positive and significant (CVS commits: 1.935, p < 0.05; CVS and SVN commits: 2.539, 
p < 0.01) when we consider its interaction with ambidextrous developers’ degree 
centrality, betweenness centrality and closeness centrality. The results indicate that 
ambidextrous developers perform better if they work on many projects since they may 
access to more novel information from different projects, which improve the integration 
role of ambidextrous developers by allowing them to exchange more novel information 
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with other developers. In the data analysis, we also found that the number of projects has 
interaction with a project team size. When we considered the interaction of the number of 
projects with a project team size, the coefficient for the interaction term is negative and 
significant (CVS commits: -3.428, p < 0.05; CVS and SVN commits: -5.447, p < 0.01). 
Therefore, the impact of the number of projects on project performance is constrained by 
a project team size. The results indicate that the impact of the number of projects on 
project performance decreases if ambidextrous developers work on many large projects 
since they may spend more time and effort in maintaining connections with many 
developers (Hansen 1999, Hansen 2002, Shane and Cable 2002). In contrast, if 
ambidextrous developers work on many small projects, they may not spend too much 
time and effort in maintaining connections with many developers while they access to 
more novel information from different projects. In support for the hypothesis 10, we 
found that the impact of betweenness centrality on project performance is moderated by 
the number of projects. The coefficient for the interaction term of betweenness centrality 
and the number of projects is negative and significant (CVS commits: -2.366, p < 0.05; 
CVS and SVN commits: -1.510, p < 0.05). Therefore, we found support for tenth 
hypothesis for betweenness centrality. If ambidextrous developers work on small number 
of projects, the effect of their betweenness centrality on project performance becomes 
higher. Regarding the interaction of the number of projects with closeness centrality, we 
found that the impact of closeness centrality on project performance is moderated by the 
number of projects. The coefficient for the interaction term of closeness centrality and the 
number of projects is negative and significant (CVS commits: -3.024, p < 0.05; CVS and 
SVN commits: -2.535, p < 0.05). Therefore, we also found support for tenth hypothesis 
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for closeness centrality. If ambidextrous developers work on small number of projects, 
the effect of their closeness centrality on project performance becomes higher. Regarding 
the interaction of the number of projects with degree centrality, the coefficient for the 
interaction term of degree centrality and the number of projects is positive and significant 
(CVS commits: 2.541, p < 0.05; CVS and SVN commits: 2.067, p < 0.05). Although the 
impact of degree centrality on project performance is moderated by the number of 
projects, the effect of the interaction term of degree centrality and the number of projects 
seems contrary to our expectations. In our hypothesis 9, we found that high degree 
centrality negatively affects the integration role of ambidextrous developers since most 
information exchanged by ambidextrous developers are redundant held by all project 
developers. However, we expect that ambidextrous developers perform well since they 
have access to diverse knowledge from both exploitative and exploratory activities. If 
ambidextrous developers work on many projects simultaneously, they may access to 
more novel information from different projects, which improve the integration role of 
ambidextrous developers by allowing them to exchange more novel information with 
other developers.  
4.6.1.2. Results of Control Variables 
Consistent with prior research, we controlled effects of team human capital and 
ability, user input and market potential, project life-cycle effects on the project technical 
performance. The results for our control variables are consistent for all models across two 
technical performance measures, and hence we discuss the results for the base model 
(Model 1).  
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Regarding team human capital and ability, we found that a project team size has a 
positive effect on the project technical performance. The coefficient for a project team 
size is positive and significant (CVS commits: 7.981, p < 0.01; CVS and SVN commits: 
9.265, p < 0.01). The results showed that projects with large teams perform better than 
projects with small teams. 
Regarding user input and market potential, we found that the number of bugs and 
page views have a positive effect on the project technical performance. The coefficient 
for bugs is positive and significant (CVS commits: 10.277, p < 0.01; CVS and SVN 
commits: 13.588, p < 0.01). The coefficient for page views is positive and significant 
(CVS commits: 4.827, p < 0.01; CVS and SVN commits: 6.701, p < 0.01). However, the 
number of support requests does not have an effect on the project technical performance. 
Bugs play an important role to identify defects in software, while support request are 
associated with specific user questions and offered solutions. Thus, the number of defects 
detected by users directly affects the project technical performance.  
Regarding project life-cycle effects, we found that project age and project 
language (English) have a positive effect on the project technical performance. The 
coefficient for a project age is positive and significant (CVS commits: 27.532, p < 0.01; 
CVS and SVN commits: 14.245, p < 0.01) and the coefficient for the square of project 
age is also positive and significant (CVS commits: 6.598, p < 0.01; CVS and SVN 
commits: 11.857, p < 0.01). Therefore, the results showed that a project age does not 
have a curvilinear effect on the project technical performance. We found the development 
status of software has a negative effect on the project technical performance for some 
models, but not significant for other models. We may say that project teams may perform 
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better at the early stages of software development, and their performance decreases when 
a project becomes stable or mature.  
4.6.1.3. Illustrative Combined Models 
In the previous section, we presented the results of hypotheses tested with an 
individual model for each independent variable along with ambidexterity. In this section, 
we present illustrative combined models in order to show that further combined models 
are possible. We use the number of CVS commits as the dependent variable for our 
illustrative combined models consistent with prior research (Singh et al. 2011, Singh 
2010, Grewal et al. 2006, Rai et al. 2002). However, there is no basis for which an 
independent variable should be used as representative for each variable group (internal 
cohesion, external connectivity, network location of projects, and network location of 
ambidextrous developers). Prior studies use one variable for internal cohesion as well as 
one variable for external connectivity to test their hypotheses (Singh et al. 2011). 
However, we have centrality measures for projects and ambidextrous developers. The 
correlation analysis indicates the high correlation among variables within and between 
variable groups as shown in Table 17 and Table 18. For example, there are high 
correlations among the pairs of internal cohesion variables. There are also high 
correlations among the pairs of external connectivity variables. External connectivity 
variable are also correlated with centrality variables of projects and centrality variables of 
ambidextrous developers. In addition, centrality variables of projects and centrality 
variables of ambidextrous developers are also correlated with each other. Therefore, we 
cannot create a combined model which includes external connectivity variables, 
centrality variables of projects and centrality variables of ambidextrous developers. 
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However, ambidexterity and internal cohesion variables are not correlated with other 
variable groups (external connectivity, network location of projects, and network location 
of ambidextrous developers).  
We have 5 internal cohesion variables (clustering coefficient, repeat ties, third 
party ties, Jaccard similarity, and correlation similarity). We also have 4 external 
connectivity variables (external cohesion, direct ties/indirect ties, direct ties/frequency 
decayed indirect ties, and technological diversity). We have 2 groups of centrality 
variables for projects and ambidextrous developers. First, we included each internal 
cohesion variable along with ambidexterity and control variables. Second, we created all 
possible combined models by adding each external connectivity variable and each 
centrality variable group to ambidexterity, one internal cohesion variable and control 
variables. Therefore, we ran all possible combined models (30=5*[4+2]). We selected 
correlation similarity as a representative variable for internal cohesion. In Table 22, we 
report the results of illustrative combined models which include ambidexterity, 
correlation similarity and control variables along with each external connectivity variable 
and each centrality variable group. We report the results of other combined models in 
Appendix D. In Table 22, Model 1 presents the base model with only ambidexterity and 
control variables. Model 2.1 through Model 2.4 add correlation similarity and one 
external connectivity measure (external cohesion, direct ties/indirect ties, direct 
ties/frequency decayed indirect ties, and technological diversity respectively) to Model 1. 
Model 3 adds correlation similarity and projects’ centralities measures to Model 1 
(degree centrality, betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality together). Model 4 
adds correlation similarity, ambidextrous developers’ centralities measures and the 
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number of projects to Model 1 (the degree centrality of ambidextrous developers, the 
betweenness centrality of ambidextrous developers, the closeness centrality of 
ambidextrous developers, and the number of projects together). 
The F statistics of all illustrative combined models are significant at the 0.01 
alpha level. We rejected the null hypotheses that the effects of the independent variables 
are zero, and, hence, all models are found to be statistically significant. The adjusted R2 
statistics indicate a reasonable fit for all combined models with the adjusted R2 ranged 
from 0.455 to 0.459. However, the contribution of internal cohesion, external 
connectivity and centrality variables to the base model is marginal considering the 
adjusted R2 statistic of the base model (0.446). The results indicate that ambidexterity is 
significant in almost all illustrative models. Therefore, the results of ambidexterity are 
stronger than the results of social network measures. We found that the result of each 
variable in illustrative models is almost consistent with the result of the same variable in 
individual technical performance models presented in the previous section. In a few 
cases, the results of some variables in illustrative models are not significant. Therefore, 
we concluded that the results of individual technical performance models and illustrative 
models are generally the same. Additional analysis and model development may be 
possible in future research. 
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4.7. Discussions and Contributions 
We empirically study the effect of ambidexterity and social network properties of 
OSS developers on OSS project performance. We also examine the effect of 
ambidextrous developers who participate in patch development and feature request 
activities on OSS project performance. We develop technical performance models for 
OSS projects and measure technical performance (knowledge creation) with two 
measures. We measure technical performance using the number of CVS commits which 
is commonly used in the OSS literature (Singh et al. 2011, Singh 2010, Grewal et al. 
2006, Rai et al. 2002). We also measure technical performance using the sum of CVS and 
SVN commits. The overall fit of models with the number of CVS commits is greater than 
the overall fit of models with the sum of CVS and SVN commits. This could be due to 
the fact that the SVN was not mature enough to fully capture project performance until 
our network construction date (December 2008). Therefore, SVN commits should be 
analyzed over a long time period with very recent data. 
We found that ambidexterity has a curvilinear effect on project performance. Our 
result indicates a balanced pursuit of both exploitative and exploratory activities 
concurrently has a positive impact on project success. In addition, it shows the 
importance of different roles and specializations of ambidextrous and non-ambidextrous 
developers for project success. Ambidextrous developers have access to diverse 
knowledge from exploitative and exploratory activities, and quickly exchange and 
integrate greater amounts of knowledge with other project developers. On the other hand, 
non-ambidextrous developers play unique roles depending on their specializations on 
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either exploitative or exploratory activities. They also benefit from knowledge exchanged 
by ambidextrous developers. 
Our results illustrate the roles of ambidextrous developers as coordination 
mechanisms between patch development and feature request activities on project 
performance. Ambidextrous developers play an integration role by speeding up 
information flow and allowing information and knowledge to be exchanged and 
integrated more rapidly among other developers. Our results indicate that the integration 
role of ambidextrous developers on project performance depends on ambidextrous 
developers’ access to novel information through indirect ties or from multiple projects: 
the greater the access to novel information, the higher the impact on project performance. 
Ambidextrous developers also play a control role to control and regulate information 
flow among other developers. Our results indicate that the control role of ambidextrous 
developers on project performance depends on the level of control on information flow 
among other developers: the greater the level of control on information flow, the higher 
the impact on project performance.  
Our results for social network measures are consistent with the findings of prior 
research on OSS development. However, the results of ambidexterity are stronger than 
the results of social network measures whose contributions are relatively marginal.  
Our results for projects’ centrality indicate that project performance is positively 
related to degree and closeness centrality of a project. However, the result of betweenness 
centrality of a project is opposite to our expectations since project performance is 
negatively related to betweenness centrality of a project. Our results for ambidextrous 
developers’ centrality indicate that project performance is positively related to 
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betweenness and closeness centrality of ambidextrous developers. However, the result of 
degree centrality of ambidextrous developers is opposite to our expectations since project 
performance is negatively related to degree centrality of ambidextrous developers. 
Combined results of projects’ centrality and ambidextrous developers’ centrality show 
interesting differences between the effects of ambidextrous developers’ centrality and 
projects’ centrality. Contrary to our expectations, degree and betweenness centrality 
measures do not behave in the same way for projects and ambidextrous developers.  
Degree centrality of a project positively affects project performance whereas 
degree centrality of ambidextrous developers negatively affects project performance. 
Therefore, while high degree centrality is undesirable for ambidextrous developers, it 
could be desirable for a project as a whole. Our results for the interaction between degree 
centrality and the number of projects indicate that the impact of ambidextrous 
developers’ degree centrality on project performance is moderated by the number of 
projects. If ambidextrous developers work on many projects simultaneously, they may 
access to more novel information from multiple projects. Therefore, the number of 
projects positively affects the impact of ambidextrous developers’ degree centrality on 
project performance. The integration role of ambidextrous developers on project 
performance is facilitated by low degree centrality or access to multiple projects which 
enables ambidextrous developers to access to novel information.  
Betweenness centrality of a project negatively affects project performance 
whereas betweenness centrality of ambidextrous developers positively affects project 
performance. Therefore, while high betweenness centrality is desirable for ambidextrous 
developers, it could be undesirable for a project as a whole. The control role of 
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ambidextrous developers on project performance is facilitated by high betweenness 
centrality which enables ambidextrous developers to control and regulate information 
flow among other developers. Our results indicate that high closeness centrality provides 
quick access to information, thereby it is desirable for both ambidextrous developers as 
well as projects. 
We found that project performance is positively related to the internal cohesion of 
a project. As measured by clustering coefficient, repeat ties, Jaccard similarity, and 
correlation similarity, our findings indicate that different measures of internal cohesion 
are consistent and have a positive impact on project performance. However, the result of 
internal cohesion measured by third party ties is not significant. This could be because, 
although repeat ties and third party ties are based on social interactions among 
developers, repeat interactions between two developers are much stronger than third party 
interactions with common third parties since repeat interactions result in greater trust 
within a focal team. 
We found that external cohesion has a curvilinear effect on project performance. 
A moderate level of external cohesion facilitates both the access to and the diversity of 
external knowledge resources available to a project team. 
We found that project performance is positively related to the number of direct 
and indirect ties. Our results show that the resource sharing benefit of direct ties is greater 
than knowledge spillover benefit, hence direct ties facilitate resource pooling by enabling 
project teams to combine knowledge with repeating interactions. Indirect ties provide 
novel information by enabling project teams to access to knowledge spillovers. However, 
we found that knowledge spillovers provided by provided by indirect ties are not equally 
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accessible to or appropriated by everyone since knowledge spillover benefits provided by 
indirect ties are contingent on the number of direct ties.  
We found that technological diversity has a curvilinear effect on project 
performance. Our results indicate that when developers join to another project, they 
perform better if they work on projects that are moderately technologically diverse from 
each other since they can recognize and absorb knowledge close to their existing 
knowledge base. Therefore, OSS developers who work on multiple projects 
simultaneously should choose work on projects that are moderately technologically 
diverse from one another. OSS project leaders should encourage developers to work on 
projects that are moderately technologically diverse. 
By providing a more comprehensive understanding of the effects of ambidexterity 
and social network structure of OSS developers combined with the effect of coordination 
mechanisms (ambidextrous developers) on project performance, this dissertation makes 
several important theoretical and practical contributions.  
From a theoretical perspective, we develop the theory for and then empirically 
test how ambidexterity affects project performance. Recent research on OSS 
development has studied the social network structure of software developers as 
determinant of project success (Singh et al. 2011, Singh 2010, Singh et al. 2007, Grewal 
et al. 2006). However, this stream of research has focused on the project level, and has 
not recognized the fact that projects could consist of different types of activities, each of 
which could require different types of expertise. We propose that OSS project activities 
can be classified as implementation-oriented (exploitation) and innovation-oriented 
(exploration) based on organizational theory (March 1991). We identified a new category 
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of developers (ambidextrous developers) in OSS projects who contribute to exploitative 
activities (patch development) and exploratory activities (feature request). We develop a 
theoretical construct for project ambidexterity based on the concept of ambidextrous 
developers. We construct ambidexterity as a measure of the ability of OSS projects to 
pursue both exploitative and exploratory activities concurrently. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first research to study ambidexterity in OSS development. Recent 
research in organizational science has begun to study ambidexterity based on perceptual 
(survey) data in the context of formal organizations (Jansen et al. 2009, Jansen et al. 
2006, Lin et al. 2007), In contrast, we used real-world project data to study 
ambidexterity. Our results illustrate the roles of ambidextrous developers as coordination 
mechanisms between patch development and feature request activities on project 
performance. Our results also illustrate ambidextrous developers’ differences compared 
to other developers in terms of roles played by ambidextrous developers. 
We replicated recent research on OSS development that has studied the effect of 
social network structure of software developers on project performance (Singh et al. 
2011, Singh 2010, Singh et al. 2007, Grewal et al. 2006). However, we used larger and 
more recent data from the SourceForge database. Our data is also different from data 
used in recent research since we used a different foundry (programming language) to 
select projects. Our findings associated with the social network structure of software 
developers are consistent with the findings of recent studies on OSS development. Thus, 
we provide greater reliability to their findings and increase the generability of their 
findings. 
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This dissertation also makes several important contributions to practice. We 
empirically illustrated how ambidexterity affects project performance. We found that a 
moderate level of ambidexterity results in the higher performance of a project rather than 
very high or very low levels of ambidexterity. A moderate level of ambidexterity enables 
project teams to access diverse knowledge from different types of tasks, and to exchange 
relevant knowledge within a project team. A moderate level of ambidexterity also enables 
project teams to access more and deeper experience by ensuring adequate specialization 
to absorb and integrate new knowledge. Team composition is often a central concern for 
OSS project leaders. We illustrate the importance of team composition to the success of a 
project in terms of the optimal mix of ambidextrous and non-ambidextrous developers.  
We found that non-ambidextrous developers play unique roles depending on their 
specializations on specific tasks (either exploitative or exploratory tasks). On the other 
hand, ambidextrous developers play the same or similar roles based on a variety of 
different tasks (both exploitative and exploratory tasks) on which they work. Therefore, 
we suggest that projects should be composed of both ambidextrous and non-
ambidextrous developers for the following reasons. First, projects should be composed of 
ambidextrous who work on both exploitative and exploratory activities in order to gain 
diverse knowledge from different types of tasks. Second, we also suggest that projects 
should be composed of non-ambidextrous developers who specialize in either 
exploitative or exploratory activities in order to gain more and deeper experience from 
their specializations. Therefore, we provide OSS project leaders with a way to optimize 
their team compositions. OSS project leaders should identify, recruit, and retain both 
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ambidextrous and non-ambidextrous developers while trying to maintain a moderate level 
of ambidexterity. 
4.9. Limitations and Future Research 
We measure the effects of social network structure of OSS developers on project 
performance which represents the rate of knowledge creation by a project. We assume 
that network structure affects knowledge transfer. However, we did not observe 
knowledge transfer directly but rather infer it from the relationship between network 
structure and project performance. Knowledge may flow to projects through other 
mechanisms. For example, a developer may acquire knowledge from unconnected 
projects by using their software or by analyzing their software’s source code. In this 
dissertation, we did not consider other mechanisms for knowledge flow. We did not 
analyze characteristics of individual team members such as their experiences and 
motivations which may also influence the extent to which knowledge is transferred or 
absorbed (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). These aspects of relationships can be analyzed in 
order to understand the mechanism through which network structure affects project 
performance. These limitations have been recognized in prior research on OSS social 
networks (Singh et al. 2011, Sing 2010).  
We focus on the technical performance of a project measured as the rate of 
knowledge creation by a project. While we have presented several models, additional 
analysis and model development may be possible in future research. 
We select one programming language as a network boundary. Therefore, our data 
is restricted to projects using the same programming language. Future research can 
collect data for multiple programming languages. 
249 
 
We measure project performance using the cumulative number of CVS and SVN 
commits over the life span of a project. Grewal et al. (2006) indicated the existence of 
multiple regimes each with possibly different models. Analyzing the effects of 
ambidexterity and social network structure of OSS developers on project performance in 
different regimes can produce interesting results. 
Future research can investigate the commercial performance of a project 
measured as the number of downloads which represents user acceptance. 
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APPENDIX A: HAZARD RATIO CALCULATION FOR VARIABLES 
 
 
Hazard ratios of model variables on patch release time have been calculated based 
on Cox’s proportional hazard model expressed as follows: 
, 	exp	  
where: 
h0 (t) = Baseline hazard function at time t 
β = Model coefficient of independent variables or interactions 
X = Independent variables 
 
TABLE A1: Hazard Ratio Calculation for Disclosure 
 Confidentiality Model Integrity Model 
Disclosure exp[Disclosure*βDisclosure] exp[Disclosure*βDisclosure] 
0 [Not disclosed] exp[0*(1.07655)] = 1 exp[0*(1.10792)] = 1 
1 [Disclosed] exp[1*(1.07655)] = 2.93 exp[1*(1.10792)] = 3.03 
 
TABLE A2: Hazard Ratio Calculation for Multiple Vendors 
 Confidentiality Model Integrity Model 
MVendor exp[MVendor*βMVendor] exp[MVendor*βMVendor] 
0 [Single] exp[0*(0.49679)] = 1 exp[0*(0.45523)] = 1 
1 [Multiple] exp[1*(0.49679)] = 1.64 exp[1*(0.45523)] = 1.58 
 
TABLE A3: Hazard Ratio Calculation for Confidentiality 
 Confidentiality Model 
Confidentiality exp[C*βConfidentiality] 
0 [None] exp[0*(0.26318)] = 1 
1 [Partial] exp[1*(0.26318)] = 1.30 
2 [Complete] exp[2*(0.26318)] = 1.69 
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TABLE A4: Hazard Ratio Calculation for Integrity 
 Integrity Model 
Integrity exp[I*βIntegrity] 
0 [None] exp[0*(0.24536)] = 1 
1 [Partial] exp[1*(0.24536)] = 1.28 
2 [Complete] exp[2*(0.24536)] = 1.63 
 
TABLE A5: Hazard Ratio Calculation for Availability 
  Confidentiality Model Integrity Model 
Availability VType * 
exp[A*βAvailability +  
A*VType*βVType_A] 
exp[A*βAvailability +  
A*VType*βVType_A] 
0 [None] 0 [PS] 
exp[0*(-0.44305) +  
0*0*(0.53838)] = 1 
exp[0*(-0.37897) +  
0*0*(0.53785)] = 1 
0 [None] 1 [OSS] 
exp[0*(-0.44305) +  
0*1*(0.53838)] = 1 
exp[0*(-0.37897) +  
0*1*(0.53785)] = 1 
1 [Partial] 0 [PS] 
exp[1*(-0.44305) +  
1*0*(0.53838)] = 0.64 
exp[1*(-0.37897) +  
1*0*(0.53785)] = 0.68 
1 [Partial] 1 [OSS] 
exp[1*(-0.44305) +  
1*1*(0.53838)] = 1.10 
exp[1*(-0.37897) +  
1*1*(0.53785)] = 1.17 
2 [Complete] 0 [PS] 
exp[2*(-0.44305) +  
2*0*(0.53838)] = 0.41 
exp[2*(-0.37897) +  
2*0*(0.53785)] = 0.47 
2 [Complete] 1 [OSS] 
exp[2*(-0.44305) +  
2*1*(0.53838)] = 1.21 
exp[2*(-0.37897) +  
2*1*(0.53785)] = 1.37 
* Availability has an interaction with Vendor Type. 
 
TABLE A6: Hazard Ratio Calculation for Patch Type 
 Confidentiality Model Integrity Model 
PType exp[PType*βPType] exp[PType*βPType] 
0 [Update] exp[0*(-0.39724)] = 1 exp[0*(-0.39043)] = 1 
1 [New Release] exp[1*(-0.39724)] = 0.67 exp[1*(-0.39043)] = 0.68 
 
TABLE A7: Hazard Ratio Calculation for Software Type 
 Confidentiality Model Integrity Model 
SWType exp[SWType*βSWType] exp[SWType*βSWType] 
0 [Application SW] exp[0*(0.39553)] = 1 exp[0*(0.38421)] = 1 
1 [System SW] exp[1*(0.39553)] = 1.49 exp[1*(0.38421)] = 1.47 
 
  
268 
 
TABLE A8: Hazard Ratio Calculation for Patch Quality (Multiple Patches) 
 Confidentiality Model Integrity Model 
Multiple Patches exp[MPatches*βMPatches] exp[MPatches*βMPatches] 
0 [Single] exp[0*(0.31560)] = 1 exp[0*(0.31731)] = 1 
1 [Multiple] exp[1*(0.31560)] = 1.37 exp[1*(0.31731)] = 1.37 
 
TABLE A9: Hazard Ratio Calculation for Vendor Type 
  Confidentiality Model Integrity Model 
VType * Availability ** 
exp[VType*βVType +  
VType*βVTypeT +  
VType*A*βVType_A] 
exp[VType*βVType +  
VType*βVTypeT +  
VType*A*βVType_A] 
0 [PS] 0 [None] 
exp[0*(1.62207) +  
0*(-0.38656) +  
0*0*(0.53838)] = 1 
exp[0*(1.67718) +  
0*(-0.39976) +  
0*0*(0.53785)] = 1 
0 [PS] 1 [Partial] 
exp[0*(1.62207) +  
0*(-0.38656) +  
0*1*(0.53838)] = 1 
exp[0*(1.67718) +  
0*(-0.39976) +  
0*1*(0.53785)] = 1 
0 [PS] 2 [Complete] 
exp[0*(1.62207) +  
0*(-0.38656) +  
0*2*(0.53838)] = 1 
exp[0*(1.67718) +  
0*(-0.39976) +  
0*2*(0.53785)] = 1 
1 [OSS] 0 [None] 
exp[1*(1.62207) +  
1*(-0.38656) +  
1*0*(0.53838)] = 3.44 
exp[1*(1.67718) +  
1*(-0.39976) +  
1*0*(0.53785)] = 3.59 
1 [OSS] 1 [Partial] 
exp[1*(1.62207) +  
1*(-0.38656) +  
1*1*(0.53838)] = 5.89 
exp[1*(1.67718) +  
1*(-0.39976) +  
1*1*(0.53785)] = 6.14 
1 [OSS] 2 [Complete] 
exp[1*(1.62207) +  
1*(-0.38656) +  
1*2*(0.53838)] = 10.10 
exp[1*(1.67718) +  
1*(-0.39976) +  
1*2*(0.53785)] = 10.52 
*   Vendor Type has been constructed as a time-dependent covariate due to its interaction with time. 
** Vendor Type has an interaction with Availability. 
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APPENDIX B: VARIABLE CALCULATIONS 
 
 
Calculation of Clustering Coefficient:  
 
Following Watts and Strogatz (1998), we measured the clustering coefficient as 
follows: 
	
3 	
	
 
The “triangles” are trios of vertices where each one is connected to the other two. 
The “connected triples” are trios where at least one is connected to the other two (Watts 
and Strogatz 1998). A triplet consists of three nodes that are connected by either two or 
three undirected ties. A triangle consists of the three different configurations of closed 
trios of three vertices. In order to account for the three different configurations, a factor 
of three is added in the numerator (Watts and Strogatz 1998). The factor of three ensures 
that the clustering coefficient lies strictly in the range from 0 to 1. 
 
Calculation of External Cohesion: 
 
We measured the external cohesion with Burt’s (1992) network constraint. 
Network constraint measures the extent to which a project member i’s external network is 
invested in his relationship with an external alter j. The network constraint posed by 
external alter12 j on ego i is measured as: 
	
∑ ∑ ∑
, ,  
where Np is the number of project members and Ne is the number of developers 
external to the project. There are two components to this constraint measure. The first 
component is the proportion of her total network time and energy that a project member i 
directly allocates to external alter j: 
∑
 
where zij is the tie strength between i and j. The second component is the strength 
of the indirect connections between i and j through mutual contacts q: 
                                                 
12 In social network analysis, the focal actor is termed as ego and the actors who have ties to the ego are 
termed as alters. 
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Here piq is the proportion of her total network time and energy that i devotes to q 
and pqj is the proportion of her total network time and energy that contact q devotes to 
contact j. Note that contact q belongs to a group a developers that are external to the focal 
project. This formulation allows us to measure the extent to which a project member’s 
external contacts share relationships with each other. 
 
Calculation of Technological Diversity: 
 
In order to calculate Technological diversity, we first defined the technological 
position of each project. The technological position of a project can be defined in terms 
of different dimensions such as the type of the project, programming language, user 
interface, and operating system (Singh et al. 2011). Each of these dimensions represents 
different type of technical expertise. A project type represents the application domain 
knowledge whereas other three dimensions represent the tool knowledge and expertise 
that comprise the knowledge of process, data and functional architecture (Kim and Stohr 
1998, Singh et al. 2011). The similarity of domain and tools affect the amount of 
knowledge that can be reused from one project to another (Singh et al. 2011).  
 
Following Jaffe (1986), we characterized a project’s technological position by a 
vector Fp = (F1…Fk), where k is the total number of categories under the four dimensions, 
and Fk is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the project p falls under the category k. 
A project can fall under several categories within a single dimension. For example, a 
project can fall under education, internet, communication, and office/business categories 
in the project type dimension. A project can fall under developers, industrial users, 
system administrators, and end users in the user interface (target users) dimension. 
Technological diversity between the two projects p and q is then calculated by the 
angular separation or uncentered correlation of the vectors Fp and Fq as follows (Jaffe 
1986): 
	
1
 
Calculation of Indirect Ties with Frequency Decay Function: 
 
Burt (1992) provided a frequency decay measure for indirect ties that accounts for 
this decline in tie strength across distant ties. The argument for the frequency decay 
function is that the rate at which the strength of a relation decreases with the increasing 
length of its corresponding path distance should vary with the social structure in which it 
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occurs (Burt 1992). Following Burt (1992), this decay function for the developer i is 
given as: 
1
1
 
where fij is the number of developers that the developer i can reach within and 
including path length j, and Ni is the total number of developers that the developer i can 
reach in the network. Then dij is the decay associated with the information that is 
received from developers at path length j. The measure of indirect ties with a frequency 
decay function for the developer i is then calculated as: 
 
where N is the total number of developers in the network and wij is the number of 
developers that lie at a path length of j from i.  
 
Calculation of Degree Centrality: 
 
We measured the degree centrality with Freeman’s (1979) degree centrality. 
Degree centrality is the measure of how many an actor is connected to other actors in the 
network, i.e. the number of direct connections of an actor (Freeman 1979, Wasserman 
and Frost 1994). Degree centrality of a developer reflects the activeness of a developer in 
the network. Following Wasserman and Frost (1994), the degree centrality of an actor i is 
defined as: 
1
∑
1
 
where ki is the degree of an actor i calculated as the sum of Xij which gets the 
value of 1 if an actor i is connected to j, otherwise gets the value of 0. N is the total 
number of actors in the network. The degree centrality is normalized by dividing by the 
maximum possible degree in the network (N-1) which is that one actor is connected to all 
other actors in the network. This calculation results in that the degree centrality lies in the 
range from 0 to 1. However, UCINET reports the normalized degree centrality as a 
percentage for each node by multiplying with 100 (Wasserman and Frost 1994). 
Therefore, the measure of degree centrality for a project ranges from 0 to 100. 
 
Calculation of Betweenness Centrality: 
 
We measured the betweenness centrality with Freeman’s (1979) betweenness 
centrality. Betweenness centrality is the measure of how often a developer falls on the 
shortest path between pairs of other developers (Freeman 1979, Wasserman and Faust 
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1994). Developers with a high betweenness centrality lie in the shortest path of 
information flow between other developers. These developers can exert control over 
information flow among other developers, and potentially may have some control over 
the interactions between other developers (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Thus, 
betweenness centrality signifies a developer’s ability to be central to the flow of 
information and resources in the network. These developers can be important to the 
network-wide information diffusion process by occupying a central position on the 
shortest path between other developers in a network. Following Wasserman and Frost 
(1994), the degree centrality of an actor i is defined as: 
∑
1 2 /2
 
where njk is the number of shortest paths between actors j and k, a
i
jk is the number 
of shortest paths between actors j and k passing through an actor i. N is the total number 
of actors in the network. The betweenness centrality is normalized by dividing by the 
maximum possible betweenness in the network [(N-1)(N-2)/2] which is the number of 
pairs of actors not including an actor i (the maximum possible paths passing through an 
actor). This calculation results in that the betweenness centrality lies in the range from 0 
to 1. However, UCINET reports the normalized betweenness centrality as a percentage 
for each node by multiplying with 100 (Wasserman and Frost 1994). Therefore, the 
measure of betweenness centrality for a project ranges from 0 to 100. 
 
Calculation of Closeness Centrality: 
 
We measured the closeness centrality with Freeman’s (1979) closeness centrality. 
Closeness centrality is the measure of how close an actor is to all other actors in the 
network by considering direct and indirect connections to all other actors (Freeman 1979, 
Wasserman and Frost 1994). It basically measures the inverse of the sum of geodesic 
distances between actors in the network, thereby an actor with high closeness centrality 
has minimum geodesic distances to other actors. Closeness centrality signifies a 
developer’s ability to reach resources in the network (Gulati and Gargiulo1999). 
Information would have to travel over shorter distances to reach a developer who is more 
central in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). A developer who is close to many 
developers can quickly interact and communicate with them without passing through 
many intermediaries (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Following Wasserman and Frost 
(1994), the closeness centrality of an actor i is defined as: 
1
∑ ,
 
where d(ni, nj) is the shortest path distance between actors j and k. N is the total 
number of actors in the network. The closeness centrality is normalized by multiplying by 
273 
 
the maximum possible path distance in the network (N-1) which is that one actor is 
connected to another one actor passing through all other actors in the network, i.e., there 
are (N-1) path distances between those two actors. This calculation results in that the 
closeness centrality lies in the range from 0 to 1. However, UCINET reports the 
normalized closeness centrality as a percentage for each node by multiplying with 100 
(Wasserman and Frost 1994). Therefore, the measure of closeness centrality for a project 
ranges from 0 to 100. 
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APPENDIX C: CORRELATION BETWEEN PAIRED VARIABLES 
 
 
TABLE C1: Correlations between Paired Variables (N=690) 
Variable Type Paired Variable Names Correlation Sig. 
Internal 
Connectivity 
Clustering Coefficient (Patch)  
Clustering Coefficient (FR) 
0.804 .000 *** 
Repeat Ties (Patch)  
Repeat Ties (FR) 
0.837 .000 *** 
Third Party Ties (Patch)  
Third Party Ties (FR) 
0.872 .000 *** 
Jaccard Similarity (Patch)  
Jaccard Similarity (FR) 
0.835 .000 *** 
Correlation Similarity (Patch)  
Correlation Similarity (FR) 
0.816 .000 *** 
External 
Connectivity 
External Cohesion (Patch)  
External Cohesion (FR) 
0.836 .000 *** 
Direct Ties (Patch)  
Direct Ties (FR) 
0.849 .000 *** 
Indirect Ties (Patch)  
Indirect Ties (FR) 
0.554 .000 *** 
Indirect Ties FD (Patch)  
Indirect Ties FD (FR) 
0.405 .000 *** 
Technological Diversity (Patch)  
Technological Diversity (FR) 
0.638 .000 *** 
Network 
Location 
Degree Centrality (Patch)  
Degree Centrality (FR) 
0.835 .000 *** 
Betweenness Centrality (Patch)  
Betweenness Centrality (FR) 
0.584 .000 *** 
Closeness Centrality (Patch)  
Closeness Centrality (FR) 
0.234 .000 *** 
*Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level 
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